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Executive Summary
Since the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4), there has been a marked increase in national 
policies and legislation on climate change, however, these policies, 
taken together, have not yet achieved a substantial deviation in emis-
sions from the past trend. Many baseline scenarios (those without 
additional policies to reduce emissions) show GHG concentrations that 
exceed 1000 ppm CO2eq by 2100, which is far from a concentration 
with a likely probability of maintaining temperature increases below 
2 °C this century. Mitigation scenarios suggest that a wide range of 
environmentally effective policies could be enacted that would be 
consistent with such goals. This chapter assesses national and sub-
national policies and institutions to mitigate climate change in this 
context. It assesses the strengths and weaknesses of various mitiga-
tion policy instruments and policy packages and how they may interact 
either positively or negatively. Sector-specific policies are assessed in 
greater detail in the individual sector chapters (7 – 12). Major findings 
are summarized as follows. [Section 15.1]
The design of institutions affects the choice and feasibility of 
policy options as well as the sustainable financing of climate 
change mitigation measures (limited evidence, medium agreement). 
By shaping appropriate incentives, creating space for new stakeholders 
in decision making, and by transforming the understanding of policy 
choices, institutions designed to encourage participation by represen-
tatives of new industries and technologies can facilitate transitions to 
low-emission pathways, while institutions inherited unchanged from 
the past can perpetuate lock-in to high-carbon development paths. 
[15.2, 15.6]
There has been a considerable increase in national and sub-
national mitigation plans and strategies since AR4 (medium evi-
dence, high agreement). These plans and strategies are in their early 
stages of development and implementation in many countries, mak-
ing it difficult to assess whether and how they will result in appropri-
ate institutional and policy change, and thus, their impact on future 
emissions. However, to date these policies, taken together, have not 
yet achieved a substantial deviation in emissions from the past trend. 
Theories of institutional change suggest they might play a role in shap-
ing incentives, political contexts, and policy paradigms in a way that 
encourages emissions reductions in the future. [15.1, 15.2]  
Sector-specific policies have been more widely used than 
economy-wide, market-based policies (medium evidence, high 
agreement). Although economic theory suggests that economy-wide 
market-based policies for the singular objective of mitigation would 
generally be more cost-effective than sector-specific policies, political 
economy considerations often make economy-wide policies harder 
to design and implement than sector-specific policies. Sector-specific 
policies may also be needed to overcome sectoral market failures that 
price policies do not address. For example, building codes can require 
publicly funded energy efficient investments where private investments 
would otherwise not exist. Sector approaches also allow for packages 
of complementary policies, as, for example, in transport, where pricing 
policies that raise the cost of carbon-intensive forms of private trans-
port are more effective when backed by public investment in viable 
alternatives. [15.1, 15.2, 15.5, 15.8, 15.9]
Direct regulatory approaches and information measures are 
widely used, and are often environmentally effective, though 
debate remains on the extent of their environmental impacts 
and cost effectiveness (medium evidence, medium agreement). 
Examples of regulatory approaches include energy efficiency standards; 
examples of information programmes include labelling programmes 
that can help consumers make better-informed decisions. While such 
approaches often work at a net social benefit, the scientific literature 
is divided on whether such policies are implemented with negative pri-
vate costs to firms and individuals. Since AR4 there has been continued 
investigation into ‘rebound’ effects that arise when higher efficiency 
leads to lower energy prices and greater consumption. There is general 
agreement that such rebound effects exist, but there is low agreement 
in the literature on the magnitude. [3.9.5, 8.3, 9.7.2.4, 15.5.4, 15.5.5]
Fuel taxes are an example of a sector-specific policy and 
are often originally put in place for objectives such as rev-
enue — they are not necessarily designed for the purpose of 
climate change mitigation (high confidence). In Europe, where fuel 
taxes are highest, they have contributed to reductions in carbon emis-
sions from the transport sector of roughly 50 % for this group of coun-
tries. The short-run response to higher fuel prices is often small, but 
long-run price elasticities are quite high, or roughly – 0.6 to – 0.8. This 
means that in the long run, 10 % higher fuel prices correlate with 7 % 
reduction in fuel use and emissions. In the transport sector, taxes have 
the advantage of being progressive or neutral in most countries and 
strongly progressive in low-income countries. [15.5.2]
Reduction of subsidies to fossil energy can result in significant 
emission reductions at negative social cost (high confidence). 
[15.5.2] Although political economy barriers are substantial, many 
countries have reformed their tax and budget systems to reduce fuel 
subsidies that actually accrue to the relatively wealthy, and utilized 
lump-sum cash transfers or other mechanisms that are more targeted 
to the poor. [15.5.3]
Cap and trade systems for greenhouse gases are being estab-
lished in a growing number of countries and regions (limited evi-
dence, medium agreement). Their environmental effect has so far been 
limited because caps have either been loose or have not yet been bind-
ing. There appears to have been a tradeoff between the political feasi-
bility and environmental effectiveness of these programmes, as well as 
between political feasibility and distributional equity in the allocation 
of permits. Greater environmental effectiveness through a tighter cap 
may be combined with a price ceiling that makes for political feasibil-
ity. [15.5.3]
1148
National and Sub-national Policies and Institutions 
15
Chapter 15
Carbon taxes have been implemented in some countries 
and — alongside technology and other policies — have contrib-
uted to decoupling of emissions from gross domestic product 
(GDP) (high confidence). Differentiation by sector, which is quite com-
mon, reduces cost-effectiveness that arises from the changes in pro-
duction methods, consumption patterns, lifestyle shifts, and technology 
development, but it may increase political feasibility, or be preferred 
for reasons of competitiveness or distributional equity. In some coun-
tries, high carbon and fuel taxes have been made politically feasible 
by refunding revenues or by lowering other taxes in an environmental 
fiscal reform. [15.2, 15.5.2, 15.5.3]
Adding a mitigation policy to another may not necessarily 
enhance mitigation (high confidence). For instance, if a cap and 
trade system has a sufficiently stringent cap, then other policies such 
as renewable subsidies have no further impact on total emissions 
(although they may affect costs and possibly the viability of more 
stringent future targets). If the cap is loose relative to other policies, 
it becomes ineffective. This is an example of a negative interaction 
between policy instruments. Since other policies cannot be ‘added on’ 
to a cap-and-trade system, if it is to meet any particular target, a suf-
ficiently low cap is necessary. A carbon tax, on the other hand, can 
have an additive environmental effect to policies such as subsidies to 
renewables. [15.7]
There is a distinct role for technology policy as a complement to 
other mitigation policies (high confidence). Properly implemented 
technology policies reduce the cost of achieving a given environmental 
target. Technology policy will be most effective when technology-push 
policies (e. g., publicly funded research and development (R&D)) and 
demand-pull policies (e. g., governmental procurement programmes or 
performance regulations) are used in a complementary fashion (robust 
evidence, high agreement). [15.6] While technology-push and demand-
pull policies are necessary, they are unlikely to be sufficient without 
complementary framework conditions. Managing social challenges of 
technology policy change may require innovations in policy and insti-
tutional design, including building integrated policies that make com-
plementary use of market incentives, authority and norms (medium 
evidence, medium agreement). [15.6.5]. 
Since AR4, a large number of countries and sub-national jurisdictions 
have introduced support policies for renewable energy such as feed-
in tariffs (FIT) and renewable portfolio standards (RPS). These have 
promoted substantial diffusion and innovation of new energy tech-
nologies such as wind turbines and photovoltaic (PV) panels, but have 
raised questions about their economic efficiency, and introduced chal-
lenges for grid and market integration (7.12, 15.6).
Worldwide investment in research in support of climate change 
mitigation is small relative to overall public research spending 
(medium evidence, medium agreement). The effectiveness of research 
support will be greatest if it is increased slowly and steadily rather 
than dramatically or erratically. It is important that data collection for 
programme evaluation be built into technology policy programmes, 
because there is very little empirical evidence on the relative effective-
ness of different mechanisms for supporting the creation and diffusion 
of new technologies. [15.6.2, 15.6.5]
Public finance mechanisms reduce risks that deter climate 
investments (high confidence). The future value of carbon permits 
created by an economic instrument such as cap and trade may, for 
example, not be accepted as sufficiently secure by banks. Government 
public finance mechanisms to reduce risks include debt and equity 
mechanisms, carbon finance, and innovative grants. [15.12]
Government planning and provision can facilitate shifts to less 
energy and GHG-intensive infrastructure and lifestyles (high con-
fidence). This applies particularly when there are indivisibilities in the 
provision of infrastructure as in the energy sector (e. g., for electric-
ity transmission and distribution or district heating networks); in the 
transport sector (e. g., for non-motorized or public transport), and in 
urban planning. The provision of adequate infrastructure is important 
for behavioural change (medium evidence, high agreement) [15.5.6].
Successful voluntary agreements on mitigation between gov-
ernments and industries are characterized by a strong institu-
tional framework with capable industrial associations (medium 
evidence, medium agreement). The strengths of voluntary agreements 
are speed and flexibility in phasing measures, and facilitation of barrier 
removal activities for energy efficiency and low emission technologies. 
Regulatory threats, even though the threats are not always explicit, are 
also an important factor for firms to be motivated. There are few envi-
ronmental impacts without a proper institutional framework (medium 
evidence, medium agreement). [15.5.5]
Synergies and tradeoffs between mitigation and adaptation 
policies may exist in the land-use sector (medium evidence, 
medium agreement). For other sectors such as industry and power, the 
connections are not obvious. [15.11] 
The ability to undertake policy action requires information, 
knowledge, tools, and skills, and therefore capacity building 
is central both for mitigation and to the sustainable develop-
ment agenda (medium evidence, high agreement). The needs for 
capacity building include capacity to analyze the implications of cli-
mate change; capacity to formulate, implement, and evaluate policies; 
capacity to take advantage of external funding and flexible mecha-
nisms; and capacity to make informed choices of the various capacity 
building modalities. [15.10] 
Mainstreaming climate change into development planning has 
helped yield financing for various climate policy initiatives 
(medium evidence, medium agreement). Among developing and some 
least developed countries, an emerging trend is the establishment of 
national funding entities dedicated to climate change. While diverse in 
design and objectives, they tap and blend international and national 
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sources of finance, thereby helping to improve policy coherence and 
address aid fragmentation. Financing adaptation and mitigation in 
developing countries is crucial from the viewpoint of welfare and 
equity (medium evidence, high agreement). [15.12]
Gaps in knowledge: The fact that various jurisdictions produce vari-
ous policy instruments influenced by co-benefits and political economy 
and that they interact in complex manners makes it difficult to evalu-
ate the economic and environmental effectiveness of individual policy 
instrument as well as policy package of a nation. Most importantly, it 
is not known with certainty how much an emission reduction target 
may cost to the economy in the real world in comparison to the ‘first 
best’ optimal solution estimated by economic models in other chapters 
in this report. Costs may be under-stated or over-stated.
15.1 Introduction
This chapter assesses national and sub-national mitigation policies 
and their institutional settings. There has been a marked increase 
in national policies and legislation on climate change since the AR4 
with a diversity of approaches and a multiplicity of objectives (see 
Section 15.2). However, Figure 1.9 of Chapter 1 suggests that these 
policies, taken together, have not yet achieved a substantial devia-
tion in emissions from the past trend. Limiting concentrations to lev-
els that would be consistent with a likely probability of maintaining 
temperature increases below 2 °C this century (scenarios generally 
in the range of 430 – 480 ppmv CO2eq) would require that emissions 
break from these trends and be decreased substantially. In contrast, 
concentrations exceed 1000 ppmv CO2eq by 2100 in many baseline 
scenarios (that is, scenarios without additional efforts to reduce emis-
sions). 
The literature on mitigation scenarios provides a wide range of CO2 
shadow price levels consistent with these goals, with estimates of 
less than USD 50 / tCO2 in 2020 in many studies and exceeding USD 
100 / tCO2 in others, assuming a globally-efficient and immediate effort 
to reduce emissions. These shadow prices exhibit a strongly increasing 
trend thereafter. Policies and instruments are assessed in this light.
Section 15.2 assesses the role of institutions and governance. Section 
15.3 lays out the classification of policy instruments and packages, 
while 15.4 discusses the methodologies used to evaluate policies and 
institutions. The performance of various policy instruments and mea-
sures are individually assessed in Sections 15.5 and 15.6.  
The two main types of economic instruments are price instruments, 
that is, taxes and subsidies (including removal of subsidies on fossil 
fuels), and quantity instruments — emission-trading systems. These are 
assessed in Sections 15.5.2 and 15.5.3 respectively. An important fea-
ture of both these instruments is that they can be applied at a very 
broad, economy-wide scale. This is in contrast to the regulation and 
information policies and voluntary agreements which are usually sec-
tor-specific. These policies are assessed in Sections 15.5.4, 15.5.5, and 
15.5.7. Government provision and planning is discussed in 15.5.6. The 
next section, 15.6, provides a focused discussion on technology policy 
including research and development and the deployment and diffusion 
of clean energy technologies. In addition to technology policy, longer-
term effects of the policies assessed in Section 15.5 are addressed in 
Section 15.6.
Both these sections, 15.5 and 15.6, bring together lessons from poli-
cies and policy packages used at the sectoral level from Chapters 7 
(Energy), 8 (Transport), 9 (Buildings), 10 (Industry), 11 (Agriculture, For-
estry and Land Use) and Chapter 12 (Human Settlements, Infrastruc-
ture, and Spatial Planning). 
The following sections further assess the interaction among policy 
instruments, as they are not usually used in isolation, and the impacts 
of particular instruments depend on the entire package of policies and 
the institutional context. Section 15.7 reviews interactions, both ben-
eficial and harmful, that may not have been planned. The presence of 
such interactions is in part a consequence of the multi-jurisdictional 
nature of climate governance as well as the use of multiple policy 
instruments within a jurisdiction. Section 15.8 examines the deliberate 
linkage of policies across national and sub-national jurisdictions. 
Other key issues are further discussed in dedicated sections. They are: 
the role of stakeholders including non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) (15.9), capacity building (15.10), links between adaptation and 
mitigation policies (15.11), and investment and finance (15.12). Gaps 
in knowledge are collected in 15.13.  
15.2 Institutions and 
governance
15�2�1 Why institutions and governance matter
Institutions and processes of governance (see Annex 1: Glossary for 
definitions) shape and constrain policy-making and policy implementa-
tion in multiple ways relevant for a shift to a low carbon economy. First, 
institutions — understood as formal rules and informal norms — set the 
incentive structure for economic decision making (North, 1991), influ-
encing, for example, decisions about transportation investments, and 
behavioural decisions relevant to efficient energy use. Second, insti-
tutions shape the political context for decision making, empowering 
some interests and reducing the influence of others (Steinmo et  al., 
1992; Hall, 1993). Harrison (2012) illustrates this with respect to envi-
ronmental tax reform in Canada. Third, institutions can also shape pat-
terns of thinking and understanding of policy choices — through both 
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normative and cognitive effects (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). These 
effects can result in dominant policy paradigms — ideas, policy goals, 
and instruments — that favour some actions and exclude others from 
consideration (Radaelli and Schmidt, 2004). For example, existing 
energy systems are likely to remain in place without appropriate insti-
tutional change (Hughes, 1987) and changes in discourse, which would 
perpetuate existing technologies and policies and lock out new ones 
(Unruh, 2000; Walker, 2000). More generally, a mismatch between 
social-ecological context and institutional arrangements can lead to 
a lack of fit and exert a drag on policy and technological response 
(Young, 2002). 
15�2�2 Increase in government 
institutionalization of climate mitigation 
actions
There has been a definite increase since AR4 in formal governmental 
efforts to promote climate change mitigation. These efforts are diverse 
in their approach, scale, and emphasis, and take the form of legisla-
tion, strategies, policies, and coordination mechanisms. Many of these 
are relatively recent, and often in the design or early implementa-
tion stage. As a result, it is premature to evaluate their effectiveness 
and there is insufficient literature as yet that attempts to do so. Since 
global greenhouse gas emissions have continued to increase in recent 
years (Chapter 5 and Section 15.1), it will be important to closely 
monitor this trend to evaluate if policies and institutions created are 
sufficiently strong and effective to lead to the reductions required to 
stabilize global temperature, for instance, at the 2 °C target. This sec-
tion reviews national centralized governmental actions, while 15.2.3 
discusses sectoral actions and 15.2.5 examines the roles of other 
stakeholders including non-state actors.
A review of climate legislation and strategy in almost all United Nation 
(UN) Member States shows that there has been a substantial increase 
in these categories between 2007 and 2012 (Dubash et al., 2013) (See 
Figure 15.1). Dubash et al. (2013) define climate legislation as mitiga-
tion-focused legislation that goes beyond sectoral action alone, while 
climate strategy is defined as a non-legislative plan or framework 
aimed at mitigation that encompasses more than a small number of 
sectors, and that includes a coordinating body charged with implemen-
tation. International pledges are not included. By these definitions, 
39 % of countries, accounting for 73 % of population and 67 % of 
greenhouse gas emissions, were covered by climate law or strategies 
in 2012, an increase from 23 % of countries, 36 % of population, and 
45 % of emissions in 2007. There are also strong regional differences, 
Figure 15�1 | National climate legislation and strategies in 2007 and 2012.* Reproduced from Dubash et al., (2013). In this figure, climate legislation is defined as mitigation-
focused legislation that goes beyond sectoral action alone. Climate strategy is defined as a non-legislative plan or framework aimed at mitigation that encompasses more than a 
small number of sectors, and that includes a coordinating body charged with implementation. International pledges are not included, nor are sub-national plans and strategies. The 
panel shows proportion of GHG emissions covered.
* Number of countries and GHG emissions covered (NAI: Non Annex I countries (developing countries), AI: Annex I countries (developed countries), LAM: Latin America, MAF: 
Middle East and Africa, ASIA: Asia, EIT: Economies in Transition, OECD-1990: OECD of 1990)
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with Asia and Latin America recording the fastest rate of increase. 
Taken as a block, in 2012, 49 % of current emissions from the develop-
ing world regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America were under climate 
law and 77 % of emissions were under either law or strategy, while for 
the developed world regions of Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development 1990 Countries OECD-1990 and Economies in 
Transition (EIT) the equivalent numbers are 38 % and 56 %. Finally, 
while the number of countries with climate legislation increased mar-
ginally from 18 % to 22 % over this period, the number of countries 
with climate strategies increased from 5 % to 18 %, suggesting many 
more countries are adopting a strategy-led approach. (For regional 
aggregations see Annex II.2)
Climate legislation and strategies follow a wide diversity of approaches 
to operationalization and implementation. The imposition of carbon 
prices is one approach widely discussed in the literature (See Section 
15.5) but less frequently implemented in practice. Examples include 
the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) (See Section 
14.4.2) or setting of carbon taxes (see Section 15.5.2). One study of 
the 19 highest emitting countries finds that six have put in place some 
form of carbon price, while 14 have put in place both regulation and 
other economic incentives for greenhouse gas mitigation (Lachapelle 
and Paterson, 2013). Common explanations for this variation are in 
terms of the novelty of emissions trading (although emissions trad-
ing has been in practice implemented much more widely than carbon 
taxation), the legitimacy problems faced by emissions trading (Pater-
son, 2010), or political contestation over increased taxation (see for 
example Laurent (2010), on the French case, Jotzo (2012) for Austra-
lia or Jagers and Hammar (2009), for evidence that popular support 
for carbon taxes in Sweden depend on how it is framed in popular 
debate), and lobbying by fossil-fuel or energy-intense industry lobbies 
(Bailey et al., 2012; Sarasini, 2013).
More generally speaking, policy instruments have often been sec-
tor-specific. Economy-wide instruments, even when implemented, 
have had exemptions for some sectors, most commonly those most 
exposed to international trade. The exemptions have arisen because 
national policies have been developed under the strong influence of 
sectoral policy networks (Compston, 2009) and many stakeholders 
therein — including firms and NGOs — influence the policy to promote 
their interests (Helm, 2010). This phenomenon undermines the overall 
cost-effectiveness of climate policy (Anthoff and Hahn, 2010) although 
it may help further other objectives such as equity and energy security 
(see Section 15.7).
Another approach follows a model of national-level target backed by 
explicit creation of institutions to manage performance to that target. 
In China, for example, a ‘National Leading Group on Climate Change’ 
in June 2007, housed in the apex National Development and Reform 
Commission and chaired by the premier (Tsang and Kolk, 2010a) coor-
dinates the achievement of targets set in the subsequent National Cli-
mate Change Programme. The Chinese examples illustrate a broader 
point emerging from a cross-country study that implementation of cli-
mate legislation and plans are, in at least some cases, drawing power-
ful finance and planning departments into engagement with climate 
change (Held et al., 2013).
Another approach is to establish dedicated new climate change bodies 
that are substantially independent of the executive and that seek to 
coordinate existing government agencies through a variety of levers. 
The leading example of this approach is in the UK, where a dedicated 
Climate Change Committee analyzes departmental plans and monitors 
compliance with five-year carbon budgets (U. K., 2008; Stallworthy, 
2009). Instead of direct executive action, as in the Chinese case, this 
approach relies on analysis, public reporting, and advice to govern-
ment. Following the UK example, Australia has established an inde-
pendent Climate Change Authority to advise the government on emis-
sion targets and review effectiveness of its Carbon Pricing Mechanism 
(Keenan et al., 2012).
15�2�3 Climate change mitigation through 
sectoral action
While there is no systematic study of implementation of climate plans, 
case study evidence suggests that these plans are frequently opera-
tionalized through sectoral actions. There are a variety of ways through 
which national plans interface with sectoral approaches to mainstream 
climate change. In some cases, there is a formal allocation of emis-
sions across sectors. For example, in Germany, mitigation efforts were 
broken down by sectors for the period between 2008 and 2012, with 
the national ‘Allocation Act 2012’ specifying emissions budgets for 
sectors participating in the EU ETS as well as the remaining sectors 
(Dienes, 2007; Frenz, 2007). More typically, climate mainstreaming 
occurs through a sector by sector process led by relevant government 
departments, as in France (Mathy, 2007), India (Dubash, 2011; Atter-
idge et al., 2012), and Brazil (da Motta, 2011a; La Rovere et al., 2011).
In some cases, the sectoral process involves a role for stakehold-
ers in engagement with government departments. In France, sectoral 
approaches are devised at the central level through negotiation and 
consultation between multiple ministries, experts, business, and NGOs. 
According to at least one analysis, this approach risks a dilution of 
measures through the influence of lobbies that may lose from miti-
gation actions (Mathy, 2007). In Brazil, sector specific approaches are 
developed by sectoral ministries complemented by a multi-stakeholder 
forum to solicit views and forge consensus (Hochstetler and Viola, 
2012; Viola and Franchini, 2012; Held et al., 2013a).
In some cases, climate change considerations bring about changes in 
long-standing patterns of sector governance. In South Africa, for exam-
ple, the Copenhagen pledge led to a process of reconsidering South 
Africa’s integrated resource plan for electricity to include carbon reduc-
tion as one among multiple criteria (Republic of South Africa, 2011). In 
India, the establishment of national sectoral ‘missions’ had the effect 
of creating new institutional mechanisms in the case of the National 
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Solar Mission, or of raising the profile and importance of particular 
ministries or departments as in the example of the Bureau of Energy 
Efficiency (Dubash, 2011). In other cases, climate mainstreaming was 
facilitated by prior political shifts in governance of a sector. Brazil’s 
climate approach particularly emphasizes the forest sector (da Motta, 
2011b; La Rovere, 2011). Progress on the Brazilian plan was enabled 
by prior domestic political consensus around a far-reaching Forest 
Code (Hochstetler and Viola, 2012).
15�2�4 Co-Benefits as a driver of mitigation 
action
The importance of co-benefits — both development gains from climate 
policy and climate gains from development policy — emerge as a par-
ticularly strong rationale and basis for sectoral action. As Table 6.7 
shows, an inventory of sectoral action on climate change (drawn from 
Chapter 7 – 12) is linked to a wide range of co-benefits and adverse 
side-effects, encompassing economic, social, and environmental 
effects. Table 15.1 provides a roadmap for the co-benefits and adverse 
side-effects from sectoral mitigation measures most prominently dis-
cussed across Chapters 7 to 12. They are listed in three columns: eco-
nomic, social, and environmental. Each column shows the range of 
effects on objectives or concerns beyond mitigation discussed in Chap-
ters 7.12 for that category. For example, energy security is categorized 
in the column of ‘economic’ and addressed in Section 7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 
10.8, 11.13.6, and 12.8.
This perception is reinforced by comparative case studies and specific 
country studies. A comparative study finds that co-benefits is an impor-
tant driving force for mitigation policies across large, rapidly industrial-
izing countries (Bailey and Compston, 2012a), a finding that is sup-
ported by country level studies. India’s National Action Plan on Climate 
Change (NAPCC), for example, is explicitly oriented to pursuit of co-
benefits, with mitigation understood to be the secondary benefit emerg-
ing from development policies. The linkage between energy security and 
mitigation is particularly important to winning broader political support 
for action on mitigation (Dubash, 2011; Fisher, 2012). A similar trend is 
apparent in China (Oberheitmann, 2008), where provincial implementa-
tion of targets is enabled by linking action to local motivations, notably 
for energy efficiency (Teng and Gu, 2007; Richerzhagen and Scholz, 
2008a; Qi et al., 2008; Tsang and Kolk, 2010b; Kostka and Hobbs, 2012).
Tsang and Kolk (2010a) go so far as to say that Chinese leaders essen-
tially equate climate policy with energy conservation. Kostka and Hobbs 
(2012) identify three ways in which this alignment of global and local 
objectives happens: interest bundling, through which objectives of 
political institutions are tied to local economic interests; policy bun-
dling, to link climate change with issues of local political concern; and 
framing in ways that play to local constituencies. 
The concept of ‘nationally appropriate mitigation actions’ (NAMAs) 
has a conceptual connection to the idea of co-benefits. Nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions are intended to be mitigation actions 
that are ‘nationally appropriate’ in the sense that they contribute to 
development outcomes. Therefore, NAMAs provide a possible mech-
anism for connection of national policies and projects to the global 
climate regime, although the mechanisms through which this will be 
accomplished are yet to be fully articulated (see Box 15.1). Another, 
related mechanism is the explicit formulation in many countries of ‘low 
emissions development strategies’ that seek to integrate climate and 
development strategies (Clapp et al., 2010).
15�2�5 Sub-national climate action and 
interaction across levels of governance
In many countries, the formulation and implementation of national 
mitigation approaches are further delegated to sub-national levels, 
with differing levels of central coordination, depending on national 
contexts and institutions. Comparative analysis of cross-country cli-
mate action is insufficiently developed to allow generalization and 
explanation of different approaches to climate policy.
Table 15�1 | Roadmap for the assessment of potential co-benefits and adverse side-effects from mitigation measures for additional objectives in the sector chapters (7 – 12). For 
overview purposes, only those objectives and concerns are shown that are assessed in at least two sectors. For a broader synthesis of the literature assessed in this report, see Sec-
tion 6.6.
Effect of mitigation measures on additional objectives or concerns
Economic Social Environmental
Energy security (7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 11.13.6, 12.8)
Employment impact (7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 11.7, 11.13.6)
New business opportunity / economic activity (7.9, 11.7, 
11.13.6)
Productivity / competitiveness (8.7, 9.7, 10.9, 11.13.6)
Technological spillover / innovation (7.9, 8.7, 10.8, 11.3, 
11.13.6)
Health impact (e. g., via air quality and noise) (5.7, 7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 
10.8, 11.7, 11.13.6, 12.8)
Energy / mobility access (7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 11.13.6, 12.4)
(Fuel) Poverty alleviation (7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 11.7, 11.13.6)
Food security (7.9, 11.7, 11.13.6 / 7)
Impact on local conflicts (7.9, 10.8, 11.7, 11.13.6)
Safety / disaster resilience (7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 12.8)
Gender impact (7.9, 9.7, 11.7, 11.13.6)
Ecosystem impact (e. g., via air pollution) (7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 
11.7, 11.13.6 / 7, 12.8)
Land-use competition (7.9, 8.7, 10.8, 11.7, 11.13.6 / 7)
Water use / quality (7.9, 9.7, 10.8, 11.7, 11.13.6)
Biodiversity conservation (7.9, 9.7, 11.7, 11.13.6)
Urban heat island effect (9.7, 12.8)
Resource / material use impact (7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 12.8)
Box 15�1 | Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)
The Bali Action Plan (BAP), (1 / CP.13; UNFCCC, 2007) states that 
developing countries are called on to take NAMAs supported and 
enabled by technology and finance. For example, NAMAs could be 
articulated in terms of national emissions intensity or trajectories, 
sectoral emissions, or specific actions at sectoral or sub-sectoral 
levels. As of June 2013, 57 parties had submitted NAMAs to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) secretariat. 
The design of mechanisms to link NAMAs to global support lead 
to some complex tradeoffs. For example, large scale sectoral 
NAMAs provide the least scope for leakage (decreased emissions 
in one sector is undermined by increased emissions in another 
part of the economy) and the lowest measurement costs (Jung 
et al., 2010). However, designing NAMAs around transaction 
costs might run counter to designing them for targeted focus 
on national development priorities. Exploring the extent of this 
tradeoff and managing it carefully will be an important part of 
implementing NAMAs.
Much of the writing on NAMAs is focused on the challenges of 
linking national actions to the international climate framework. 
Conceptual challenges involved in linking NAMAs to the UNFCCC 
process include the legal nature of NAMAs (van Asselt et al., 
2010), financing of NAMAs, and associated concerns of avoid-
ing double counting (Cheng, 2010; Jung et al., 2010; van Asselt 
et al., 2010; Sovacool, 2011a) and measurement, reporting, and 
verification of NAMAs (Jung et al., 2010; Sterk, 2010; van Asselt 
et al., 2010).
While NAMAs pertain particularly to the developing world, co-
benefits based arguments are also used in developed countries. In 
the United States, Gore and Robinson (2009) argue that expansion 
of municipal scale action is articulated in the form of co-benefits, 
and is driven by network-based communication and citizen 
initiative. In Germany, several benefits in addition to climate 
change have been attributed to the policy for energy transition or 
‘Energiewende,’ including security of energy supply and industrial 
policy (Lehmann and Gawel, 2013).
1153
National and Sub-national Policies and Institutions 
15
Chapter 15
In some federal systems, national target setting by the central govern-
ment is followed by further allocation of targets to provinces, often 
through nationally specific formulae or processes. For example, in 
the case of Belgium, Kyoto targets were re-allocated to the regional 
level through a process of negotiation, followed by the preparation of 
regional climate plans to implement regional targets (Happaerts et al., 
2011). Ultimately, since agreement could not be reached on regional 
targets to meet the national Kyoto targets, the approach relied on off-
sets were explicitly internalized as part of the national approach to 
meeting Kyoto targets. In China, national action is defined and moni-
tored by the central government in consultation with provinces, and 
implementation is delegated to provinces. Targets set in the subse-
quent National Climate Change Programme as part of the 11th Five 
Year Plan were implemented through a mechanism of provincial com-
muniqués to track compliance with the target, and provincial leading 
groups to implement the target (Teng and Gu, 2007; Qi et al., 2008; 
Tsang and Kolk, 2010b; Held et al., 2011a; Kostka and Hobbs, 2012). A 
range of policy mechanisms were used to implement this target, such 
as differential energy prices based on energy efficiency performance, 
promotion of energy audits, and financial incentives for performance 
(Held et al., 2011b). Subsequent revised targets have been set for the 
12th Five Year Plan. 
Other countries represent intermediate cases between central control 
and decentralization. India has developed a mix of national policies 
through its National Action Plan on Climate Change, responsibility 
for which rests with central government ministries, and State Action 
Plans on Climate Change to be developed and implemented by states 
(Dubash et al., 2013). While they are predominantly focused on imple-
menting national level directives, there is also sufficient flexibility to 
pursue state-level concerns, and some states have created new mecha-
nisms, such as the establishment of a Climate Change department in 
the state of Gujarat, and the establishment of a green fund in Kerala 
(Atteridge et al., 2012). In France, the EU objectives were adopted as 
national goals, and through national legislation, all urban agglomera-
tions over 50,000 are required to prepare ‘Climate and Energy Territo-
rial Plans’ to meet these goals and, additionally, to address adaptation 
needs (Assemblée Nationale, 2010). Since all other planning processes 
related to issues such as transport, building, urban planning, and energy 
have to conform to and support these objectives, this approach pro-
vides a powerful mechanism to mainstream climate change into local 
public planning. These plans also form a framework around which pri-
vate voluntary action can be organized. In Germany, while the federal 
government initiates and leads climate action, the states or ‘Länder’ 
have a veto power against central initiatives through representation in 
the upper house of parliament (Weidner and Mez, 2008). In addition, 
however, the Länder may also take additional action in areas such as 
energy efficiency measures, renewable energy development on state 
property and even through state-wide targets (Biedermann, 2011).
In some cases, sub-national jurisdictions seem to be attempting to 
compensate for the lack of political momentum at the national level 
(Schreurs, 2008; Dubash, 2011). In the United States, for example, 
although progress at the federal level has been slow and halting, there 
have been multiple efforts at sub-national scales, through unilateral 
and coordinated action by states, judicial intervention, and municipal-
mitigation is particularly important to winning broader political support 
for action on mitigation (Dubash, 2011; Fisher, 2012). A similar trend is 
apparent in China (Oberheitmann, 2008), where provincial implementa-
tion of targets is enabled by linking action to local motivations, notably 
for energy efficiency (Teng and Gu, 2007; Richerzhagen and Scholz, 
2008a; Qi et al., 2008; Tsang and Kolk, 2010b; Kostka and Hobbs, 2012).
Tsang and Kolk (2010a) go so far as to say that Chinese leaders essen-
tially equate climate policy with energy conservation. Kostka and Hobbs 
(2012) identify three ways in which this alignment of global and local 
objectives happens: interest bundling, through which objectives of 
political institutions are tied to local economic interests; policy bun-
dling, to link climate change with issues of local political concern; and 
framing in ways that play to local constituencies. 
The concept of ‘nationally appropriate mitigation actions’ (NAMAs) 
has a conceptual connection to the idea of co-benefits. Nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions are intended to be mitigation actions 
that are ‘nationally appropriate’ in the sense that they contribute to 
development outcomes. Therefore, NAMAs provide a possible mech-
anism for connection of national policies and projects to the global 
climate regime, although the mechanisms through which this will be 
accomplished are yet to be fully articulated (see Box 15.1). Another, 
related mechanism is the explicit formulation in many countries of ‘low 
emissions development strategies’ that seek to integrate climate and 
development strategies (Clapp et al., 2010).
15�2�5 Sub-national climate action and 
interaction across levels of governance
In many countries, the formulation and implementation of national 
mitigation approaches are further delegated to sub-national levels, 
with differing levels of central coordination, depending on national 
contexts and institutions. Comparative analysis of cross-country cli-
mate action is insufficiently developed to allow generalization and 
explanation of different approaches to climate policy.
Box 15�1 | Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)
The Bali Action Plan (BAP), (1 / CP.13; UNFCCC, 2007) states that 
developing countries are called on to take NAMAs supported and 
enabled by technology and finance. For example, NAMAs could be 
articulated in terms of national emissions intensity or trajectories, 
sectoral emissions, or specific actions at sectoral or sub-sectoral 
levels. As of June 2013, 57 parties had submitted NAMAs to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) secretariat. 
The design of mechanisms to link NAMAs to global support lead 
to some complex tradeoffs. For example, large scale sectoral 
NAMAs provide the least scope for leakage (decreased emissions 
in one sector is undermined by increased emissions in another 
part of the economy) and the lowest measurement costs (Jung 
et al., 2010). However, designing NAMAs around transaction 
costs might run counter to designing them for targeted focus 
on national development priorities. Exploring the extent of this 
tradeoff and managing it carefully will be an important part of 
implementing NAMAs.
Much of the writing on NAMAs is focused on the challenges of 
linking national actions to the international climate framework. 
Conceptual challenges involved in linking NAMAs to the UNFCCC 
process include the legal nature of NAMAs (van Asselt et al., 
2010), financing of NAMAs, and associated concerns of avoid-
ing double counting (Cheng, 2010; Jung et al., 2010; van Asselt 
et al., 2010; Sovacool, 2011a) and measurement, reporting, and 
verification of NAMAs (Jung et al., 2010; Sterk, 2010; van Asselt 
et al., 2010).
While NAMAs pertain particularly to the developing world, co-
benefits based arguments are also used in developed countries. In 
the United States, Gore and Robinson (2009) argue that expansion 
of municipal scale action is articulated in the form of co-benefits, 
and is driven by network-based communication and citizen 
initiative. In Germany, several benefits in addition to climate 
change have been attributed to the policy for energy transition or 
‘Energiewende,’ including security of energy supply and industrial 
policy (Lehmann and Gawel, 2013).
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scale action (Carlarne, 2008; Rabe, 2009, 2010; Posner, 2010). There 
are examples of states joining together in creating new institutional 
mechanisms, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
among Northeastern states in the United States to institute an emis-
sions trading programme, and the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) 
between California and several Canadian provinces, although both 
these initiatives have also failed to live up to their original promise 
(Mehling and Frenkil, 2013). Climate policy in the state of California, 
with its new cap and trade programme, is particularly worth noting 
both because of the size of its economy and because California has a 
history as a pioneer of environmental innovation (Mazmanian et  al., 
2008; Farrell and Hanemann, 2009).
As detailed further in Section 15.8, cities are particularly vibrant sites 
of sub-national action in some countries, often operating in networks 
and involving a range of actors at multiple scales (Betsill and Bulkeley, 
2006; Gore and Robinson, 2009). For example, in the Netherlands, the 
central government has established a programme that provides subsi-
dies to municipalities to undertake various measures such as improve-
ments in municipal buildings and housing, improved traffic flow, sus-
tainable energy, and so on (Gupta et  al., 2007). In Brazil, important 
cities such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo have taken specific mea-
sures that go beyond national policies. For example, a 2009 São Paulo 
law (No. 13.798) commits the state to undertake mandatory economy-
wide GHG emission reduction targets of 20 % by 2020 from 2005 lev-
els (Lucon and Goldemberg, 2010). In the United States, over 1000 cit-
ies and municipalities have committed to reaching what would have 
been the US Kyoto target as part of the Conference of Mayors’ Climate 
Protection Agreement (Mehling and Frenkil, 2013).
Sub-national action on climate change is a mix of bottom-up experi-
mentation and the interaction of top-down guidance with local imple-
mentation action. In some cases, countries have set in place explicit 
mechanisms for coordination of national and sub-national action, such 
as in China and India, but there is insufficient evidence to assess the 
effectiveness of these mechanisms. More typical is relatively uncoor-
dinated action and experimentation at sub-national level, particularly 
focused on cities. These issues are discussed further in Section 15.8.
15�2�6 Drivers of national and sub-national 
climate action
National and sub-national actions are related to domestic political 
institutions, domestic politics, international influences, and ideational 
factors. Based on data from industrialized countries, a comparative 
political analysis suggests that proportional representation systems 
such as those in many EU nations are more likely than first past the 
post systems to give importance to minority interests on environmen-
tal outcomes; systems with multiple veto points, such as the US system, 
afford more opportunities for opponents to block political action; and 
in federal systems powerful provinces with high compliance costs can 
block action, as seems to have occurred in Canada (Harrison and Sund-
strom, 2010). Lachapelle and Paterson (2013) use quantitative analysis 
to substantiate the argument about proportional representation and 
systems with multiple veto points. They also show that presidential-
congressional systems find it systematically more difficult to develop 
climate policy than parliamentary systems. 
These are, however, only general tendencies: the specific details of 
country cases, as well as the possibility of multiple and interacting 
causal factors, suggests the need for caution in predicting outcomes 
based on these factors. 
In particular, national domestic political factors are also salient. Elec-
toral politics, operating through pressure for action from domestic 
constituents, is a determinant of action as is the cost of compliance 
(Harrison and Sundstrom, 2010). The role of climate change in elec-
toral strategies developed by political parties may also play a role 
in climate governance, although evidence for this effect is available 
only for developed countries (Carter, 2008; Fielding et al., 2012; Bai-
ley and Compston, 2012a). For example, the compliance costs of car-
bon pricing were the subject of direct electoral competition between 
Australia’s major political parties in the 2007 and 2010 general elec-
tions (Rootes, 2011; Bailey et  al., 2012). The presence of substantial 
co-benefits opportunities and re-framing policy around these oppor-
tunities can also influence domestic politics in favour of climate action 
(Held et al., 2013b); (Bailey and Compston, 2012a). Finally, the ‘type’ 
of state — liberal market, corporatist or developmental — can shape 
outcomes (Lachapelle and Paterson, 2013). For example, somewhat 
counter-intuitively corporatist states (e. g., Germany, South Korea) are 
more likely to have introduced carbon pricing than states with liberal 
market policy traditions (e. g., the United States, Canada). Conversely, 
liberal market economies are more likely, as are developmental states 
(e. g., China), to focus on R&D as a principal policy tool (on the United 
States, see notably Macneil (2012). These patterns reflect powerful 
institutional path dependencies and incentives facing actors promot-
ing climate policy in particular countries (Macneil, 2012).  
International pressures are also important in explaining state action. 
Diplomatic pressure, changes in public and private finance that empha-
size mainstreaming climate change, and a general trend toward higher 
fossil-fuel energy prices all are associated with increasing climate 
action (Held et al., 2013b).
Finally, based on comparative case studies, various ideational factors 
such as national norms around multilateralism, perceptions of equity 
in the global climate regime (Harrison and Sundstrom, 2010), and 
ideas put forward by scientists, international organizations and other 
voices of authority can also shift domestic politics (Held et al., 2013b).
15�2�7 Summary of institutions and governance
The evidence on institutional change and new patterns of climate gov-
ernance is limited, as many countries are in the process of establishing 
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new institutions and systems of governance. However, several trends 
are visible. First, there is a considerable increase in government led 
institutionalization of climate action through both legislation and pol-
icy since AR4. The factors driving these changes include international 
pressures, scope for co-benefits, and changing norms and ideas. The 
specifics of national political systems also affect country actions. Sec-
ond, evidence from national cases illustrates considerable diversity in 
the forms of action. While there are only a few cases of nationally led 
economy wide carbon price setting efforts, more common are sectoral 
approaches to climate change mitigation or delegated action to sub-
national levels, often embedded within national climate policy frame-
works. Third, the promise of ‘co-benefits’ is often an important stated 
reason for climate policies and their framing. Fourth, there is a profu-
sion of activity at sub-national levels, particularly urban areas, much 
of which is only loosely coordinated with national actions. Finally, the 
diversity of approaches appears to be strongly driven by local institu-
tional and political context, with legislative and policy measures tai-
lored to operate within the constraints of national political and insti-
tutional systems.
15.3 Characteristics and 
classification of policy 
instruments and packages 
This section presents a brief and non-exhaustive description of the 
main policy instruments and packages, using the common classifica-
tion set by Chapter 3.8. Most of these instruments will be assessed 
with the common evaluation criteria set by Chapter 3 (see Section 
15.5) in most of the remaining parts of this chapter. As indicated in 
Section 15.2, these instruments are introduced within an institutional 
context that obviously influences their design and implementation.    
15�3�1 Economic instruments
Economic instruments are sometimes termed ‘market-based’ approaches 
because prices are employed in environmental and climate policies. Eco-
nomic instruments for climate change mitigation include taxes (includ-
ing charges and border adjustments), subsidies and subsidy removal, 
and emissions trading schemes. Taxes and subsidies are known as price 
instruments since they do not directly target quantities, while emis-
sions trading schemes, especially cap-and-trade schemes (see below), 
are known as quantity instruments. This distinction can be important, as 
seen in Sections 15.5.3.8, 15.7.3.2, and 15.7.3.4.
Taxes and charges are ideally defined as a payment for each unit of 
GHG released into the atmosphere. In the climate context, they are 
usually unrelated to the provision of a service and are thus known as 
taxes rather than charges. They can be levied on different tax bases, 
whereas tax rates, given the global and uniform characteristics of the 
taxed emissions, usually do not show spatial variation (OECD, 2001). 
In the last years, many taxes on GHG or energy have devoted part of 
their revenues to the reduction of other distortionary taxes (green tax 
reforms), although other revenue uses are now playing an increasing 
role (Ekins and Speck, 2011).
Border tax adjustments are related instruments that intend to solve the 
dysfunctions of variable climate change regulations across the world. 
Although some authors highlight that they could alleviate the problem 
of leakage and a contribute to a wider application of mitigation policies 
(Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007), others emphasize that they do not consti-
tute optimal policy instruments and could even increase leakage (Jakob 
et al., 2013) or cause potential threats to fairness and to the function-
ing of the global trade system (e. g., Bhagwati and Mavroidis, 2007).
Subsidies to low GHG products or technologies have been applied by a 
number of countries but, contrary to the previous revenue-raising / neu-
tral economic instruments, they demand public funds. In some coun-
tries there are ‘perverse’ subsidies lowering the prices of fossil fuels 
or road transport, which bring about a higher use of energy and an 
increase of GHG emissions. Therefore, subsidy reduction or removal 
would have positive effects in climate change and public-revenue 
terms and is therefore treated as an instrument in its own right (OECD, 
2008).
In ‘cap-and-trade’ emissions trading systems regulators establish an 
overall target of emissions and issue an equivalent number of emis-
sions permits. Permits are subsequently allocated among polluters and 
trade leads to a market price. The allocation of emission permits can 
be done through free distribution (e. g., grandfathering) or through 
auctioning. In ‘baseline and credit’ emissions trading systems, polluters 
may create emission reduction credits (often project-based) by emit-
ting below a baseline level of emissions (Stavins, 2003).
15�3�2 Regulatory approaches
Regulations and standards were the core of the first environmental 
policies and are still very important in environmental and climate poli-
cies all around the world. They are conventional regulatory approaches 
that establish a rule and / or objective that must be fulfilled by the pol-
luters who would face a penalty in case of non-compliance with the 
norm. There are several categories of standards that are applicable to 
climate policies, mainly:
•	 Emission standards, which are the maximum allowable discharges 
of pollutants into the environment, and which can also be termed 
as performance standards; 
•	 Technology standards that mandate specific pollution abatement 
technologies or production methods (IPCC, 2007); and
•	 Product standards that define the characteristics of potentially pol-
luting products (Gabel, 2000).  
1156
National and Sub-national Policies and Institutions 
15
Chapter 15
15�3�3 Information policies
A typical market failure in the environmental domain is the lack, or 
at least asymmetric nature, of relevant information among some 
firms and consumers. Good quality information is essential for rais-
ing public awareness and concern about climate change, identify-
ing environmental challenges, better designing and monitoring the 
impacts of environmental policies, and providing relevant informa-
tion to inform consumption and production decisions. Examples 
of information instruments include eco-labelling or certification 
schemes for products or technologies and collection and disclosure 
of data on GHG emissions by significant polluters (Krarup and Rus-
sell, 2005).
15�3�4 Government provision of public goods 
and services and procurement
A changing climate will typically be a ‘public bad’ and actions and 
programmes by governments to counteract or prevent climate 
change can thus be seen as ‘public goods’. There are many examples 
where public good provision may be an appropriate form of miti-
gation or adaptation. Examples include physical and infrastructure 
planning, provision of district heating or public transportation ser-
vices (Grazi and van den Bergh, 2008), and funding and provision 
of research activities (Metz, 2010). Moreover, the removal of insti-
tutional and legal barriers that promote GHG emissions (or preclude 
mitigation) should be included in this policy type. Afforestation pro-
grammes and conservation of state-owned forests are an important 
example.
15�3�5 Voluntary actions
Voluntary actions refer to actions taken by firms, NGOs, and other 
actors beyond regulatory requirement. Voluntary agreements repre-
sent an evolution from traditional mandatory approaches based on 
conventional or economic regulations and intend to provide further 
flexibility to polluters. They are based on the idea that, under certain 
conditions, polluters can decide collectively to commit themselves to 
abatement instead of, or beyond the requirements of regulation. Vol-
untary agreements, sometimes known as long-term agreements, can 
be developed in different ways; in most cases the voluntary commit-
ment is assumed as a consequence of an explicit negotiation process 
between the regulator and the pollutant. In other cases a spontane-
ous commitment may be viewed as a way to avoid future mandatory 
alternatives from the regulator (Metz, 2010). Finally, there are cases 
where the regulator promotes standard environmental agreements 
on the basis of estimation of costs and benefits to firms (Croci, 
2005). 
15.4 Approaches and tools 
used to evaluate policies 
and institutions
15�4�1 Evaluation criteria
Several criteria have been usually employed to assess the effects of cli-
mate change policies and these have been laid out in Section 3.7. The 
criteria that have been used are environmental effectiveness, economic 
effectiveness (cost-effectiveness and economic efficiency), distribu-
tional equity and broader social impacts, and institutional, political, 
and administrative feasibility and flexibility. Political and institutional 
feasibility are not only a separate criterion, but also need to be taken 
into account when judging other criteria such as economic effective-
ness. It would be misleading to show that a tax would have been more 
cost-effective than, for example, a regulation if it would never have 
been feasible to implement the tax at a sufficiently high level to have 
the same effect as that regulation.
15�4�2 Approaches to evaluation
One can evaluate the effect of policy instrument x on a set of vari-
ables y that matter for the evaluation criteria either through model-
ling or through ex-post empirical measurement. For any evaluation 
based solely on modelling, it will never be possible to know whether 
all important aspects of the relationship between x and the y’s are cap-
tured appropriately by the model. For this reason, it is highly desirable 
to have ex-post empirical analysis to evaluate a policy instrument. In 
order to measure the effect of a policy instrument, one must compare 
the observed y’s in the presence of x with the ‘but-for’ or ‘counterfac-
tual’ value of the y’s  defined as their estimated likely value but for the 
implementation of x.
Statistical methods can be used to attempt to control for the evolution 
of the world in the absence of the policy. The most reliable basis for 
estimating counterfactual developments is to build programme evalu-
ation into the design of programmes from their inception (Jaffe, 2002). 
If the planning of such evaluation is undertaken at the beginning of a 
programme, then data can be developed and maintained that greatly 
increase the power of statistical methods to quantify the true impact 
of a programme by controlling for but-for developments.
Statistical analyses capture only those policy effects that can be and have 
been measured quantitatively. Qualitative analyses and case studies 
complement statistical analyses by capturing the effects of policies and 
institutions on other aspects of the system, and the effect of institutional, 
social and political factors on policy success (e. g., Bailey et al., 2012).
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Of course, data for ex-post evaluation is not always available, and even 
where it is, it is very challenging to capture all aspects of the situation 
empirically. Therefore, there will always be a role for models to eluci-
date the structure of policy effects, and to estimate or put bounds on 
the magnitude of effects. Such models can be purely analytical / theo-
retical, or they can combine empirical estimates of certain parameters 
with a model structure, as in ‘bottom-up’ models where many small 
effects are estimated and cumulated, or in simulation models, which 
combine an analytical / theoretical structure with numerical estimates 
of parameters of the model. Many such models are ‘partial equilib-
rium,’ meaning they capture the particular context of interest but 
ignore impacts on and feedback from the larger system. There are also 
computable ‘general equilibrium’ (CGE) models that allow for interac-
tions between the context of the policy focus and the larger system, 
including overall macroeconomic impacts and feedbacks see for exam-
ple, Bohringer et al., (2006). 
‘Experimental economics’ uses a laboratory setting as a ‘model’ of a 
real-world process, and uses ‘experimental subjects’ responses in that 
setting as an indicator of likely real-world behaviour (Kotani et  al., 
2011). With any model, results are truly predictive of real-world results 
only to the extent that the model — be it theoretical, simulation or 
experimental — captures adequately the key aspects of the real world 
in the experiment.
15.5 Assessment of the 
performance of policies 
and measures, including 
their policy design, in 
developed and developing 
countries taking into 
account development 
level and capacity
15�5�1 Overview of policy implementation
In this section we assess the performance of a series of policy instru-
ments and measures, starting with economic instruments (taxes in 
15.5.2, emissions trading in 15.5.3), regulatory approaches (15.5.4), 
information programmes (15.5.5), government provision of public 
goods (15.5.6) and voluntary agreements (15.5.7). We assess aspects 
of these and other policies in Section 15.6 on technology and R&D pol-
icy, and in Section 15.7 that deals with interactions between policies.
Many policy instruments are in principle capable of covering the entire 
economy. However, as mentioned in Section 15.2, in practice the instru-
ments are often targeted to particular sectors or industries. This partly 
reflects the fact that certain barriers or market failures are specific to 
or more pronounced in certain sectors or industries. Furthermore, some 
policies may cover only part of the economy as a result of the ability 
of special interests to exempt some sectors or industries (Compston, 
2009), (Helm, 2010).
Broader coverage tends to promote greater cost-effectiveness. How-
ever, on fairness grounds there is an argument for partly or fully 
exempting certain industries in order to maintain international com-
petitiveness, particularly when the threat to competitiveness comes 
from other nations that have not introduced climate policy and would 
gain competitive advantage as a result.
Table 15.2 brings together policy instruments discussed in sector 
chapters (Chapters 7 to 12). Two broad themes emerge from this sur-
vey. First, while policies that target broad energy prices — taxes or 
tradable allowances are clearly applicable across all sectors — a wide 
range of other policy approaches are also prevalent, which enable 
policy design that addresses sector specific attributes. For example, 
in the buildings sector regulatory instruments are an important tool. 
In the absence of a building code enforcing enhanced efficiency, an 
energy price signal alone might be insufficient to induce a builder to 
invest in an energy efficient building that they plan to sell or rent. 
Building and product standards also increase investor certainty 
thereby reducing costs. Similarly, the transport sector relies not only 
on pricing policies but also on government provision of infrastructure 
and regulation that guides urban development and modal choices. 
The industry sector faces information and other barriers to investment 
in efficiency, which can be overcome by audits and other informa-
tion based programmes. In Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use 
(AFOLU), government regulation to protect forests and set the condi-
tions for REDD+ (Reducing Emissions From Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation) plays a substantial role, as do certification programmes 
for sustainable forestry.
Sector-specific policies often exist alongside broader ones. In energy 
supply, broad-based GHG emissions pricing has often been supple-
mented by specific price- and quantity-based mechanisms (such as 
feed-in-tariffs (FITs) and portfolio standards) and underpinned by 
sufficient regulatory stability (including non-discriminatory access to 
electricity and gas networks). In industry, relatively broad tax exemp-
tions may be combined with mandatory audits, with the former help-
ing ‘level the playing field’ and providing the impetus for action, and 
the latter addressing an information barrier; thus each instrument 
addresses a separate market failure or barrier. The implementation 
of multiple policy instruments within a single sector can promote 
cost-effectiveness when the two instruments address distinct market 
failures. On the other hand, multiple instruments can work against 
cost-effectiveness when the two instruments fail to address different 
market failures and thus are simply redundant. This issue is discussed 
further in Section 15.7 below. 
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Table 15�2 | Sector Policy Instruments.
Policy Instruments Energy (See 7�12) Transport (See 8�10) Buildings (See 9�10) Industry (See 10�11) AFOLU (See 11�10)
Human Settlements 
and Infrastructure 
(See 12�5)
Economic 
Instruments — Taxes 
(Carbon taxes may be 
economy-wide)
•	Carbon taxes •	Fuel taxes
•	Congestion charges, 
vehicle registration 
fees, road tolls
•	Vehicle taxes
•	Carbon and / or energy 
taxes (either sectoral 
or economy wide)
•	 Carbon tax or energy 
tax
•	Waste disposal taxes 
or charges
•	Fertilizer or Nitrogen 
taxes to reduce nitrous 
oxide
•	Sprawl taxes, impact 
fees, exactions, 
split-rate property 
taxes, tax increment 
finance, betterment 
taxes, congestion 
charges
Economic 
Instruments — Tradable 
Allowances 
(May be economy-wide)
•	Emissions trading (e. g., 
EU ETS)
•	Emission credits under 
the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM)
•	Tradable Green 
Certificates
•	Fuel and vehicle 
standards
•	Tradable certificates 
for energy efficiency 
improvements (white 
certificates) 
•	Emissions trading
•	Emission credits under 
CDM
•	Tradable Green 
Certificates 
•	Emission credits under 
CDM
•	Compliance schemes 
outside Kyoto protocol 
(national schemes)
•	Voluntary carbon 
markets
•	Urban-scale Cap 
and Trade
Economic 
Instruments — Subsidies
•	Fossil fuel subsidy 
removal
•	Feed-in-tariffs for 
renewable energy
•	Capital subsidies 
and insurance for 1st 
generation Carbon 
Dioxide Capture and 
Storage (CCS)
•	Biofuel subsidies
•	Vehicle purchase 
subsidies
•	Feebates 
•	Subsidies or tax 
exemptions for 
investment in efficient 
buildings, retrofits and 
products
•	Subsidized loans
•	Subsidies (e. g., for 
energy audits)
•	Fiscal incentives (e. g., 
for fuel switching)
•	Credit lines for low 
carbon agriculture, 
sustainable forestry.
•	Special Improvement 
or Redevelopment 
Districts
Regulatory Approaches
•	Efficiency or 
environmental 
performance standards
•	Renewable Portfolio 
Standards for 
renewable energy 
•	Equitable access to 
electricity grid
•	Legal status of long-
term CO2 storage
•	Fuel economy 
performance standards
•	Fuel quality standards
•	GHG emission 
performance standards
•	Regulatory restrictions 
to encourage modal 
shifts (road to rail) 
•	Restriction on use 
of vehicles in certain 
areas
•	Environmental capacity 
constraints on airports
•	Urban planning and 
zoning restrictions
•	Building codes and 
standards
•	Equipment and 
appliance standards
•	Mandates for energy 
retailers to assist 
customers invest in 
energy efficiency
•	Energy efficiency 
standards for 
equipment
•	 Energy management 
systems (also 
voluntary)
•	Voluntary agreements 
(where bound by 
regulation)
•	Labelling and 
public procurement 
regulations
•	National policies 
to support REDD+ 
including monitoring, 
reporting and 
verification
•	Forest law to reduce 
deforestation
•	Air and water pollution 
control GHG precursors
•	Land-use planning and 
governance 
•	Mixed use zoning
•	Development 
restrictions
•	Affordable housing 
mandates
•	Site access controls
•	Transfer 
development rights
•	Design codes
•	Building codes
•	Street codes
•	Design standards
Information 
Programmes
•	Fuel labelling
•	Vehicle efficiency 
labelling
•	Energy audits
•	Labelling programmes
•	Energy advice 
programmes
•	Energy audits
•	Benchmarking
•	Brokerage for industrial 
cooperation
•	Certification schemes 
for sustainable forest 
practices
•	 Information policies 
to support REDD+ 
including monitoring, 
reporting and 
verification
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Policy Instruments Energy (See 7�12) Transport (See 8�10) Buildings (See 9�10) Industry (See 10�11) AFOLU (See 11�10)
Human Settlements 
and Infrastructure 
(See 12�5)
Government Provision 
of Public Goods or 
Services
•	Research and 
development
•	 Infrastructure 
expansion (district 
heating / cooling or 
common carrier)
•	 Investment in transit 
and human powered 
transport
•	 Investment in 
alternative fuel 
infrastructure
•	Low emission vehicle 
procurement
•	Public procurement of 
efficient buildings and 
appliances
•	Training and education
•	Brokerage for industrial 
cooperation
•	Protection of national, 
state, and local forests.
•	 Investment in 
improvement and 
diffusion of innovative 
technologies in 
agriculture and forestry
•	Provision of utility 
infrastructure 
such as electricity 
distribution, district 
heating / cooling 
and wastewater 
connections, etc.
•	Park improvements
•	Trail improvements
•	Urban rail 
Voluntary Actions
•	Labelling programmes 
for efficient buildings
•	Product eco-labelling
•	Voluntary agreements 
on energy targets or 
adoption of energy 
management systems, 
or resource efficiency
•	Promotion of 
sustainability by 
developing standards 
and educational 
campaigns
15�5�2 Taxes, charges, and subsidy removal 
15�5�2�1 Overview
Taxes on carbon (together with emissions trading systems) are eco-
nomic instruments. In the presence of rational consumers, firms, and 
complete markets, they achieve any given level of emissions reduc-
tion in the least costly way possible. Economic instruments like carbon 
taxes are attractive because of their simplicity and broad scope  cover-
ing all technologies and fuels (Section 3.8) and thus evoking the cost-
minimizing combination of changes to inputs in production and tech-
nologies to changing behaviour as manifested in consumption choices 
and lifestyles. This is the reason they have the potential to be more effi-
cient than directly regulating technology, products, or behaviour.1 To 
minimize administrative costs, a carbon tax can be levied ‘upstream’ 
(at the points of production or entry into the country). Finally, unlike an 
emissions trading system that requires new administrative machinery, 
a tax can piggyback off existing revenue collection systems. 
Despite these attractive properties, carbon taxes are not nearly as 
prevalent a policy instrument as one might expect. As yet, the Scandi-
navian countries, the Netherlands, the UK, and the Canadian province 
of British Columbia are the only large jurisdictions with significant and 
fairly general carbon taxes of at least USD 10 / tCO2.2 The reasons for 
this are not entirely clear. It may be that a carbon tax, unlike a nar-
rower sectoral regulation, attracts more hostile lobbying from fossil 
1 If psychological or institutional barriers to adoption or other market failures are 
the main factor impeding choice then regulations or other instruments may be 
an efficient complement or stand-alone instrument to deal with this (see Section 
15.4). 
2 Australia has a fixed fee hybrid system sometimes described as a tax that will be 
converted into an ETS.
fuel interests3 for whom the stakes it creates are high (Hunter and Nel-
son, 1989; Potters and Sloof, 1996; Goel and Nelson, 1999; Godal and 
Holtsmark, 2001; Skjærseth and Skodvin, 2001; Kolk and Levy, 2002; 
van den Hove et  al., 2002b; McCright and Dunlap, 2003; Markussen 
and Svendsen, 2005; Pearce, 2006; Beuermann and Santarius, 2006; 
Deroubaix and Lévèque, 2006; Pinkse and Kolk, 2007; Bridgman et al., 
2007; Bjertnæs and Fæhn, 2008; Blackman et  al., 2010; Sterner and 
Coria, 2012). Secondly, the payments required by a tax are transparent, 
unlike the less visible costs of regulations. The general public, not being 
aware of the above-mentioned efficiency properties of a tax, may be 
less likely to accept such an instrument (Brännlund and Persson, 2010). 
Third, policy may be driven by perceived risks to competitiveness and 
employment as well as the distribution of costs rather than on consid-
erations of pure efficiency (Decker and Wohar, 2007). Finally, a set of 
institutional path dependencies may have led to a favouring of emis-
sions trading systems over taxes, including a post-Kyoto preference 
for emissions trading in key bureaucracies, supported by creation of 
supportive industry and other associations (Skjærseth and Wettestad, 
2008; Paterson, 2012).
Countries that have sizeable general carbon taxes are fewer 
still — mainly a few Northern European countries. The carbon tax in 
Sweden is 1100 SEK or USD165 / tCO2, which is an order of magnitude 
higher than the price of permits on the EU emissions trading scheme 
(ETS) market or than the carbon taxes discussed in many other coun-
tries. Such high taxes typically have some exemptions motivated by 
the fact that other (competing) countries have no (or low) taxes. Swe-
den, for example, exempted the large energy users who participate in 
the EU ETS from also paying the carbon tax on the grounds that there 
would otherwise be a form of ‘double’ taxation (See 15.5.2.4 for a 
more thorough discussion). 
3 These can be either producers (for instance of fossil fuels) or users of energy, rang-
ing from energy intensive industries to truck drivers.
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Although general carbon taxes are so far uncommon, there are many 
policies that have similar effects but (for political reasons) avoid using 
the words ‘carbon’ and / or ‘tax’, (Rabe and Borick, 2012). Taxes on fuels, 
especially transport fuels are very common. While narrower in scope, 
they nevertheless cover a significant fraction of emissions in many 
countries. They can be interpreted as sectoral carbon taxes; in some 
countries this is clearly stated as an objective of fuel taxes, in others it 
is not. Fuel taxes may be politically easier to implement in some coun-
tries since (private) transport is hardly subject to international competi-
tion and hence leakage rates are low. A large share of all revenues 
from environmentally related taxes in fact come from fuel taxes, which 
were introduced in various countries, beginning with Europe and Japan, 
though they are also common in low income, oil-importing countries. 
One of their main stated purposes is to finance road building, although 
additional arguments include reducing expensive imports, government 
revenue raising, and reducing environmental impacts. Irrespective of 
the motivation, the effect of carbon taxes on fuel is to raise prices to 
consumers and restrict demand (see Section 15.5.2.2). Fuel taxes are 
important for climate change mitigation since the transport sector 
represents a large and increasing share of carbon emissions (27 % of 
global energy-related CO2 emissions in 2010 — see Section 8.1). Theory, 
simulation, and empirical studies all suggest strongly that taxing fuel is 
a lower cost method of reducing emissions compared to policies such 
as fuel efficiency mandates, driving restrictions, or subsidies to new 
technologies4 (Austin and Dinan, 2005). However, consumers who buy 
vehicles may be unable to correctly internalize the long-run savings of 
more fuel-efficient vehicles. This would be considered a ‘barrier’ and 
would provide motivation for having fuel efficiency standards in addi-
tion to fuel taxes (see Section 15.5.4). 
Variation in fuel prices is generated by subsidies as well as taxes. Fossil 
fuel subsidies are prevalent in many countries, being most common 
in oil and coal producing countries. According to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (2013), the Middle East and North Africa region 
accounts for around 50 % of global energy subsidies. In 2008, fossil 
fuel subsidies — for transport fuels, electricity, tax breaks for oil and 
gas production, and for research and development into coal genera-
tion, exceeded USD2010 489.1 billion globally (IEA / OECD, 2011). A more 
recent estimate by the IMF (2013) puts the figure at USD2010 469.5 bil-
lion or 0.7 % of global GDP in 2011. This is a pre-tax estimate and 
includes petroleum products, electricity, natural gas, and coal. A large 
share is in the fossil fuel exporting countries. After factoring in nega-
tive externalities, through corrective taxes, the IMF reports USD2010 
1.85 trillion in implicit subsidies. This figure assumes damages corre-
sponding to a USD 25 / t social cost on carbon, consistent with United 
States Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon (2010). 
‘Advanced economies’ make up 40 % of the global post-tax estimate. 
Reviewing six major studies that estimate fossil fuel subsidies, Ellis 
(2010) notes that removal of such subsidies would increase the aggre-
gate GDP in OECD and non-OECD countries in the “range from 0.1 per 
4 See also Section 15.12 on climate finance.
cent in total by 2010 to 0.7 per cent per year to 2050 (Ellis, 2010).” The 
studies reviewed include both modelling and empirical exercises.
15�5�2�2 Environmental effectiveness and efficiency
Assessing the environmental effectiveness of carbon taxation is not 
straightforward because multiple instruments and many other factors 
co-evolve in each country to produce policy mixes with different out-
comes in terms of emissions. For example, energy taxes varying by sec-
tor have been prominent in the Nordic countries since the 1970s with 
carbon taxes being added on in the early 1990s. Ex-post analyses have 
found varying reductions in CO2 emission from carbon taxes in Nor-
way, Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland, compared to business-as-usual 
(see Andersen (2004) for an extensive review of these studies and their 
estimation techniques).
The UK’s Climate Change Levy (CCL), introduced in 2001 on manufac-
turing plants and non-residential energy users (offices, supermarkets, 
public buildings, etc.), has had a strong impact on energy intensity 
(Martin et  al., 2011). Electricity use, taxed at a rate of about 10 %, 
declined by over 22 % at plants subject to the levy as compared to 
plants that were eligible to opt out by entering into a voluntary agree-
ment to reduce energy use. There was no evidence that the tax had any 
detrimental effect on economic performance or led plants to exit from 
the industry (Martin et al., 2011).
From 1990 to 2007, the CO2 equivalent emissions in Sweden were 
reduced by 9 % while the country experienced an economic growth of 
+51 %. In Sweden, with the highest carbon tax (albeit with exemptions 
for some industrial sectors), there was a very strong decoupling of car-
bon emissions and growth with reductions in carbon intensity of GDP 
of 40 % (Johansson, 2000; Hammar et al., 2013). Per capita emissions 
in Denmark were reduced by 15 % from 1990 to 2005; the experience 
in Scandinavia, the UK, and the Netherlands was similar (Enevoldsen, 
2005; Enevoldsen et al., 2007), (Bruvoll and Larsen, 2004), (Cambridge 
Econometrics, 2005), (Berkhout et al., 2004; Sumner et al., 2011; Lin 
and Li, 2011). Of course, many factors may be at play, and these dif-
ferences cannot be attributed solely to differences in taxation. Overall, 
the evidence does suggest that carbon taxes, as part of an environ-
mental tax reform, lead to abatement of GHG emissions, generate rev-
enue for the government, and allow reductions in income tax threaten-
ing employment. Theory strongly suggests that if a tax is implemented 
then it would also be cost effective, but it is for natural reasons hard to 
demonstrate this empirically at the macro level. 
There is much more evidence available on the environmental efficacy 
of fuel as compared to carbon taxation. In the short run, consumers 
may be locked into patterns of use by habit, culture, vehicle charac-
teristics, urban infrastructure, and architecture. The short-run response 
to higher fuel prices is indeed often small — price elasticity estimates 
range between – 0.1 to – 0.25 for the first year. However long-run price 
elasticities are quite high: approximately – 0.7 or a range of – 0.6 to 
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– 0.8. This range is the average found by surveys of hundreds of stud-
ies that use both market based variations in fuel price as well as pol-
icy induced variations and exploit both temporal and cross-sectional 
variations in the data; the individual study estimates range substan-
tially more depending on countries or regions covered, time period, 
method and other factors (Oum, 1989; Goodwin, 1992; Graham and 
Glaister, 2002; Goodwin et al., 2004). In the long run, therefore, 10 % 
higher fuel prices will ultimately lead to roughly a 7 % reduction in fuel 
use and emissions. Income elasticities are about 1, which means that 
5 % growth in income gives 5 % growth in emissions. If instead a 2 % 
reduction is desired there is a 7 % gap between the 5 % increase and 
the – 2 % desired and a 10 % increase in fuel price every year would be 
needed to achieve such a reduction in emissions with a 5 % growth in 
income. 
The long-run effects of transport fuel taxation have been large. Sterner 
(2007) shows that in Europe, where fuel taxes have been the high-
est, they have contributed to reductions in CO2 emissions from trans-
port by 50 % for this group of countries. The whole Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) would have had 
30 % higher fuel use had not the European Union and some other 
members imposed high fuel taxes (i. e., if all the OECD countries had 
instead chosen as low fuel taxes as in the United States). Similarly, the 
OECD could have decreased fuel use by more than 35 % if all member 
countries would have chosen as high taxes as the United Kingdom. 
The accumulated difference in emissions over the years leads to a dif-
ference in several ppm in CO2 concentration, presumably making fuel 
taxes the policy that has had the largest actual impact on the climate 
up till now (Sterner, 2007).   
The environmental effect of a fuel tax is illustrated in Figure 15.2, 
where the fitted curve is from a log-linear regression of the emission 
intensity of liquid fuels on the price of diesel. The cross-country varia-
tion in diesel prices is mostly due to variation in taxes (and in some 
cases, subsidies). Figure 15.2 suggests that the effect of a change in 
the price of a fuel on emissions is greater at low prices. This is intuitive, 
since fuel will be consumed wastefully when it is cheap, allowing for 
greater demand reductions when the price rises.
Though there are few clean experiments, the market continuously cre-
ates ‘quasi-experiments’ which are analogous to the introduction of 
policies. Increased fuel prices in the USA in 2008, for instance, led to 
a shift in the composition of vehicles sold, increasing fuel-efficiency, 
while also reducing miles travelled (Ramey and Vine, 2010; Aldy and 
Stavins, 2012).
Other price instruments that have been used in the transport sector are 
congestion charges, area pricing, parking fees, and tolls on roads or 
in cities. These have been used to reduce congestion; emission reduc-
tion is a co-benefit. The USD2010 15.4 congestion fee in London led to 
reductions in incoming private cars by 34 % when introduced. Over-
all congestion was also estimated to have been reduced by 30 %, and 
emissions fell (Leape, 2006). The smaller (USD2010 2.6) congestion fee in 
Stockholm reduced total road usage by 15 % (Johansson et al., 2009).
Reducing subsidies to fossil energy will have a significant impact on 
emissions. Removing them could reduce world GHG emissions by 10 % 
at negative social cost by 2050 (Burniaux and Chateau, 2011).The IMF 
calculates that the removal of these subsidies induce a 15 % reduction 
in global energy related carbon emissions or 5 billion tCO2 in absolute 
terms and concludes that the post-tax estimate of USD2010 1.85 tril-
lion in subsidies is ‘likely to underestimate’ energy subsidies due to the 
assumptions made, hence the impact on carbon emissions is likely to 
be higher. Ellis (2010) reports a range of effects from just a few percent 
to 18 % by 2050 depending on the size of the subsidy reduction. 
Recognizing the potential impact of a reduction in subsidies to fossil 
fuels, the G20 and APEC blocks agreed in 2009 to phase out inefficient 
fossil fuel subsidies in all countries (G20 Leaders, 2009).
In China, the energy saving policies adopted in 1991, the 1998 Law 
on Energy Conservation, and the 2004 Medium and Long Term Spe-
cific Schema on Energy Saving, led to higher energy prices and explain 
half the decline in energy intensity of Chinese industries between 1997 
and 1999, while R&D accounted for only 17 % of the decline (Fisher-
Vanden et al., 2006; Yuan et al., 2009).
15�5�2�3 Distributional incidence and feasibility
Although fuel taxes have often been criticized for being regressive 
(that is, for imposing a proportionally higher burden on the poor), 
this is not always the case. There are large variations in distributional 
impacts both within and between social groups  the effects range from 
regressive or progressive (Rausch et al., 2010, 2011); see also 6.3.5.2.
Studies of the distributional incidence of fuel taxes show that they 
may be neutral or weakly regressive (before revenue recycling) in rich 
countries, but they are generally progressive in poor countries. In many 
Figure 15�2 | The impact of average diesel prices across the world on the emissions 
intensity of liquid fuels.
D
ie
se
l P
ri
ce
 [U
SD
20
10
/l]
Liquid Fuel Emissions Intensity [kgCO2eq/Hundred USD2010 of GDP]
Diesel Price [USD2010/l]
Diesel Price [USD2010/l]
Area of Circle Proportional to
Country's Total Emissions
0
1
2
3
4
0 50 100 150 200 250
1162
National and Sub-national Policies and Institutions 
15
Chapter 15
least developed and developing countries such as India, Indonesia, 
China, and many African countries, the progressivity of fuel taxes is 
in fact quite strong. In Europe they are approximately neutral (Sterner, 
2012). Carbon taxation can sometimes have regressive effects prior to 
recycling revenue, but recycling can make the poorest households bet-
ter off. Generally, the degree of progressivity can be selected depend-
ing on the method of recycling revenues. The environmental taxation 
gives rise to government income that can be allocated in ways that 
either benefit the poor or any other group giving a considerable range 
of options for how progressive or regressive the politicians want to 
make the overall package (Bureau, 2011). 
The distributional effects of other taxes vary significantly. Kerosene 
taxes in developing countries are regressive since kerosene is used 
predominantly by the poor (Younger et al., 1999; Gangopadhyay et al., 
2005; Datta, 2010). This regressivity may also apply to taxes on elec-
tricity or coal. The distributional effects of a more general carbon tax 
will depend on the mode of implementation with respect to different 
fuels and sectors and typically be more complex than for a single fuel, 
since the potential substitution possibilities are many. Results vary, but 
for instance, Hassett et al. (2009) finds a carbon tax to be regressive in 
the USA, showing that the cost is about 3.74 % for the poorest decile 
four times the effect on the highest decile. In India, on the other hand, 
a carbon tax would be progressive (Datta, 2010). The pro- or regressiv-
ity of carbon taxes will vary between countries but can also be affected 
by design, as shown for instance by Fullerton et al., (2012) or Sterner 
and Coria (2012).
The assertion that fuel taxes are regressive is often used as an argu-
ment and can make fuel taxes politically difficult to implement even if 
not true. Feasibility is however not tied in any simple way to income 
distribution effects. If a tax is progressive, this does not necessarily 
increase feasibility since this means that the interests of influential 
groups are affected, which may be a much bigger impediment to feasi-
bility (Datta, 2010). Fear of social unrest may hold up subsidy removal. 
Protests over reduced petrol subsidies are common; for example, 
recently riots erupted in Nigeria when President Jonathan Goodluck 
tried to eliminate very costly petrol subsidies with only partial success. 
Some countries such as Iran and Indonesia have recognized that fuel 
subsidies actually accrue to the relatively wealthy and managed to 
successfully reduce the subsidies without much unrest, by making sure 
that revenues saved are spent fairly — for instance through general 
lump-sum cash transfers (Coady et al., 2010; Atashbar, 2012; Sterner, 
2012; Aldy and Stavins, 2012).
15�5�2�4 Design issues: exemptions, revenue recycling, 
border adjustments
As mentioned above in 15.5.2.1, despite the attractive efficiency prop-
erties of a broad carbon tax, and even its progressivity in many cir-
cumstances, it may face political resistance. To have a big effect on 
emissions a tax must be high. Carbon and fuel taxes have often been 
initially resisted, but once introduced it seems the fee level has often 
been increased, (Sumner et al., 2011b). Another factor may be a path 
dependency since the taxes reduce the use of fossil fuel and lower fuel 
use means less opposition to fuel taxes, (Hammar et  al., 2004). This 
path dependency may be the rationale for raising the fuel or carbon 
taxes slowly and steadily as done by the Conservative government in 
the UK with the Fuel Price Escalator starting in 1993, a policy that was 
continued under the successor Labour government for several years. 
An emissions tax involves a transfer from economic agents to the 
state, namely the tax revenue from the residual emissions that are 
not abated. Private parties have to make this transfer in addition to 
bearing the cost of actually reducing emissions. There are a number 
of approaches to designing a tax (or fee) so that the transfer does not 
take place and resistance from incumbent polluters is reduced.
One approach is simply to exempt certain carbon-intensive indus-
tries — such as heavy industry in Sweden, as mentioned earlier. Such 
policies with incomplete coverage are less cost efficient than general 
policies (Montgomery, 1972 and Chapter 6.3.5.1). This lack of effi-
ciency applies not only to carbon emissions — it applies even more 
broadly to agriculture, forestry and to other climate gases such as 
methane or nitrous oxide (Bosetti et al., 2011). However, narrow sec-
toral policies may be politically more feasible due to concerns about 
international competitiveness, the structure of winners and losers, and 
consequent lobbying (Holland et al., 2011).
A related approach that tries to avoid the loss of coverage is to exempt 
some firms from taxes conditional on their undertaking emission 
reduction commitments. In Denmark, for example, companies signing 
an energy savings agreement with the government received a 25 % 
tax reduction (OECD, 2001; Agnolucci, 2009; Sumner et al., 2011; Ekins 
and Speck, 2011; Aldy and Stavins, 2012). Similarly, in the UK some 
firms may sign Climate Change Agreements (CCA) to reduce emissions 
that exempt them from the CCL. This experience offers a cautionary 
tale: on average the agreements did not require firms to reduce emis-
sions beyond what they would have done anyway (Martin et al., 2011). 
Conditional exemptions amount to unconditional ones if the condi-
tions are lax.
Yet another approach to avoiding a large transfer to the state is to 
recycle all or part of the tax revenue. In the Canadian province of Brit-
ish Columbia, revenue from the broad carbon tax of USD2010 29.1 / tCO2 
is fully rebated to the general population via income tax cuts and 
transfers to low-income people who do not pay income tax. British 
Columbia raised the tax gradually in increments of USD2010 4.8 / tCO2 
annually to its current level (Jaccard, 2012).
Sometimes revenues are recycled to firms in emission-intensive indus-
tries. Again, this relies on identifying the recipients, so it is usually con-
fined to a few sectors with the attendant disadvantages mentioned 
above. Refunded emission payments and other combinations of taxes 
and subsidies may be designed to be neutral so that, for example, the 
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industry pays the cost of abatement but does not pay a tax for the 
allowed or reference level of pollution (Fischer, 2011). One expression 
of this is fees, which are collected in environmental funds and sub-
sequently used in ways that benefit the polluters. An example from 
NOx emissions in Sweden is that a refunded emission payment may 
be politically more acceptable and thus environmentally more effective 
than simply a tax. Since the fee is refunded (in proportion to output), 
there is considerably less resistance to the fee and it can be set much 
higher than what would have been acceptable for a pure tax. Nor-
way has pioneered another instrument for NOx emissions — taxes are 
refunded to cover abatement expenses. This implies a combination of a 
tax on emissions with a subsidy on abatement. Experience shows that 
a lower fee can achieve the same result with this instrument design 
as a tax (Fischer, 2011). Norway is considering promoting similar solu-
tions for carbon emissions (Hagem et al., 2012). The drawback of such 
schemes for reducing carbon emissions is that their sectoral nature 
reduces coverage and raises costs. 
Abatement subsidies have also been financed out of general revenues. 
Abatement subsidies need to be financed through tax revenues. The 
taxes needed to finance the subsidies in general involve a marginal 
excess burden. This deadweight loss is an extra cost of subsidies rela-
tive to emissions taxes. Furthermore, there is an efficiency penalty due 
to their sectoral nature. If applied to firms, subsidies may create per-
verse incentives to enter or to fail to exit from, a polluting industry, and 
raise costs (Polinsky, 1979). Perhaps for such reasons, they are seen in 
residential and commercial sectors, for instance, tax breaks are pro-
vided for building insulation or refurbishing. There are also white certif-
icates and innovative financing schemes that allow loans to be repaid 
as part of electricity bills (See Section 9.10 for further discussion).
Another reason for tax exemptions is to avoid a loss of competitive-
ness in industries exposed to foreign competition that is not subject to 
taxation or equivalent policies. A pure tax (at a high level) may incen-
tivize industries to move to neighbouring countries. This is known as 
‘leakage’, since emissions `leak’ to jurisdictions not subject to taxa-
tion. It is generally hard to find decisive empirical evidence of carbon 
leakage, though this may be partly because high carbon taxes have 
not been tried in any significant way for trade-exposed sectors. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, some simulations suggest that there could be 
sizeable effects (Elliott et al., 2010). Though the overall effects of bor-
der tax adjustment on leakage are subject to debate (see Jakob et al., 
2013), a recent model comparison suggests that full border tax adjust-
ments would moderately decrease leakage rates from on average from 
on average 12 to 8 % (Bohringer et al., 2012). Border tax adjustments 
are taxes levied on imported goods that impose equivalent taxes on 
emissions `embedded’ in the goods. Aichele and Felbermayr (2011) 
find that sectoral carbon imports for a committed (i. e., taxed) coun-
try from an uncommitted exporter are approximately 8 % higher than 
if the country had no commitments and that the carbon intensity of 
those imports is about 3 % higher. When measurement of embedded 
emissions is uncertain, border tax adjustments can be criticized for 
introducing trade barriers in environmental guise (Holmes et al., 2011).
Leakage can also occur intertemporally. As shown by Sinn (2008, 
2012), a carbon tax might not only encourage demand in other areas. 
There may also be a perverse supply side reaction (referred to as the 
Green Paradox) increasing the current supply of fossil fuels in antici-
pation of rising carbon taxes. Subsequent research (Gerlagh, 2011; 
Hoel, 2012) has shown that, strictly speaking, this only applies to very 
simplified and special models with complete exhaustion of all fossil 
fuels (which would lead to very drastic climate change) and also only 
to models in which the carbon tax actually starts low and rises faster 
than the discount rate. A number of conclusions can be drawn from 
the debate: (1) generally, the supply side should not be neglected; (2) 
if a tax is used, there are arguments for making it high rather than low 
and fast-growing; and most importantly, (3) instruments used need to 
cover as many countries and sources as possible. It may be difficult to 
find a single optimal tax, and it may be necessary, rather to formulate 
a tax rule that will decide how the tax rate is to be updated (Kalkuhl 
and Edenhofer, 2013). 
15�5�3 Emissions trading
15�5�3�1 Overview of emissions trading schemes 
Over the past three decades, emissions trading, or cap and trade, has 
evolved from just a textbook idea (Dales, 1968) to its current role as a 
major policy instrument for pollution control. Earlier experiences with 
emissions trading include schemes such as the California RECLAIM 
Program and the US Acid Rain Program (Tietenberg, 2006; Ellerman 
et al., 2010). 
But since the start of the EU carbon trading system (See Section 
14.4.2), several countries and sub-national jurisdictions (e. g., New 
Zealand, Australia, California, northeastern United States, Quebec, 
South Korea, Tokyo, and five cities and seven provinces in China) have 
also put in place or proposed trading schemes to control their carbon 
emissions. This section provides a brief overview of the literature (see 
further Perdan and Azapagic, 2011; Aldy and Stavins, 2012) and draws 
lessons for the design of carbon trading programmes.
15�5�3�2 Has emissions trading worked?
We begin by assessing environmental effectiveness. There were three 
GHG cap-and-trade programmes that were operational5 by 2012 (New-
ell et al. 2013). The EU ETS, reviewed in 14.4.2, is by far the largest. 
Emissions are estimated to have fallen by 2 – 5 % relative to business-
as-usual in the first pilot phase from 2005 – 2007 (Ellerman, Convery, 
De Perthuis, et al., 2010). Similarly, Egenhofer et al., (2011) attribute 
5 California and Quebec started recently in 2013, as did Australia with its ‘fixed-
price’ or tax period; trading starts 2014 and S Korea starts even later. None of 
these can be evaluated empirically at present.
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reduction of emission intensity by 3.35 % per year in 2008 – 2009, in 
contrast to only 1 % in 2006 – 2007, to the EU ETS. Permit prices have 
fallen to around USD 10 – 15 in 2012 (Newell et  al., 2013). Section 
14.4.2 concludes that environmental effectiveness has been compro-
mised to a large extent by a structurally lenient allocation of permits 
that was driven by the necessity for institutional and political feasibil-
ity. 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), (see 15.5.3.3) has 
been ineffective since the cap has never been binding and is not 
expected to become so for several years (Aldy and Stavins, 2012). The 
third, much smaller, New Zealand ETS, appears to have had a small 
impact on emissions (Bullock, 2012). The last of the emissions trad-
ing schemes in GHGs, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), was 
an offset programme, not a cap-and-trade scheme. Section 13.13.1.2 
finds that there are many challenges when it comes to additionality, 
baseline definition and leakage but possibly some advantages from 
the viewpoint of generating income in developing countries.
This experience shows that it is has been very difficult to get a cap-
and-trade programme for GHGs enacted with a cap tight enough to 
have a significant environmental effect, at least initially. Other pro-
grammes (notably for the whole USA) that have been suggested have 
not made it through the political process. It is unclear to what extent 
this issue is peculiar to ETSs but there is a similar if not stronger oppo-
sition to the other major economic instrument, carbon taxation. One 
of the advantages claimed for an ETS is a greater option of allocat-
ing rights to appease opponents of a tax scheme. Hence there is a 
tradeoff between feasibility, distributional effects, and environmental 
effectiveness at least in the short run. Older non-GHG cap-and-trade 
programmes such as the SO2 and leaded petrol phase-out programmes 
in the United States have been environmentally effective (Tietenberg, 
2006; Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013).6 It may be that any policy 
instrument stringent enough to have a significant environmental effec-
tive programme may have faced opposition in the particular circum-
stances. One possible lesson for design may be to build a price ceiling 
into any proposed cap-and-trade programme. In that case, the concern 
that a tight cap would lead to very high costs, would be alleviated and 
may make it politically feasible to have a somewhat more ambitious 
cap (Aldy and Stavins, 2012). 
Cost-effectiveness is the main economic rationale for using emis-
sions trading as opposed to simpler regulation. The experience with 
regard to GHG programmes is too limited to draw any conclusions yet. 
As in many of the earlier markets, cost savings in the US Acid Rain 
Program — an allowance trading system established in 1995 to con-
trol SO2 emissions from coal-fired plants in the continental United 
States — were substantial (Carlson et al., 2000; Ellerman et al., 2000). 
6 Note that there is literature (e. g., Lohmann, 2008) much less enthusiastic about 
the concept of emissions trading for reasons of justice and environmental integ-
rity, among others, and more so after the current collapse of carbon prices in the 
EU-ETS (Lohmann, 2008).
Cost savings in this programme came not only from equalizing mar-
ginal costs across affected electric utility units on a period-by-period 
basis but also from equalizing (present value) marginal costs intertem-
porally as firms have saved current permits for future use in what is 
known as banking of permits. According to (Ellerman and Montero, 
2007), the use of banking has been substantial and remarkably close 
to what would be expected in a well-functioning market. Recently, the 
price has collapsed to zero also in this market as the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has used other instruments to push for further 
reductions.
Banking has also been responsible for a large part of the significant 
cost savings in the US Lead Phasedown Program, a trading scheme 
established in 1982 to provide refineries with flexibility to gradually 
remove lead from gasoline. In addition to banking, cost savings in this 
program were driven by dynamic efficiencies, i. e., the faster adoption 
and / or development of more efficient refining technologies (Kerr and 
Newell, 2003). In contrast, dynamic efficiency has played a minor role 
in explaining cost savings in the US SO2 allowance program (e. g., Eller-
man et al., 2000; Fowlie, 2010; Kumar and Managi, 2010).
The introduction of a price on carbon through either a carbon tax 
or cap-and-trade can have substantial distributional consequences. 
Extensive analyses of these effects have been conducted in the US 
context. Burtraw et  al. (2009) illustrate in the context of a trading 
programme that the outcome for the average household will depend 
much more importantly on the use of the value associated with emis-
sions allowances than with the actual stringency of the regulation. For 
example, lump sum dividends or some kinds of tax reform can be pro-
gressive. Similarly Hassett et al. (2009) find that the degree of regres-
sivity is much reduced when a lifetime measure of income is used. 
Parry (2004) shows in an analytical framework that emissions trading 
can be regressive, especially if implemented with free allocation to 
incumbent emitters (grandfathering). Bovenberg et al. (2005) find that 
profits can be maintained throughout the economy by freely allocating 
less (sometimes considerably less) than 25 % of pollution permits, with 
the rest auctioned. These considerations are very similar for tax or cap-
and-trade systems. Granting greater than this quantity for free would 
lead to windfall profits. In simulation modelling of the US electricity 
market, Burtraw and Palmer (2008) find that it would be sufficient to 
allocate just 6 % of the allowances to the electricity industry to offset 
costs under a CO2 trading programme because a majority of costs are 
borne by consumers; greater allocation would again lead to windfall 
profits. Hassett et  al. (2009) examine regional effects and find them 
not to be very significant. Blonz et al. (2012) show that even if pro-
grammes are regressive, social safety nets, which adjust automatically 
to inflation, generally protect low-income groups in the United States, 
and middle income groups may be most vulnerable.  
It should be noted that the experience with emissions trading, whether 
for greenhouse gases or other, non-climate-related pollutants, has 
been wholly in high-income countries. Coria and Sterner (2010) 
describe some success for air pollution in a middle income country like 
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Chile but it is unclear to what extent these can be transferred to devel-
oping countries.
15�5�3�3 Sector coverage and scope of the cap
A key component in a trading scheme is establishing the pollutants 
(e. g., greenhouse gases) and entities that will be regulated. There are 
several factors that may affect this decision: (1) the quality and cost of 
emissions measurement and verification, (2) the ability to target sec-
tors with the greatest mitigation potential, (3) the ability to broaden 
the coverage to unlock low-cost mitigation opportunities, (4) the politi-
cal and institutional feasibility of including certain sectors, and (5) the 
interactive effects the cap may have with other policies.  
In most trading schemes, the affected sources are relatively large 
emitting sources whose emissions have been closely monitored 
(smaller sources are often regulated with alternative instruments). 
This applies to the earlier programmes (e. g., Acid Rain, RECLAIM, Lead 
Phasedown)7 but also in carbon markets. In other words, there are few 
cases in which the point of obligation has been upstream, i. e., different 
than the emitting point. The trading scheme in Australia, launched in 
2012, covered 373 entities comprising approximately 60 % of Austra-
lia’s GHG emissions. Electricity generation, industrial processes, fugi-
tive emissions, and non-legacy waste are under permit liability (Clean 
Energy Regulator, 2012). Small-scale stationary fossil fuel use (espe-
cially gas) is covered by upstream permit liability on fuel distributors. 
Liquid fuels used in aviation / shipping and synthetic GHGs are subject 
to an equivalent carbon price through changes to existing taxes. Agri-
culture and forestry can produce offset credits (Macintosh and Waugh, 
2012; Caripis et al., 2012).8
Coverage in the carbon-trading scheme in New Zealand, is the most 
comprehensive and covers all GHGs and all sectors. It has expanded 
in stages from the forestry sector (in January 2008) to fossil fuels and 
industrial emissions (in July 2010), and will cover the waste sector in 
May 2014. The agricultural sector must report emissions since Janu-
ary 2012 but a decision on when it will face surrender obligations has 
not yet been made. This is the only national emissions trading scheme 
to include forestry, and is intended to shift land-use change decisions 
towards greater carbon sequestration and less deforestation (Karpas 
and Kerr, 2011; Adams and Turner, 2012). Coverage is also scheduled 
to expand in stages in the recently launched carbon market in Cali-
fornia (Hanemann, 2009). In the first compliance period, which runs 
from 2013 – 2014, electricity generating and industrial facilities that 
7 An exception is the market for particulates established in Santiago-Chile in 1992 
for industrial sources (Montero et al., 2002). The trading commodity was not 
actual emissions, which were difficult to monitor on a daily basis, but a firm’s 
maximum capacity to emit.
8 For more see Section 7A of the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 
2007 (National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007, 2007). The carbon 
market in South Korea, to start in 2015, will cover around 450 large facilities and 
about 60 % of the country’s GHG emissions (Kim, 2011).
exceed 25,000 tonnes of CO2eq per year will be obligated to abide 
by the agreement; the second period (2015 – 2017) adds distributors 
of transportation, natural gas, and other fuels; and the third period 
(2018 – 2020) adds transportation fuels (CARB, 2011). All major sources 
will be covered over time, which will represent an equivalent of 85 % 
of California’s GHG emissions (CARB, 2011). Offset projects are fore-
seen in forestry management, urban forestry, dairy methane digesters, 
and the destruction of ozone-depleting substances. 
There are other carbon markets that are less ambitious in scope. The 
trading scheme in Tokyo, launched in April 2012, includes 300 indus-
trial facilities — which in total consume at least 1,500 kl of crude oil 
equivalent per annum — and a combined 1,000 commercial and insti-
tutional buildings. In aggregate, this is equivalent to only 20 % of 
Tokyo’s total CO2 emissions (Partnership for Market Readiness, 2012). 
Though the programme may be limited in scope, it is one of the first 
programmes in the world to address emissions from urban buildings, 
which can be quite significant (Nishida and Hua, 2011). The Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cap-and-trade programme initi-
ated in 2009 and that covers nine Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states 
in the United States (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont), only 
regulates CO2 emissions from power plants. 
15�5�3�4 Setting the level of the cap
The cap defines the stringency of the trading scheme. Naturally, the 
permit prices also depend on many circumstances such as the eco-
nomic growth. In many of the trading programmes reviewed above, 
the caps appear however to have been set below what would lead 
to efficient levels of abatement — since the allowance prices (the mar-
ginal abatement costs) have ended up below most estimates of the 
marginal environmental benefits from abatement. The RECLAIM Pro-
gram which covers NOx and SO2 is an example as are the acid rain 
and lead phase-out programmes. It should be noted, however, that to 
varying extents, carbon trading programmes include mechanisms to 
tighten the cap gradually.
Caps in the carbon markets have slower reductions maybe because 
of higher short-term mitigation costs. In the Australian scheme, there 
is no cap on emissions during the initial so-called ‘fixed-price phase’ 
(2012 – 2014) but a price that rises from AUS 23.00 per tonne in 
2012 / 2013 to AUS 25.40 in 2014 / 2015. The fixed price scheme, has 
many of the characteristics of a tax and offered advantages in the 
specific political circumstances that failed to agree on an emissions 
target but not on a price (Jotzo et al., 2012) hence preferring implic-
itly uncertainty on emissions rather than on the price (Jotzo and Betz, 
2009; Jotzo and Hatfield-Dodds, 2011; Pearce, 2012). The fixed price 
period naturally established a price signal and provided time for 
important elements of the flexible price period to be implemented, 
such as an auction platform. Starting with the first flexible-price phase 
(2015 – 2018), the government will set annual caps for five-year peri-
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ods, extending the cap by one year every year. A default cap (associ-
ated to a GHG emissions reduction of 5 % from 2000 levels by 2020) 
will apply in the event the parliament cannot agree on a cap (CAUS, 
2012).
New Zealand, on the other hand, has operated within the Kyoto cap 
for 2008 – 2012 by requiring every unit of emission to be matched by 
a Kyoto unit at the end of the Protocol’s true-up period. For 2012 and 
forward, the government has proposed legislative amendments to 
introduce a domestic cap and remove the requirement to back domes-
tic emission with Kyoto units (NZME, 2013).
The cap in the California scheme is set in 2013 at about 2 % devi-
ating under the projected level for 2012, and then drops about 2 % 
in 2014 and about 3 % from 2015 to 2020 on an annual basis (4 % 
of allowances will be held in reserve to contain costs). The Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative has introduced a ‘soft’ fixed cap from 2009 
to 2014 to decline by 2.5 % per year. Economic growth and natural 
gas prices have been lower than expected, so it is unlikely that the cap 
becomes binding by 2020 (Aldy and Stavins, 2012).9
15�5�3�5 Allocations
Permits have been allocated either by auction, or have been given 
away for free. In the latter case, allocation has been proportional to 
past emissions or output (i. e., grandfathered) or proportional to cur-
rent output. Earlier programmes relied almost exclusively on grand-
fathering. The SO2 allowance programme allocated less than 3 % of 
the total cap, through revenue-neutral auctions; mainly to provide an 
earlier and more reliable price signal to participants (Ellerman, Conv-
ery, De Perthuis, et al., 2010). Some of the recent carbon markets also 
provide free allocations because of concerns about emissions-intensive 
trade-exposed industries. In fact, the programme in New Zealand con-
siders a very limited amount of auctioning (although increasing over 
time) unlike RGGI, which allocates the vast majority of permits through 
auctions (the softer cap in RGGI may explain the difference). Australia 
and California are somewhere in the middle in terms of auctioning, 
roughly 50 % and 80 % respectively.
The Californian and Australian schemes also make explicit output-based 
(free) allocation rules for energy-intensive, trade-exposed sectors, where 
recent production determines firm-level allocation. The Australian expe-
rience on this matter has also shown the influence that industry lobby 
groups can have in policy design (Garnaut, 2008; Pezzey et al., 2010) 
and how politically involved this can become (Macintosh et al., 2010). 
9 There is a proposal from the RGGI states, however, to reduce the cap in 45 % by 
2020 (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Inc., 2013).
15�5�3�6 Linking of schemes
Linking occurs when a trading scheme allows permits from another 
trading programme to be used to meet domestic targets. Such link-
ages can be mutually beneficial as they can improve market liquid-
ity and lower costs of compliance. However, these benefits need to be 
weighed against challenges like losing unilateral control over domestic 
design and being subject to international price movements. Linking, 
however, involves certain tradeoffs in terms of exposure to interna-
tional prices and loss of flexibility to unilaterally change features in 
the domestic design once links are established. International linkage 
of trading schemes might be simpler than harmonizing carbon taxes 
through international agreements (Karpas and Kerr, 2011). There is 
however, not general agreement on this point; to the contrary, agree-
ments on taxes might avoid the most contentious baseline issues see 
for instance Nordhaus (2007). 
The experience with linking is limited because carbon markets are 
relatively recent. One example of a linking process is the ongoing col-
laboration, since 2007, between California and the Canadian prov-
ince of Quebec, which will both place compliance obligations on large 
emitters under their trading schemes beginning in January 2013 and 
continue negotiations for a full linking of the two schemes later on in 
2013 (CARB, 2011). Another example is the announcement in 2013 
of an Australia-EU ETS link by 2018 preceded by a transition phase 
in which Australian installations can use EU-Allowances for compli-
ance from 2015 on. Interestingly, Australia is also exploring ways for 
establishing links with schemes in South Korea and California, which, 
de facto, would create links between all these trading schemes.10 We 
do not yet know if linking schemes without prior commitment on 
overall caps will facilitate or complicate future negotiations on the 
caps.
15�5�3�7 Other design issues: banking, offsets, leakage, 
price volatility and market power
There are additional, important, aspects of policy design on which 
we can only briefly touch here. Unlike borrowing, banking of per-
mits for future use is a feature used in many trading schemes with 
good results in terms of cost savings and environmental benefits (i. e., 
absence of emission spikes and acceleration of emission reductions). 
A well-documented example is the US SO2 allowance programme (Ell-
erman and Montero, 2007). A dramatic example of volatility is given 
by the RECLAIM programme where in the summer of 2000 permit 
prices that began under USD 5,000 per ton of NOx increased abruptly 
in price to almost USD 45,000, leading to a relaxation of the cap see 
Metcalf (2009). Offsets, the possibility of using emission credits out-
side the capped sectors either domestically or internationally (e. g., 
CDM or REDD), is another design feature common in most trading 
10 The firm intentions of New Zealand and Australia about linking their systems came 
to a sudden end after the latter announced it was linking its system to the EU ETS.
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schemes but of much concern because of the well-known tension 
between cost-effectiveness and additionality. One way to somewhat 
assuage this tension is to move away from a project-based crediting 
approaches (e. g., CDM) to scaled-up approaches — to the level of the 
sector, jurisdiction or country. Offset provisions, if well designed, can 
also help alleviate the ‘leakage’ problem of moving emissions from 
capped to uncapped sectors. An alternative design option to address 
leakage might be to use output-based allocation rules although this 
will raise concerns related to output subsidy. Another problem is mar-
ket power specific to permit trading which has been the subject of 
much research since the work of Hahn (1984). It seems, however, that 
market power is less of a problem than anticipated (Liski and Mon-
tero, 2011), also confirmed by findings from laboratory experiments 
(Sturm, 2008).
15�5�3�8 Choice between taxes and emissions trading
Regarding the choice between taxes and tradable permits, longstand-
ing economic theory (Weitzman, 1974; Hoel and Karp, 2001, 2002; 
Newell and Pizer, 2003) suggests that in the presence of uncertainty 
about the marginal cost of emission reduction, for a stock pollutant 
like CO2, a carbon tax is more economically efficient than a tradable 
permit system. According to the Weitzman intuition, a tax is preferred 
since the benefits curve is fairly flat for a stock pollutant (this result 
could be changed in the presence of a major threshold effect). The 
reason is essentially that when there is a negative shock to the cost 
of emission reduction, as has been the case in the EU following the 
economic slowdown that began in 2008, cost efficiency calls for doing 
more abatement, with less being done at other times when the abate-
ment cost is higher. This is achieved with a tax, but not with a cap that 
is fixed in each period. The slump in the carbon price in the EU ETS is 
thus suggestive of a loss of cost-effectiveness.
In the very long run there may be more uncertainty about the level 
of an optimal tax than about a quantity target and policymakers may 
then prefer to legislate a long-run abatement target in a cap-and-trade 
system. As seen above, this can entail short-run efficiency losses and it 
would be desirable to allow flexibility with regard to annual caps that 
would add up to the long run target, but concerns about credibility 
mean that such flexibility must be severely limited. As shown in Chap-
ter 2 (Section 2.6.5), there is a literature on regulatory uncertainty that 
shows extra costs deriving from the hesitancy by investors in the face 
of all regulatory uncertainty but in particular perhaps, when it comes 
to cap-and-trade systems.
To prevent a large loss of efficiency in a cap-and trade-system, and to 
avoid exceptionally high price volatility that deters investment, price 
floors and ceilings can be used, although care would be needed in 
design to avoid breaching the integrity of the cap. Banking and bor-
rowing of permits (see Section 15.5.3) are another means of providing 
intertemporal flexibility in abatement as are the availability of credit 
reserves or of offsets.
As explained in Section 15.7, a tax can be used in conjunction with 
other policy instruments while a cap-and-trade system either renders 
the other policies environmentally irrelevant or is itself rendered envi-
ronmentally irrelevant by them. This is a major concern when decision 
making takes place at several levels. 
As discussed in Section 15.5.2.4, the issues of intertemporal (and spa-
tial) leakage discussed in the green paradox literature would appear to 
give preference to cap and trade over taxes but this is partly a simpli-
fication. The green paradox mainly exists in oversimplified models and 
poorly designed tax schemes. There are however, lessons from this lit-
erature concerning design details. For example, one might prefer high 
taxes that grow slowly to low taxes that rise very fast, and one might 
be careful with too much flexibility, particularly borrowing in permit 
systems. Kalkuhl and Edenhofer (2013) compares four policies, (1) a 
conventional Pigouvian carbon tax, (2) a carbon tax rule (that adjusts 
the tax level dependent on GHG concentrations), a permit trade (3)
with or (4) without banking and borrowing) in the context of a (weak) 
green paradox setting with respect to three different criteria: the infor-
mational burden for the government, the commitment problem of the 
government, and the robustness of the policy with respect to devia-
tions in behaviour (discount rate) by agents in the economy. They find 
that a tax and a trading scheme without banking and borrowing have 
high informational requirements. The ETS with banking and borrow-
ing shifts the timing problem of carbon emissions to the private sector, 
but does not work well if these have different discount rates from the 
regulator. The flexible tax rule or an ETS with restricted banking and 
borrowing can lead to an optimal allocation even in this case, but then 
again the informational requirements for the regulator are daunting. 
One of the attractions of emissions trading schemes appears to have 
been that they may meet with less opposition from industry, which 
can be allocated permits for free. Taxation is often resisted by lobbies 
and sometimes for constitutional reasons. Taxation is also resisted by 
those who want a smaller government — in which case environmen-
tal fiscal reform (raising carbon taxes while lower other taxes) may 
be more acceptable. Another argument that has been made in favour 
of an ETS is that it may be easier to link permit schemes across bor-
ders than to agree on common taxes. Harmonization is advantageous, 
since it reduces costs (15.7). There is however, no general agreement 
on this. Some analysts believe the opposite, that it will be easier to 
link taxation systems within an international agreement (Helm, 2003; 
Nordhaus, 2007; Jaffe et al., 2009; Metcalf and Weisbach, 2011) and 
(15.8.1). Finally, linking cap-and-trade systems would automatically 
involve financial transfers between countries. These might be a ben-
efit for low-income countries if they can be carbon-efficient and maybe 
less controversial than negotiated side payments but this hinges on 
agreement concerning the various country targets.
Finally taxes, unlike an emission-trading scheme, do not require a new 
institutional infrastructure to keep track of ownership of emissions 
allowances. This consideration may be especially important in develop-
ing countries.
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15�5�4 Regulatory approaches
15�5�4�1 Overview of the implementation of regulatory 
approaches 
As discussed in Section 15.2, economy-wide carbon pricing, though 
widely discussed in the literature, has been rarely implemented. Those 
policies that have been implemented have often been sector-specific, 
and have often fallen in the category of a regulatory approach. Regula-
tory approaches are used across sectors, usually alongside other poli-
cies, as can be seen in Table 15.2. For example, Renewable Portfolio 
Standards (RPS), and energy efficiency standards may be combined 
with fuel subsidy reduction in the energy sector (Chapter 7). In the 
transport sector, vehicle efficiency and fuel quality standards are used 
alongside government provision of mass transit, and fuel taxes (Chap-
ter 8). In the building sector, a number of complementary policies, such 
as appliance standards, labelling, and building codes are employed, 
along with tax exemptions for investment in energy-efficient build-
ings (9.9). In the industrial sector, energy audits for energy-intensive 
manufacturing firms are also regularly combined with voluntary or 
negotiated agreements and energy management schemes. Information 
programmes are the most prevalent approach for energy efficiency, 
followed by economic instruments, regulatory approaches and volun-
tary actions (10.11). 
Several of these regulatory approaches often contain market-like fea-
tures so that the distinction between regulatory approaches and eco-
nomic instruments is not always sharp. Renewable Portfolio Standards 
programmes often, for example, allow utilities to satisfy their obliga-
tions by purchasing renewable energy credits from other producers, 
while feed-in tariffs involve both regulations and subsidies for renew-
able energy. Low-carbon fuel standards also sometimes incorporate 
market-like features including trading among suppliers.
Regulatory approaches play the following roles in mitigation policy. 
First, they directly limit greenhouse gas emissions by specifying tech-
nologies or their performance. Second, in sectors such as AFOLU (see 
Chapter 11) and urban planning (see Chapters 8 and 12) in which 
much activity is strongly influenced by government planning and pro-
vision, regulations that take climate policy into account are clearly 
important. These are discussed in further in Section 15.5.6. Third, 
regulations such as RPS can promote the diffusion and innovation of 
emerging technologies, a role that is examined in Section 15.6. Fourth, 
regulations may remove barriers for energy efficiency improvement. 
These may arise when firms and consumers are hindered by the dif-
ficulty of acquiring and processing information about energy efficient 
investments, or have split incentives as in landlord-tenant relation-
ships. 
Regulatory approaches have been criticized, both for being environ-
mentally ineffective, and more strongly, for lack of cost-effectiveness, 
as the governments have limited information and may make govern-
mental failures in intervention (Helm, 2010; see also Section 3.8.2). 
Some are opposed to the regulations on libertarian philosophical 
grounds (Section 3.10.1.1). In what follows, we assess the environ-
mental and cost effectiveness of regulatory approaches, largely focus-
ing on short-run effects of energy efficiency policies that have been 
extensively studied. Long-run effects acting through technology devel-
opment are assessed in Section 15.6. There is insufficient literature on 
distributional incidence and feasibility to underpin an assessment of 
these dimensions.
15�5�4�2 Environmental effectiveness of energy efficiency 
regulations
Several prospective studies reviewed by Gillingham, Newell, and 
Palmer (2006) and one large ex-post study of US energy efficiency 
standards for appliances (Meyers et al., 2003) found substantial energy 
savings. Such savings have also been found in the building sector 
across countries (Section 9.10) in a study of best-practice building 
codes and other standards. Recently, econometric studies in the United 
States have also found energy reductions from building codes (Aroon-
ruengsawat, 2012; Jacobsen and Kotchen, 2013). These studies also 
reported significant energy savings and related CO2 reduction. Fuel 
economy standards for vehicles have also been successful in reducing 
fuel consumption in many countries (Anderson et al., 2011). Generally 
speaking, energy efficiency policies that address market failure can 
result in energy savings (7.10, 8.10, 9.10, Table 9.8, 10.10). Some case 
studies however, identified weak environmental effectiveness due to 
lack of implementation. Such examples were found for building codes 
and energy management systems.
Rebound effects need to be taken into account in interpreting these 
findings of environmental effectiveness of energy efficiency regula-
tions. The rebound effect refers to the increase in energy consumption 
induced by a fall in the cost of using energy services as a result of 
increased energy efficiency. For detailed general discussion on rebound 
effects, see Sections 3.9.5 and 5.6.2. For sector-specific studies of 
rebound effects, see Section 9.6.2.4 for building sector and Chapter 8 
for transport sector. With regard to appliance standards and fuel-econ-
omy regulations in the United States, environmental effects remain 
large even when taking the rebound effect into account (Gillingham 
et  al., 2006; Anderson et  al., 2011). More generally, direct rebound 
effects (within the regulated sector as a result of the fall in the cost of 
energy services) are commonly found to be in the range of 10 % – 30 % 
in various sectors in developed countries, and higher in developing 
countries (Sorrell et al., 2009; Gillingham et al., 2013). Indirect rebound 
effects, which result from increased economic growth resulting from 
the fall in the cost of energy services, can be much larger. Reviewing 
claims of rebound effects in excess of 100 %, Dimitropoulos (2007) 
concluded that although the evidence base and methodologies were 
weak, the possibility of significant rebound effects could not be dis-
missed. A recent review suggests that total rebound effects are unlikely 
to exceed 60 % (Gillingham et al., 2013). 
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While the scale of the rebound effect varies, its presence suggests that 
complementary policies that include carbon pricing are called for so 
that mitigation is not compromised. Some countries, such as the UK, 
have begun to account for a direct rebound effect in energy policies 
(Maxwell et al., 2011).
Regulations such as emissions standards have also been criticized 
on the ground that they are less flexible than incentive-based 
approaches and may even provide perverse incentives and increase 
emissions under certain conditions like treating new units more strin-
gently than old ones (Burtraw et al., 2010). Yet, recent modelling that 
incorporates institutional features of various policies in the United 
States, including the capacity to adjust the stringency of a regulation 
or a cap / tax, suggests that emissions standards may be more effec-
tive than cap and trade in reducing overall emissions (Burtraw and 
Woerman, 2013).
15�5�4�3 Cost effectiveness of energy efficiency 
regulations
Regulatory approaches are often implemented in contexts in which 
market failures or barriers to adoption of energy-efficient technologies 
exist. There is a considerable sectoral literature showing that energy 
efficiency regulations have been implemented at negative costs to 
firms and individuals, meaning that their value to consumers exceeded 
programme costs on average. In the transport sector, fuel economy 
standards have been shown to produce net cost savings over the life 
of the vehicle (Chapter 8.10). In the building sector, a range of energy 
efficiency policies including appliance standards and building codes 
have been found to have negative private costs (Table 9.8), (Gilling-
ham et  al., 2006, 2009a). In the industrial sector, a number of case 
studies on energy management systems and energy audit systems 
show that they have been cost effective (Chapter 10.10).
The cost effectiveness of such regulations has been the subject of 
heated debate. Economic theory points to the following circumstances 
in which regulations may be implemented with negative private costs. 
Buyers may have less information about the efficiency and cost of a 
device than sellers. They may not be able to assess the energy sav-
ings from an appliance even after using it. This can lead to a situation 
in which low-efficiency devices drive more expensive high-efficiency 
models out of the market. Efficiency standards in this setting can 
improve consumer welfare by reducing the informational asymmetry 
between buyers and sellers (Akerlof, 1970; Leland, 1979; Goulder and 
Parry, 2008). When competition is imperfect and sellers compete on 
both quality (efficiency) and price, then a minimum quality standard 
eliminates low-quality sellers from the market enhancing price com-
petition among high-quality goods. This can make all consumers better 
off (Ronnen, 1991). Split incentives, as in landlord-tenant relationships, 
can lead to economically inefficient devices persisting in the market, 
absent intervention. For more details, see Box 3.10.
Individuals working in small workplaces often find it difficult to 
acquire and analyze information on energy efficiency (see 2.6.5.3 
on human behaviour on energy efficiency). As a consequence, those 
individuals are prone to rely on intuition to make decisions. In many 
cases, analyzing the minimum cost actions given the price signal is 
too challenging, and thus cognitive costs may result in some consum-
ers simply not taking operating (energy) costs into account at all while 
making their purchase decisions (Section 3.10.1.1). (Allcott, 2011) 
exhibits this case in a recent survey of US car buyers, 40 % of whom 
were shown not to consider fuel costs in their purchasing decision. 
This kind of consumer decision making can lead sellers to offer — and 
consumers to buy — less energy efficient products than if consumers 
could more easily compute the operating costs. Section 9.8 indicates 
that such barriers to energy efficiency are significant in the building 
sector. Regulation and information measures can help overcome these 
barriers. 
Large firms have more resources than individuals to assess information 
on energy efficiency, and so may be more sensitive to carbon pricing. 
However, firms, especially small and medium enterprises, also face the 
barriers such as split incentive and lack of information. Governments 
may employ regulations (and information measures) to help correct 
this by implementing energy efficiency standards for equipment. See 
3.10.1.2 for more on behaviour of firms on energy efficiency.
Although both the theory and empirical evidence detailed above show 
that policy interventions to remove barriers can have negative costs 
to firms and individuals, it has been argued that unaccounted labour 
and opportunity costs borne by governments, firms, and individuals 
involved in policy design and implementation process, as well as loss 
of amenity (for example, fuel economy standards may undermine other 
functions of cars, such as speed, safety, quality of air conditioning, and 
audio sets), result in understatement of regulatory costs. Such unac-
counted costs are called ‘hidden costs’ (Box 3.10). 
On the other hand, an ex-post evaluation of expected and realized 
costs of environmental regulations in the United States found that esti-
mates of the unit cost of regulations by the regulator were overstated 
just as often as they were understated, while total costs were more 
frequently overstated (Harrington et  al., 2000). Furthermore, Gilling-
ham et al. (2006) note that in the United States, “even if unaccounted-
for costs of appliance standards were almost equal to those measured, 
and actual energy savings only roughly half of those estimated, appli-
ance standards still would yield positive net benefits on average” 
(Gillingham et al., 2006b). There may also be hidden benefits of regu-
lations, (Sorrell, 2009), such as improved amenities and ‘free drivers’ 
(which would occur if nonparticipants were induced to invest in energy 
efficiency because others in the programme made such investments) 
induced by regulation (Gillingham et  al., 2006). In conclusion, while 
it is clear that opportunities do exist to improve energy efficiency at 
negative private cost by regulations, the literature is divided as to what 
extent such negative private cost opportunities exist.
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It is the social rather than the private costs of regulations, however, 
that are more relevant for public policy. This means that externalities 
need to be taken into account and co-benefits of policies, such as local 
air pollution reduction, would ideally be valued and subtracted from 
costs. Such externalities can be large. Muller, Mendelsohn, and Nord-
haus (2011) found that the external costs of coal-fired utilities in the 
United States exceeded value-added in that sector. These and other 
costs and benefits have to be taken into account when evaluating poli-
cies.
15�5�5 Information measures
Information measures have been widely used in all sectors. To take 
typical examples, energy efficiency labelling for home electric appli-
ances and thermal insulation of buildings, as well as carbon footprint 
certificates and public awareness initiatives are implemented in the 
building sector (9.10). Energy management systems, as well as govern-
ment-assisted energy audits, either mandatory or voluntary, are used 
in the building, industry, and energy sectors (7.10, 9.10, 10.10). Man-
datory reporting of GHG emissions is common for firms in the power 
and industrial sectors (7.10, 10.10), while labelling of automobile fuel 
economy is used in the transport sector (8.10). Sustainability certificate 
programmes are used in the forestry sector (11.10). 
Regarding the environmental and economic effectiveness, a number of 
case studies in the building sector are shown for the energy efficiency 
labelling for home electric appliance, building label and certificates, 
energy audit programmes, and awareness raising campaign to stimu-
late behavioural change (see 9.10, Table 9.8). For energy efficiency, the 
role of information measures is the same with regulatory approaches, 
that is, to address market failure such as lack of information and split 
incentives. For details of the market failure and role of information 
measures, see Section 15.5.4. 
While some studies mentioned above reported high economic and 
environmental effectiveness, the results are mixed in general, reflecting 
the wide diversity of the information measures, and it is not appropri-
ate to draw a general conclusion. Note that some policy instruments, 
such as energy management systems and energy audit in the indus-
trial sector that may fall either in regulatory approach and informa-
tion measures, are also covered in the section on regulatory approach 
above. 
Since information programmes typically provide information and 
leave it to firms or consumers to take appropriate action, those 
actions will usually only be taken spontaneously, or if they are per-
ceived to have negative private costs economically. The discussion of 
hidden costs / benefits and rebound effects parallels that of regulatory 
approach, are covered in Section 15.5.4.
It should be noted that the role of information measure has been 
mostly supplementary to other policy instruments such as obligatory 
standards or much wider policy package as detailed in sector specific 
policy chapter (7.10, 8.10, 9.10, 10.10, 11.10). For example, energy 
efficiency labelling is often followed by energy efficiency standard as a 
single policy package. This also makes difficult to estimate the impacts 
of the information measure alone.
15�5�6 Government provision of public goods 
or services, and procurement
While formal assessment is difficult, it is clear that public provision and 
planning can and have played a prominent role in the mitigation of 
climate change at the national and sub-national levels, and in a wide 
range of industries including energy, transport, agriculture, forestry, 
and others. At the national level, government provision or funding is 
crucial for basic research into low and zero-emission technologies (see 
Section 15.7).
In the energy sector, the provision and planning of infrastructure, 
whether for electricity transmission and distribution or district heating 
networks, interconnectors, storage facilities, etc., is complementary to 
the development of renewable energy sources such as wind and solar 
energy (7.6.1.3). A modal shift from air to rail transport also requires 
public planning or provision by national and local governments as a 
part of the policy mix and in best-case scenarios could reduce associ-
ated emissions by 65 – 80 % (8.4.2). 
Urban planning that incorporates climate change mitigation can have 
a major impact on emissions (Chapter 12); therefore, municipal gov-
ernments have a very important role to play. Since mitigation poli-
cies have many co-benefits at the local level, including reduced local 
pollution and congestion, and improved quality of urban space, cities 
have an interest in mitigation policies in addition to the largely exter-
nal climate benefits they provide. Land-use and transport policies can 
considerably influence the share of non-motorized transport, public 
transport, and associated emissions (8.4.2.3). Buildings and associ-
ated energy supply infrastructure are very long-lasting (9.4.5) so public 
planning to encourage the rapid adoption of new low-carbon tech-
nologies and avoid lock-in to high-emission infrastructure assumes 
importance. Such planning would need to take into account transport 
pricing relative to land prices, building, parking, and other zoning 
regulation, city-wide district heating and cooling systems, and green 
areas (see Section 12.5, and Baeumler et al., 2012). Capacity building 
at the municipal level may be needed for incorporating climate change 
mitigation and its co-benefits into the planning process, especially in 
developing countries (see Section 15.10.3).
Government planning and infrastructure provision can complement a 
carbon or fuel tax, addressing additional market failures that increase 
the quantity response to the price instrument by making substitution 
towards less energy and carbon-intensive lifestyles easier to imple-
ment. Conversely, whether or not a public transit system will gener-
ate sufficient demand to be economical depends on whether private 
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transit (and its climate externalities) is suitably priced. By contrast, as 
noted below in Section 15.8, a tradable permit system for emissions 
would be a substitute, rather than a complement for emission reduc-
tion through public provision. In conjunction with a tradable permit 
system, local actions would affect the cost of reducing emissions, but 
not overall emissions themselves. This raises the possibility that local 
governments may be de-motivated to integrate mitigation in their 
planning if they are located in a national or international jurisdiction 
with a tradable permit system. In that case, their actions would not be 
‘additional’ in GHG emission reduction, rather they would reduce the 
cost of meeting the overall cap. Furthermore, the cost reduction would 
not be captured entirely by the residents of the local jurisdiction in 
which the actions took place.
Since most of the world’s forests are publicly owned, provision of 
sequestration services as part of forest conservation is largely in the 
public sector. Forest protected areas make up 13.5 % of the worlds’ 
forests, and 20.8 % for tropical lowland evergreen broadleaf forests 
(rainforests) (Schmitt et  al., 2009). During the period 2000 – 2005, 
strictly protected forest areas experienced 70 % less deforestation than 
all tropical forests (Campbell et  al., 2008), but impact studies must 
also control for ‘passive protection’ (protected areas being located in 
remote and inaccessible areas), and ‘leakage’ (more deforestation out-
side the protected area). The understanding of how protected areas 
can contribute to forest conservation, and thereby be a means of cli-
mate change mitigation, has advanced much since AR4, due to better 
spatial data and methods.
Andam et al. (2008) find substantial passive protection for protected 
areas in Costa Rica. While a simple comparison suggests that pro-
tected areas reduce deforestation by 65 %, the impact drops to 10 % 
after controlling for differences in location and other characteristics. 
Gaveau et  al. (2009) estimate the difference between deforestation 
rates in protected areas and wider areas in Sumatra, Indonesia dur-
ing the 1990s to be 58.6 %; this difference falls to 24 % after propen-
sity score matching which accounts for passive protection. In a global 
study, also using matching techniques, Joppa and Pfaff (2011) finds 
that for about 75 % of the countries, protected areas reduce forest con-
version, but that in 80 % of these controlling for land characteristics 
reduces the impact by 50 % or more. Thus, an emerging consensus is 
that protected areas reduce deforestation (Chomitz et al., 2007), even 
though protection is not perfect, and there is a medium to high degree 
of passive protection. Estimates of leakage are more challenging, as 
the channels of leakage are diverse and harder to quantify. 
Local governance of forests can be an effective way of reducing emis-
sions from deforestation and forest degradation, as at least some of 
the public goods provided by forest are included in the decision mak-
ing process. A meta-analysis of 69 cases of community forest manage-
ment finds that 58 % of these were successful in meeting ecological 
sustainability criteria, e. g., ‘improved forest condition’ (Pagdee et al., 
2006). Similarly, using data from 80 different forest management 
units in 10 countries, a study found positive correlation between 
greater devolved authority at the local level with higher levels of 
carbon sequestration (Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009). However, a study 
analyzing forest cover of central Himalaya in India that controls for 
confounders reports no statistically significant results (in forest cover) 
between village and state-managed forests, even though the costs per 
hectare are seven folds greater for the state-managed forests (Som-
anathan et al., 2009). 
Where property rights are insecure, strengthening land rights is often 
put forward as a way to contain deforestation, though the effects are 
ambiguous. It is argued that the lack of tenure rights can discourage 
investment in land and increase soil exhaustion. This would, in turn, 
lead to greater incentives to deforest to compensate for the lost pro-
ductivity due to degradation. Unclear tenure can also lead to unpro-
ductive and violent land conflicts (Alston et  al., 2000). However, by 
increasing the value of land clearing, policies that strengthen private 
property rights over land could increase deforestation (Angelsen, 
1999).
15�5�7 Voluntary actions
It has become quite common for major firms, either individually or in 
alliance with others, to commit to mitigation of climate change as part 
of their corporate social responsibility through emission cuts at their 
offices and facilities, technological research, development, and sales of 
climate friendly equipment (See IPCC, 2007). Non-government organi-
zations also initiate voluntary actions (See Section 15.9). 
This section focuses on voluntary agreements that are convened by 
industries in association with government. Voluntary agreements have 
been developed in very different ways in different nations, depending 
on their institutional and corporate culture background. In what fol-
lows the literature will be reviewed according to the three categories 
provided by Pinkse and Kolk (2009).
15�5�7�1 Government-sponsored voluntary programmes 
for firms
Government-sponsored programmes for firms, where participation is 
completely voluntary and there are no penalties for not participating in 
the agreement, have been implemented in several countries, including 
the United States and Australia. The United States EPA led voluntary 
programmes foster partnerships with industry and the private sector 
at large by providing technical support among other means (US EPA, 
2013).
Ex-post case studies on the environmental and economic effective-
ness have been scarce compared to the wide range of activities. Where 
available, they have been critical of this type of programme. Several 
studies say little reduction was achieved (see Brouhle et al. (2009) ana-
lyzing a voluntary programme in the US metal-finishing industry) or 
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the impacts were short lived, as was the case for the US Climate Wise 
Program (Morgenstern et al., 2007). See also Griffiths et al. (2007) and 
Lyon and Maxwell (2004) who conclude the US Climate Leaders pro-
gramme had little effect on firm behaviour. 
15�5�7�2 Voluntary agreements as a major complement to 
mandatory regulations
Voluntary agreements (VAs) often form a part of a larger climate policy 
approach that contains binding policies such as a carbon tax or a cap-
and-trade programme. Voluntary agreements conducted jointly with 
mandatory regulations have been widely implemented in Europe (Rez-
essy and Bertoldi, 2011).
This approach allows the regulated industries to use the voluntary 
agreement as a partial fulfilment of the mandatory regulation. For 
example, through participation in the CCA in the UK, energy intensive 
industrial sectors established targets to improve energy efficiency and 
the companies that met such targets received an 80 % discount from 
the CCL (Price et al., 2008). Likewise, the Dutch government ensured 
industries participating in Long-Term Agreements (LTA) were not sub-
ject to additional government policies regulating CO2 emission reduc-
tions or energy conservation and that the new energy tax would not be 
levied on the participating industries. In both cases participants estab-
lished a long term plan to save energy and reduce CO2, and imple-
mented energy management systems (Price et al., 2008; Stenqvist and 
Nilsson, 2012).
Some studies found that the voluntary agreements were environmen-
tally and economically effective. Bressers et al. (2009) found positive 
results in terms of ambition, compliance, goal attainment and behav-
ioural change. They also acknowledged the efficiency advantages of 
flexibility in phasing technical measures. Ekins and Etheridge (2006) 
analyzed the UK CCA and found that, while the targets were not very 
stringent and were generally achieved in advance of the set date, the 
CCAs appeared to have catalyzed energy savings by increasing aware-
ness. This allowed the net environmental benefits to exceed what 
would have been achieved by levying a flat tax without rebates and 
CCAs while also generating economic gains for the companies under 
the CCAs (Ekins and Etheridge, 2006).
Rezessy and Bertoldi (2011) assessed the effectiveness of voluntary 
agreements in nine EU member countries. In cases where there is 
cooperative culture between governmental entities and the private 
sector, VAs can have some beneficial effects compared to legislation. 
They include willingness by the industry, sharing of information, flex-
ibility in phasing measures, and fine-tuned solutions to individual 
industries. They emphasized that by engaging signatories in energy 
audits, consumption monitoring, energy management systems and 
energy efficiency project implementation, the voluntary agreements 
helped overcome the barrier for energy efficiency improvement in a 
systematic manner. Nevertheless, they also noted that the VAs had 
been criticized for lenient targets, deficiencies in monitoring, and 
difficulty in establishing the additionality. There are other critical 
studies. Bohringer and Frondel (2007) argued that they found little 
evidence that the commitment of the German cement industry was 
effective, due to weak monitoring. Martin et  al. (2011) concluded 
that the CCL had strong negative environmental impacts. Voluntary 
agreement between the European Commission and the car indus-
try which set a mid-term target of 25 % reduction on CO2 emissions 
from automobiles by 2008 completely failed (Newell and Paterson, 
2010).
15�5�7�3 Voluntary agreements as a policy instrument in 
governmental mitigation plan
Voluntary agreements may be used as a major policy instrument with 
wide coverage and political salience in a governmental mitigation 
plan. This type of voluntary agreement has been implemented in Japan 
and Taiwan, province of China. 
The Japanese Voluntary Action Plan (VAP) by Keidanren (Japan Busi-
ness Federation) was initiated in 1997. The plan, led by Keidanren 
and joined by 114 industrial associations, covered about 80 % of 
GHG emissions from Japan’s industrial and energy transformation 
sectors. The plan is embedded in the regulatory culture in which the 
government constantly consults with industrial associations. It was 
reviewed annually in governmental committees, and an independent 
third party committee was also established to monitor its implemen-
tation; the included industries were required to be accountable with 
their environmental performance constantly. Industrial groups and 
firms established energy and GHG management systems, exchanged 
information, being periodically reviewed and acted to improve 
energy efficiency and cut GHG emissions. Several industry sectors 
raised the ambition levels with stricter targets during the course of 
VAP, once they achieved original targets (Tanikawa, 2004; Akimoto, 
2012; Uchiyama et  al., 2012; Yamaguchi, 2012). An econometric 
analysis found that voluntary actions by the manufacturing sector 
led to significant energy efficiency investments (Sugino and Arimura, 
2011). 
Two successful case studies in VAP have been reported. In cutting 
stand-by power by electric appliances, three major industrial associa-
tions announced 2001 the target to limit stand-by power less than 1 
W for all electric appliances to be met by 2003. It was possible for 
them to commit to the ambitious targets — ambitious in terms of the 
level of target (1 W), wide coverage of appliances, and early timing of 
goal — exactly because it was voluntary, not mandatory. In contrast, 
other countries that took a regulatory approach have implemented 
much weaker targets at later dates, and the coverage of appliances 
had been small. By 2003, almost all appliances met the target on time 
in Japan. Also, semiconductor industrial associations committed to cut 
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Perfluorocarbons (PFC) emissions in 1998 and succeeded in reduction 
by 58 % by 2009 (Wakabayashi, 2013). 
Chen and Hu (2012) analyzed the voluntary GHG reduction agree-
ments of six different industrial sectors, as well as the fluorinated gases 
(F-gas) reduction agreement of the semiconductor and liquid crystal 
display (LCD) industries in Taiwan, province of China. They found that 
the plan launched in 2005 was largely successful. 
15�5�7�4 Synthesis
The voluntary agreements have been successful particularly in coun-
tries with traditions of close cooperation between government and 
industry (IPCC, 2007; Rezessy and Bertoldi, 2011; Akimoto, 2012; 
Yamaguchi, 2012).
Successful voluntary agreements are characterized by a proper institu-
tional framework. This framework consists of, first, capable and influ-
ential industrial associations that serve as an arena for information 
exchange and development of common expectation among industries. 
Second, governmental involvement in implementation review is cru-
cial. Third, accompanying measures such as technical assistance and 
subsidies for energy audits and equipment can also be instrumental. 
Finally, regulatory threats, even if they are not explicitly articulated, are 
an important motivating factor for firms to be active in the voluntary 
agreements.
The key benefits of voluntary agreements are: 1) quick planning and 
actions when technological solutions are largely known but still face 
uncertainties; 2) flexibility in phasing technical measures; 3) facilitating 
coordination and information exchange among key stakeholders that 
are crucial to removing barriers to energy efficiency and CO2 reduc-
tions; and 4) providing an opportunity for ‘learning by doing’ and shar-
ing experiences.
However, several voluntary agreements have been criticized for not 
bringing about significant environmental impacts due to their limited 
scope or lack of proper institutional framework to ensure the actions 
to be taken (see Sections 15.5.7.2 and 15.5.7.3).
As cross-national evaluations, Morgenstern and Pizer (2007) reviewed 
voluntary environmental programmes in the United States, Europe, and 
Japan and found average reductions in energy use and GHG emissions 
of approximately 5 % beyond baselines. Borck and Coglianese (2009) 
argued that, as an alternative to regulatory approaches, voluntary 
agreements may effectively achieve small environmental goals at com-
paratively low cost.
The major role of voluntary agreements is to facilitate cooperation 
among firms, industrial associations, and governments in order to find 
and implement low cost emissions reduction measures. Such a role is 
important because large mitigation potential exists, yet it is hampered 
by formidable barriers such as lack of information and coordination 
among actors. In such context the voluntary agreements can play an 
important role as part of a policy package. 
15�5�8 Summary 
This section has reviewed a range of policy instruments. Among the 
four policy evaluation criteria, literature is rich for economic and envi-
ronmental effectiveness. The distributional incidence of taxes has 
been studied quite extensively, much less is known about other policy 
instruments. Political and institutional feasibility was also discussed as 
a design issue of economic instruments. The reasons for which sector 
specific policy instruments such as regulations and information mea-
sures have higher political feasibility than economy-wide economic 
instruments were briefly discussed in Section 15.2, but there is a 
dearth of literature really analyzing this issue.
Basic economics suggests that one instrument — e. g., a price on car-
bon — would be most cost effective in dealing with the market failure 
associated with the release of greenhouse gases. The presence of other 
market failures, however, means that one instrument is insufficient for 
dealing comprehensively with issues related to the climate problem. 
We have seen in Section 15.5.4 that there are cognitive and institu-
tional factors that imply barriers to market response to carbon prices. 
Therefore, regulatory approaches, information programmes, voluntary 
agreements, and government provision may serve as a complement to 
pricing policy as a way to remove barriers, thereby saving the money 
of firms and individuals and reducing social costs. There are strong 
separate arguments for a technology policy to correct for the external-
ity implied by insufficient protection of property rights, as detailed in 
Section 15.6. Furthermore, because carbon-pricing policy is often lack-
ing or insufficient for political reasons in nations, various policy instru-
ments are playing substitutive role (see Section 8.10 for examples of 
the transport sector).
In several sectors such as transport, urban planning and buildings, 
energy, and forestry, government planning and provision of infra-
structure is important, even crucial, for achieving emission reduc-
tions in a cost-effective manner. Absent the appropriate infrastruc-
ture, the costs of achieving significant emission reduction might be 
prohibitive.
As discussed in Section 15.2 and this section, real-world politics tend 
to produce various policy instruments and differentiated carbon price 
across sectors owing to politics. Those policy instruments may posi-
tively interact as illustrated above, but may also negatively interact. 
Such interactions will be further detailed in Sections 15.7 and 15.8. 
Policymakers face the challenge to understand how the policy package 
is constructed in their nation and must harmonize various policy instru-
ments so that they interact synergistically.
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15.6 Technology policy 
and R&D policy
15�6�1 Overview of the role of technology 
policy and R&D policy
As discussed in Chapter 3.11, there are market failures associated with 
research, technology development, and technology diffusion that are 
distinct from and interact with the market failures associated with 
environmental harm of human activities such as anthropogenic climate 
change. There is therefore a distinct role for technology policy in cli-
mate change mitigation, which is complementary to the role of policies 
aimed directly at reducing current GHG emissions, which are discussed 
in Section 15.5 above.
Public policies and institutions affect the rate and direction of techno-
logical change at all points in the chain from the invention, to inno-
vation, to adoption and diffusion of the technology, and unaddressed 
market failures or barriers at any stage in the chain can limit policy 
effectiveness (Nemet, 2013). The innovation systems literature stresses 
that technology development and deployment are driven by both tech-
nology push (forces that drive the development of technologies and 
innovation such as R&D funding and tax breaks for R&D, patents), and 
demand pull forces that increase the market demand for technologies 
such as technology subsidies and standards (Gallagher et  al., 2012; 
Wilson et al., 2012).
Box 15�2 | National and sub-national policies specific to least developed countries (LDCs)
A number of developing countries have developed legislative and 
regulatory frameworks to measure and manage GHG emission 
(Box 15.1). These frameworks or strategies can be a part of larger 
development plans that aim to shift the economy to a low carbon 
and climate resilient trajectory. These plans can serve an important 
signaling function by aiding coordination of government agencies 
and stakeholders in addition to providing the government’s com-
mitment to a low-carbon policy framework (Clapp et al., 2010).
There are pre-requisites to develop these low carbon development 
strategies. Achieving this policy ‘readiness’ entails assembling the 
technical knowledge and analytical capacity, legal and institu-
tional capacity, and engagement of stakeholders in the process 
(Aasrud et al., 2010; van Tilburg et al., 2011). Capacity building 
is also a continuous process that aims to improve strategies over 
time to enhance low carbon outcomes. Readiness for market-
based instruments increases mitigative capacity in general and 
enables implementation and monitoring of mitigation policies 
(Partnership for Market Readiness, 2011). Due to tremendous 
variation in capacity across countries, sufficient flexibility to allow 
these strategies to evolve over time is needed (Clark et al., 2010; 
van Tilburg et al., 2011).
Evidence from CDM projects indicates that capacity building is 
necessary but not sufficient to allow countries to attract CDM 
projects. Targeted measures like support for Designated National 
Authorities have shown to be successful (Okubo and Michaelowa, 
2010). In addition, CDM projects have been an important mecha-
nism for creating awareness about climate change mitigation, and 
have served as an indirect link between cap-and-trade systems 
around the world (Michaelowa, 2013). Some developing country 
beneficiaries of CDM are also moving towards implementing 
longer-term national mitigation policies. For an assessment of 
the Clean Development Mechanism, please refer to Chapter 13 
(13.13.1.2) and Chapter 16 (16.8) for the technology component. 
Climate change mitigation has also been pursued through a co-
benefits approach (See Section 15.2). Increasing access to energy 
services is an important priority for policymakers in developing 
countries (Chapter 4). An estimated 1.3 billion of the world’s 
people have no access to electricity and roughly three billion rely 
on highly polluting and unhealthy traditional solid fuel for house-
hold heating and cooking (IEA, 2012; Pachauri et al., 2012, p. 19) 
(see Section 14.3.2.1). In the short term, policies may address use 
of climate-friendly technologies like solar lighting alternatives to 
kerosene lamps (Lam et al., 2012), and gasifier cook stoves (Grie-
shop et al., 2011), while longer term policies may address more 
comprehensive approaches such as universal grid connectivity. 
Chapter 6 (Section 6.6.2.3) and Chapter 16 (Box 16.3 in Section 
16.8) use global scenario results to conclude that universal basic 
energy access can be achieved without significantly increasing 
GHG emissions. 
One option particularly relevant for developing countries is a 
repeal of regressive subsidies given to fossil fuel based energy car-
riers, together with suitable compensating income transfers so as 
not to limit energy access or increase poverty (see Section 15.5.2). 
In some developing countries, subsidies to fossil fuels are slowing 
penetration of less expensive renewables. For example subsidies 
to natural gas result in an incremental levelized cost of wind 
power in Egypt of an estimated 88 % (Schmidt et al., 2012). Care 
must also be taken to ensure transparency and to clearly demon-
strate that the savings that accrue from the removal of subsidies 
will be used to benefit the poor.
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Technology systems may create path dependencies in the innovation 
process. The current dominance of the carbon-based system creates 
incentives to improve carbon technology rather than non-carbon. 
This has been observed in private (Aghion et  al., 2012) as well as 
public institutions (Unruh, 2000) exemplified by fossil fuel subsidies 
(OECD, 2013). Escaping carbon lock-in is essentially a problem of 
coordination (Rodrik, 2007; Kretschmer, 2008), which can be facili-
tated by public policy that addresses technology-push, demand-pull, 
and framework conditions in a complementary fashion (Nemet, 
2013). 
This section addresses the generic issues that arise in the implementa-
tion of policies intended specifically to foster the development and 
implementation of low-GHG technologies. It begins by discussing 
technology policy instruments in three overarching categories: 1) the 
patent system and other forms of intellectual property (IP); 2) public 
funding of research, tax subsidies for firms engaging in R&D; and 3) 
various policies designed to foster deployment of new technologies. 
It then moves on to discuss the impact of environmental policy on 
technological change in general, technological change in a broader 
social framework often termed an ‘enabling environment’ together 
with interactions across various elements of innovation systems, and 
finally the importance of incorporating programme evaluation into the 
design of technology policy. 
15�6�2 Experience with technology policy
15�6�2�1 Intellectual property
Public policy towards IP inherently involves a tradeoff between the 
desire to create incentives for knowledge creators and developers, 
and the desire to have new knowledge used as widely as possible 
once it is created (Hall, 2007). It is therefore crucial to analyze the 
extent to which IP protection such as patents, will foster climate 
change mitigation, by encouraging the creation and development of 
new GHG-reducing technologies, versus the extent to which it will 
hamper mitigation by raising the cost and limiting access to such 
new technologies as are developed. Intellectual Property policy will 
affect climate change mitigation both through its effects on the cre-
ation of new technology and on the international transfer of miti-
gation technology. The first of these mechanisms will be considered 
here; the effect of IP policy on technology transfer is discussed in 
Chapter 13.9.
In general, the empirical evidence that IP protection stimulates inno-
vation is limited to the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors, and to 
developed economies (Park and Ginarte, 1997). It is unclear to what 
extent IP protection is relevant to the development of the kind of tech-
nologies that would mitigate climate change in advanced and middle 
income countries, and it appears unlikely to be relevant to indigenous 
technology development in the poorest countries (Hall and Helmers, 
2010).11
The Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement gener-
ally commits all countries to create and enforce standard IP protections, 
but it does allow for the possibility of exceptions to standard patent 
regulations for public policy reasons (World Trade Organization, 1994). 
Hence a major policy issue related to climate change is the extent to 
which developing countries will be compelled within the TRIPS frame-
work to enforce strong IP protection relative to GHG-reducing technolo-
gies, or whether an exception or exceptions will develop for these tech-
nologies on public policy grounds (Derclaye, 2008; Rimmer, 2009).
Because the evidence that strong IP protection increases domestic 
innovation is almost entirely limited to specific sectors in the devel-
oped world, it is unclear whether maintenance of strong IP protection 
in less developed countries will increase those countries’ indigenous 
creation or adaptation of GHG-reducing technologies. As discussed in 
Chapter 13, however, the evidence does suggest that the presence of 
an effective IP regime is a factor in fostering technology transfer into 
a country.
15�6�2�2 Public funding of research and development
Public funding of research and development may address specific mar-
ket failures related to innovation (as discussed in Chapter 3.11), but 
may also help to compensate for barriers to private investment that may 
result from long lifetimes of incumbent technologies leading to lengthy 
transition times from one system / technology to another (Fouquet and 
Pearson, 2006; Fouquet, 2010), uncertainty about future levelized costs 
of capital or discount rates (Nemet, 2013), or the lack of guarantee on 
the success of an investment (Mazzucato, 2013; Nemet, 2013).
Public research expenditures that have the potential to foster the long-
run development of GHG-mitigating technology come under a number of 
different common public research expenditure categories, including envi-
ronment, agriculture, materials, and others. There are no widely accepted 
data that attempt to identify and sum up public expenditures across dif-
ferent categories that potentially relate to mitigation technologies. Much 
discussion about the potential for technological change to mitigate GHG 
emissions revolves around reducing and eliminating use of fossil fuels, 
and the largest single category of public research expenditure related to 
mitigation is energy research, discussed in Chapter 7.12.2.
Public energy-related research expenditures among the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) countries currently comprise about 5 % of total 
public R&D spending in those countries, less than half the share of 
11 There are however other relevant examples for instance of indigenous knowledge 
in developing countries being valuable when it comes to biodiversity and pharma-
ceuticals.
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such research in total public research spending in 1980. Gallagher et 
al. (2012) report an increase in public funding for energy-technologies 
among IEA member countries in the 2000s but also find a continued 
prominence of funding for nuclear and fossil fuel technologies. A simi-
lar trend has been noted for non-IEA members like Brazil, China India, 
Mexico, Russia, and South Africa (Gallagher et  al., 2012). A gradual 
but steady increase in this share is a major policy option for fostering 
the long-run development of GHG-reducing technologies (Jaffe, 2012).
The U. S. National Research Council (NRC) evaluated Federal Energy 
research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) investments in 
energy efficiency and fossil energy for the period 1978 – 2000. The NRC 
found that these investments “yielded significant benefits (economic, 
environmental, and national security-related), important technological 
options for potential application in a different (but possible) economic, 
political, and / or environmental setting, and important additions to the 
stock of engineering and scientific knowledge in a number of fields” 
(U. S. National Research Council, 2001). In terms of overall benefit-
cost evaluation, the NRC found that the energy efficiency programmes 
produced net realized economic benefits that ‘substantially exceeded’ 
the investment in the programmes. For the fossil energy programmes, 
the net realized economic benefits were less than the cost of the pro-
grammes for the period 1978 – 1986, but exceeded the cost of the pro-
grammes for 1986 – 2000 (U. S. National Research Council, 2001). Japa-
nese technology RD&D programmes for renewable energy and energy 
efficiency, known as Sunshine program and Moonlight program since 
1974, were also found to be both economically and environmentally 
effective (Kimura, 2010).
In the short run, the availability of appropriately trained scientists and 
engineers is a constraint on a country’s ability to increase its research 
output (Goolsbee, 1998) (See also Jensen and Thomson, 2013). This 
factor combines with short-run adjustment costs in laboratory facilities 
to make rapid ramp-up in research in a particular area likely to be cost-
ineffective, as found to occur, for example, as a result of the doubling 
of US health research (Cockburn et  al., 2011). Therefore, sustained 
gradual increases in research are likely to be more effective than short-
run rapid increases. In the long run, it is possible to expand the supply 
of scientific and technical labour available to perform energy-related 
research. This can occur through training that occurs when publicly 
funded research is carried out at universities and other combined 
research and teaching institutions, and / or via direct public funding of 
training. Success at increasing the technical workforce has been found 
to be a crucial factor in the long-run benefits of health-related research 
in the United States (Cockburn et al., 2011).
15�6�2�3 Policies to foster or accelerate deployment and 
diffusion of new technologies
In addition to fostering technology development through research, many 
policies seek to foster the deployment of GHG-mitigating technologies 
in households and firms. Such deployment policies could be thought 
of as a form of abatement policy, to the extent that they reduce emis-
sions relative to what would occur with the use of previous technologies. 
But the more fundamental reason for public policy to foster technology 
deployment is that deployment feeds back and enhances subsequent 
improvement of the technology over time (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Hen-
kel and Hippel, 2005; Jaffe, 2012). For example, publicly funded research 
certainly played a role in the digital revolution, but active government 
involvement as an early purchaser was also crucial (Mowery, 2011). Pur-
chases were made of products meeting stated technical specifications, 
and this approach has helped move products down the learning curve, 
eventually allowing civilian versions to be sold competitively.
Market failure in the deployment of new technologies is often illus-
trated via an image of a ‘Valley of Death’ between small scale or 
prototype developments and successful commercialization, in which 
the need for substantial increase in the scale of investment combines 
with uncertainty about technical reliability, market receptiveness and 
appropriability to stall or slow deployment (Grubb, 2004; Nemet, 2013, 
p. 112). A variety of demand-pull public policies can operate to carry 
technology deployment through the Valley of Death. 
As laid out in Table 15.2, economic instruments such as subsidies, reg-
ulatory approaches, information programmes, government provision of 
public goods and services, as well as voluntary actions are common 
across sectors. The targeted technologies include low-emission vehi-
cles such as hybrid cars in the transport sector (8.10), efficient electric 
appliances such as light-emitting diodes (LED) in the building sector 
(9.10), and advanced industrial equipment (11.10). Feed-in-tariffs are 
used for renewable in the power sector (7.10). Quantity requirement 
are also common, including RPSs in the power sector (7.10), biofuel 
mandates in the transport sector (8.10). Information programmes such 
as labelling of home electric appliance may be used to promote the 
sales of new, low emission technologies (9.10).
Since AR4, a large number of countries and sub-national jurisdictions 
have introduced support policies for renewable energy. These have 
promoted substantial diffusion and innovation of new energy tech-
nologies such as wind turbines and photovoltaic panels, though many 
renewable energy (RE) technologies still need policy support, if their 
market shares are to be increased (see 7.5.3, 7.6.1, 7.8.2, and Chap-
ter 11 Bioenergy Annex). 
Chapter 7 (citing the IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources 
and Climate Change Mitigation (SRREN)) argued that “...some feed in 
tariffs have been effective and efficient at promoting RE electricity, 
mainly due to the combination of long-term fixed price or premium 
payments, network connections, and guaranteed purchase of all RE 
electricity generated”. Feed-in-tariffs have been effective in promoting 
renewables in Germany and other nations (Couture and Gagnon, 2010; 
Ragwitz and Steinhilber, 2013). It is also argued that the flexibility of 
FITs can incorporate economic and technological changes (Klobasa 
et al., 2013) and encourage dynamic innovation (Mitchell et al., 2006). 
Proving dynamic efficiency in the narrow economic sense is more com-
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plicated, although Jaffe et al., (2005) have explored this in a somewhat 
positive light. 
There are different views on FITs, especially in relation to their cost-
effectiveness. Some criticize FIT of having ‘failed to harness market 
incentives’ because it is not statically cost effective (i. e., it supports 
photovoltaics in addition to wind energy, although the former is more 
expensive than the latter) (Frondel et al., 2008, 2010) . Schmalensee 
(2012), using a simple model, argues that while FITs shift risk away 
from investors in renewable energies, they may not reduce the risk to 
society as a whole. In a paper for the European Union, Canton and 
Linden (2010) argue that feed-in premiums are preferable to FITs if 
internal market distortions are to be avoided. 
With the increasing market shares of intermittent generation, new 
challenges have to be addressed in respect to grid and market integra-
tion such as capacity constraints, demand spikes, back up capacity, and 
transmission. A reform of market design, including flexible demand 
side pricing, is proposed to make the system more flexible so it can 
react to the new challenges (See 7.10 and SSREN Chapter 8 for details 
(Sims et al., 2012).
A theme that runs through many of the sectoral deployment policy 
discussions is the importance of information, and the relationship 
between incomplete information and risk. Uncertainty about the physi-
cal and economic performance of new technologies is a major factor 
limiting their diffusion, so policies that address information issues may 
be complementary with economic incentives or regulatory approaches. 
Many nations, including Germany, Spain, China, India, among others, 
have implemented ambitious deployment programmes for renewables 
consisting of capacity targets, FIT, and so forth (Jänicke, 2012), result-
ing in rapid capacity expansion and lower costs of technologies. Such 
progress may result in economic and environmental efficiency in the 
long run at the global scale (Kalkuhl et al., 2013). Ondraczek (2013) 
identifies awareness among consumers as a critical element in market 
development in Kenya and Tanzania and finds evidence for a ‘virtu-
ous cycle’ between dissemination and awareness. Friebe et al. (2013) 
emphasize the need for including pre and post-sales services to sustain 
the uptake of solar home systems. Glemarec (2012) highlights the role 
for public-private partnerships to deliver energy access but underlines 
the need for public investment in capacity and market development.
Many developing countries face a somewhat different set of choices 
in encouraging technology deployment because of the dominance 
of state-owned or other monopoly enterprises in the energy sector. 
Liu and Kokko (2010) evaluate the factors related to the significant 
growth of wind power in China, and conclude that administrative rules 
stipulating levels of wind usage have been more effective than incen-
tives operating through the pricing system. Pegels (2010) describes 
the introduction of a renewable FIT guaranteed for 20 years in South 
Africa, but notes that it is unclear what effect this will have on the 
investment decisions of the monopolist electricity supplier. 
15�6�3 The impact of environmental policy 
instruments on technological change
There is some empirical literature assessing the impact of generic 
environmental policy instruments (discussed in the previous section) 
on technological change. For surveys, see Newell (2010) and Popp 
et al. (2010b). Jaffe and Palmer (1997), looking across industries in the 
United States., found that more stringent regulation was associated 
with higher R&D expenditures (controlling for industry fixed effects), 
but did not find any impact on industry patents. Lanjouw and Moody 
(1996) did find that across the United States, Germany, and Japan, pat-
enting rates were correlated at the industry level with pollution control 
expenditures. 
A number of studies have looked at the impact of energy prices on 
energy-saving technological change. These effects can be seen as 
indicative of the possible consequences of GHG policies that increase 
the effective price of emitting GHG. Popp (2002) found that rising 
energy prices increased the rate of patenting with respect to alterna-
tive energy sources and energy efficiency, with more than one-half 
the effect coming within five years of energy price changes. Newell 
(1999) found that rising energy prices increased the efficiency of the 
menu of household appliances available for purchase in the United 
States. The Norwegian carbon tax appears to have triggered technol-
ogy innovation in the form of carbon dioxide storage in the Sleipner 
gas field (Sumner et al., 2011). Fuel taxes moved auto industry innova-
tion towards more efficient technologies (Aghion et al., 2012), and the 
EU ETS moved the firms most affected by its constraints towards low-
carbon innovation (Calel and Dechezleprêtre, 2012).
At a theoretical level, there are arguments why incentive-based policies 
such as carbon taxes or tradable permits are more conducive to inno-
vation than regulatory approaches (Popp, Newell, et al., 2010b). After 
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments in the United States implemented 
a tradable permit programme for sulphur dioxide, Popp (2003) found 
that the rate of patenting on techniques for sulphur removal increased, 
and Lange and Bellas (2005) found that both capital and operating 
expenditures for scrubbers were reduced. In a survey of research on 
the effects of tradable permit systems on technology innovation and 
diffusion, Bellas (2011) concluded “The general result is that tradable 
permit programs have improved the pollution control technology com-
pared to the previous regulation used.” Sterner and Turnheim (2009) 
find similarly that the very high fee on NOx in Sweden has led to a 
rapid process of both innovation and technology diffusion for abate-
ment technologies.
More recently, a few studies have explored the effect of renewable 
energy policies on energy innovation. Johnstone et  al. (2010) found 
that policy had a significant impact on patent applications for renew-
able technologies, with different policy instruments being effective for 
different technologies. Popp et al. (2010a) found that the link between 
greater patenting and investment in specific technologies is weak, but 
there does seem to be an association between policy and investment.
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15�6�4 The social context of technological 
transitions and its interaction with 
policy
The central insight from the empirical literature is that both technol-
ogy push and demand pull policies are required to be most effective 
(Nemet, 2009). A ‘virtuous cycle’ (IEA, 2003; Edenhofer et al., 2012) 
can occur, derived from learning from combined technology push and 
market pull whereby as ‘learning’ from market demand feeds back in 
to research and development, the improved product leads to more 
market demand and reduced costs. This virtuous technology and mar-
ket cycle has been extended to include a third cycle of policy learning 
(Jänicke, 2012) whereby as learning from a successful policy occurs 
across the innovation chain, it can also be fed back into the process.
A technology policy will be more effective if it addresses multiple 
aspects such as institutions, regulations and standards, political mod-
els, laws, social norms and preferences, individual behaviours, skills, 
and other characteristics. This idea was originally developed and 
encapsulated in the UNFCCC definition of an ‘enabling environment’ 
(UNFCCC, 2001).12 This general intention to match up specific technol-
ogy requirements with the system situation in which they develop has 
been called framework conditions (Grubb, 2004), enabling environ-
ment (Edenhofer et al., 2012; Johansson et al., 2012), enabling factors 
(Nemet, 2013), and complementary innovations (Grubb et al., 2014).
There is a literature base that explores technology transitions and the 
implications of multilevel interactions across social and technological 
elements (e. g., Geels, 2011; Meadowcroft, 2011; Foxon, 2011). Three 
social challenges are raised as especially salient to social management 
when attempting to alter the technological system: (1) the size and vis-
ibility of transfers and assets created; (2) the predictability of pressure 
to expand the focus of the policies to broaden the social benefits; and 
(3) the potential for market incentives and framings of environmen-
tal issues to undermine normative motivational systems (Parson and 
Kravitz, 2013). Managing these social challenges may require innova-
tions in policy and institutional design, including building integrated 
policies that make complementary use of market incentives, authority, 
and norms (Foxon, 2011; Gallagher et  al., 2012; Parson and Kravitz, 
2013). Doing so will reduce the risk of market incentives failing to 
achieve behavioural change and recognizes that incentives and norms 
have to be integrated to achieve sustainability transitions. 
12 Enabling environment is defined as: “the component of the framework [that] 
focuses on government actions such as fair trade policies, removal of technical, 
legal and administrative barriers to technical transfer, sound economic policy, 
regulatory frameworks and transparency, all of which create an environment 
conducive to private and public sector technology transfer” (UNFCCC, 2001). 
15�6�5 Building programme evaluation into 
government technology programmes
Evaluation of government programmes to foster new energy technolo-
gies has been hampered by a lack of complete and consistent evalu-
ation data at the programme level (U. S. National Research Council, 
2001). This problem is common to many government technology pro-
grammes. Proper evaluation requires that data on project selection and 
project performance be collected as programmes commence and main-
tained after they are completed (Jaffe, 2002). Wider use of such evalua-
tion methods would allow experience with relative effectiveness of dif-
ferent programmes to be used to improve outcomes over time. While 
the above argument applies to all governmental policy in general, it is 
particularly important for technology development programmes that 
may be vulnerable to governmental failure related to the picking and 
choosing of technologies under high uncertainty (Helm, 2010). 
15�6�6 Summary of technology policy and R&D 
policy
There is a distinct role for technology policy in climate change mitiga-
tion. This role is complementary to the role of policies aimed directly at 
reducing current GHG emissions (15.6.1).
The availability of new technologies is crucial for the ability to realis-
tically implement stringent carbon policies. Technology policy will be 
most effective when all aspects of the innovation / deployment chain 
are addressed in a complementary fashion (see Section 15.6.1). Invest-
ment depends on the willingness of a variety of actors to manage the 
balance between the risks and rewards in each step of the chain, and 
government decisions are crucial to this balance.
Evidence suggests that the presence of an effective IP regime increases 
domestic innovation. However, as evidence is almost entirely limited 
to specific sectors in the developed world, it is unclear whether strong 
IP protection in less developed countries will increase those coun-
tries’ indigenous creation or adaptation of mitigation technologies 
(15.6.2.1).
Worldwide investment in research in support of climate change miti-
gation is small relative to overall public research spending. The effec-
tiveness of research support will be greatest if it is increased steadily 
rather than dramatically or erratically (15.6.3). 
A wide range of policy approaches is prevalent across sectors, which 
enable policy design that addresses sector- and technology-specific 
attributes. These policies are often designed as complementary sets of 
policies, or policy packages (15.5.1 and 15.6.2.3).
Complementary framework conditions, or an enabling environment, 
may complement a package of technology-push and demand-pull poli-
cies (15.6.4). Managing social challenges of technology policy change 
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may require innovations in policy and institutional design, including 
building integrated policies that make complementary use of market 
incentives, authority and norms (15.6. 4). 
It is important that data collection for programme evaluation be built 
into technology policy programmes (15.6.5), because there is very little 
empirical evidence on the relative effectiveness of different mecha-
nisms for supporting the creation and diffusion of new technologies.
15.7 Synergies and  tradeoffs 
among policies
This section discusses interactions between policies with different 
main objectives as well as between differing climate policies with the 
same objective. Section 15.7.2 discusses relationships between poli-
cies with different principal objectives — for example, between climate 
policy and development policy. The next two sections consider inter-
actions between climate policies. Section 15.7.3 describes interactions 
between different climate policies at different levels of government, 
and 15.7.4 takes up interactions between climate policies enacted at 
the same level of government. The interactions in 15.7.3 and 15.7.4 
reflect the absence of policy coordination, and they affect the environ-
mental and economic outcomes. Deliberate linking of policies is dis-
cussed in Section 15.8. 
15�7�1 Relationship between policies with 
different objectives
Governments throughout the world have enacted various policies to 
support the mitigation of climate change, which is the central objec-
tive of climate policy. However, the implementation of mitigation poli-
cies and measures can have positive or negative effects on additional 
objectives — and vice versa. To the extent these side-effects are posi-
tive, they can be deemed ‘co-benefits’; if adverse and uncertain, they 
imply risks.13 The co-benefits of climate policy are primary benefits of 
policies with other main objectives. Social development is a primary 
benefit of development policy, since such development is the main 
objective. Similarly, enhanced energy security, technological develop-
ment, and reduced air pollution are primary benefits of energy security, 
technological development, and air-pollution policies, respectively. To 
the extent that these other policies (with other objectives) lead to miti-
gation, such mitigation is a co-benefit of these other policies. 
13 Co-benefits and adverse side-effects describe effects in non-monetary units 
without yet evaluating the net effect on overall social welfare. Please refer to the 
glossary in Annex I for definitions and to Chapters 3.6.3 and 4.8 for a discussion 
of how the concept of co-benefits relates to welfare and sustainable development, 
respectively.
Although there is growing interest in research on mitigation as a 
co-benefit (see Sections 1.2.1 and e. g., Kahn Ribeiro and de Abreu, 
2008), the great majority of the literature assessed in other chapters 
focuses on the co-effects of sectoral mitigation measures (Chapters 
7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 11.7, 11.13.6, and 12.8) or transformation path-
ways (Section 6.6) on additional objectives. Table 15.1 in Section 
15.2.4 provides a roadmap for the assessment of those co-benefits 
and adverse side-effects on the many objectives examined in vari-
ous chapters of this report and highlights that the effects on energy 
security and air pollution as well as the associated reductions in 
health and ecosystem impacts are discussed in all sector chapters. 
For example, stringent mitigation results in reduced combustion of 
fossil fuels with major cuts in air pollutant emissions significantly 
below baseline scenarios (see 6.6.2.1 and, e. g., ApSimon et  al., 
2009) for a discussion of policy interaction in Europe); by increas-
ing the diversity of energy sources and reducing energy imports in 
most countries, mitigation often results in energy systems that are 
less vulnerable to price volatility and supply disruptions (see 6.6.2.2 
and, e. g., Lecuyer and Bibas, 2011) for a discussion of policy interac-
tion in Europe). 
According to recent scenario studies assessed in Chapter 6.6.2.7, strin-
gent climate policies would significantly reduce the costs of reaching 
energy security and / or air pollution objectives globally. Recent litera-
ture assessed in Chapters 6.6.2.3, 7.9.1 and 16.8 finds that increas-
ing access to modern energy services may not conflict with mitigation 
objectives — and vice versa.
There are two important advantages to coordinating separate policies 
and their various benefits. By coordinating policies, the various ben-
efits and costs can be considered in an integrated fashion, which offers 
information helpful to determining how to achieve the objectives at 
low cost (see 6.6.2.7). In addition, coordinating policies can improve 
political feasibility. The concept of ‘mainstreaming’ climate policy 
refers to the linking of climate policy with other policy efforts, particu-
larly policy efforts that have broad recognition. The prospects for suc-
cessful climate policy can be enhanced through such mainstreaming 
(Kok and de Coninck, 2007).
Development frameworks at international or national levels, or by sec-
tor, may include mainstreaming as a key element. For it to be effective, 
climate change mitigation needs to be mainstreamed in appropriate 
national and sector planning processes to widen development goals 
within national and sectoral contexts. For developing countries, such 
integration of mitigation into development planning can reduce prob-
lems of cooperation and coordination that may arise across different 
levels of government (Tyler, 2010).
Mitigation plans can be embedded in national policy-making processes 
to align economic and social development with mitigation actions. For 
example, in China, the National Leading Group on Climate Change is 
part of the National Development and Reform Commission, the princi-
pal national planning body (see Section 15.2.2.2).
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Limited institutional capacity in developing countries presents the 
most significant barrier to mainstreaming of mitigation policies. This 
includes a lack of knowledge and / or expertise in climate change 
issues, a lack of (or weak) oversight and / or enforcement. Developing 
countries aiming to mainstream and implement climate change miti-
gation policies must; 1) encourage awareness on the topic; 2) establish 
related training programmes; 3) ensure an adequate level of finance 
for enforcement; and 4) enhance coordination between ministries (Ellis 
et al., 2009).
15�7�2 Interactions between climate policies 
conducted at different jurisdictional 
levels
Climate policy has been conducted at various jurisdictional levels: 
international, national, regional (state or provincial), and local (munici-
pal). Important interactions can occur across jurisdictional levels. Some 
interactions are beneficial, reinforcing the intended effects; others are 
problematic, interfering with the planned objectives. Sound policymak-
ing requires attention to these interactions.
15�7�2�1 Beneficial interactions
Policies introduced by a local jurisdiction sometimes reinforce the 
goals of efforts undertaken at a higher jurisdictional level. In particu-
lar, a sub-national policy can enhance cost-effectiveness if it addresses 
market failures that are not confronted by a national climate policy. 
Thus, for example, as seen in Sections 15.5.4 and 15.5.6, an RPS in 
the electricity sector and an R&D subsidy could usefully complement a 
national emissions pricing policy. 
The connections between instruments that deal with climate change 
and those that deal with congestion or local pollution also present an 
opportunity to policymakers, but they are very different since the latter 
vary depending on the socioeconomic context, technology, fuel, and 
vehicle use (Parry et al., 2007; Oikonomou and Jepma, 2008; Vander-
schuren et al., 2010; Parry, 2013). For example, urban planning imple-
mented jointly with fuel or carbon taxes can help fast growing devel-
oping countries minimize resource waste by avoiding urban sprawl. 
Policies incentivizing more dense urban architecture combined with 
the appropriate infrastructure for modern public transport can be an 
important complement to energy taxation. Such policies can be sup-
ported (and possibly financed) by fuel taxes if the policymaker wants 
to discourage citizens from making private decisions that are incom-
patible with this broader vision; policy combinations for this sector are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8. Conversely, subsidizing fuels 
and taking a hands-off urban planning approach can result in urban 
sprawl and a growth in private automobile use along with growth in 
resulting emissions.
Local-level action can also be a good source of information by allow-
ing experimentation. In the United States, environmental policies by 
the federal government have a history of evolving out of successful 
policy ‘experiments’ undertaken by states (Goulder and Stavins, 2011; 
Shobe and Burtraw, 2012). Thus, an appealing feature of local-level 
actions are their ability to try out policy options not currently in place 
at the higher jurisdictional level; the higher jurisdiction may have more 
confidence in introducing a policy subsequently if it already has a suc-
cessful track record at the more local level.
Finally, local policies can produce beneficial strategic interactions. If 
national policy is insufficiently stringent, a stringent state / province or 
even municipal policy may create pressure on the national government 
to increase its own policy’s stringency. Goulder and Stavins (2011) cite 
the example of California, which repeatedly increased the stringency 
of its local air pollution standards and was repeatedly followed by the 
federal government increasing Clean Air Act regulations’ stringency. 
Similarly, Lucon and Goldemberg (2010) note the importance of São 
Paulo’s GHG-reducing policies in influencing other local and even 
regional governments in Brazil.
15�7�2�2 Problematic interactions
Policies introduced at different levels sometimes interact in ways 
that compromise or weaken the intended environmental or economic 
impacts.
One particular difficulty that may arise is the problem of emissions 
leakage. This can occur, for example, when a climate policy introduced 
at a lower jurisdictional level is ‘nested’ within a cap-and-trade pro-
gramme implemented at a higher jurisdictional level. Consider the 
case where a cap-and-trade programme exists at the national level, 
and where a sub-national authority introduces a new policy intended 
to reduce its own (sub-national) emissions beyond what would result 
from the national programme alone. The sub-national jurisdiction’s 
efforts might indeed yield reductions within that jurisdiction, but facili-
ties in other sub-national jurisdictions covered by the cap-and-trade 
programme will now use these allowances leading to higher emissions 
in these jurisdictions completely compensating the abatement effort in 
the more stringent jurisdiction. Since overall emissions at the higher 
level are determined by the given national-level cap, the effort by the 
sub-national jurisdiction does not succeed in reducing nationwide: it 
just causes emissions leakage — offsetting increases in emissions else-
where in the nation. The national cap effectively prevents sub-national 
jurisdictions from achieving further emissions reductions (Goulder and 
Stavins, 2011; Shobe and Burtraw, 2012). 
The issue applies to the United Kingdom’s efforts to reduce emis-
sions through a carbon tax on the power sector (electricity genera-
tors). The generators are required to pay the tax on every unit of 
carbon emissions while also being subject to the EU ETS cap on over-
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all emissions. While the tax may lead to greater reduction in carbon 
emissions by the generators in the UK, the impact on overall emis-
sions in the EU might be negligible, since overall European emissions 
are largely determined by the Europe-wide cap under the EU ETS. On 
this, see (Böhringer et al., 2008; Sartor and Berghmans, 2011; Goul-
der, 2013)
This leakage problem can be avoided when the lower-level jurisdic-
tion’s programme is nested within a carbon tax programme, rather 
than emissions cap, at the higher level. In this case, the sub-national 
policies generally are not environmentally irrelevant. The reduced 
emissions in the sub-national jurisdiction do not lead to a fall in the 
emissions price (the carbon tax) at the national level; hence there 
are no offsetting increases in emissions in jurisdictions outside the 
jurisdiction introducing the more stringent policy (De Jonghe et al., 
2009; Fankhauser et al., 2010; Goulder and Stavins, 2011). This can 
be an important advantage of a carbon tax over a cap-and-trade sys-
tem.
15�7�3 Interactions between policies conducted 
at the same jurisdictional level
Interactions also can arise when different policy instruments are intro-
duced at the same jurisdictional level. These interactions can be ben-
eficial or problematic in terms of the cost-effectiveness of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
15�7�3�1 Beneficial interactions
The potential for cost-reducing interactions is greatest when the dif-
ferent instruments address different market failures. A fundamental 
principle of public policy is that the most cost-effective outcome results 
when there are as many policy instruments as the number of market 
failures involved, with each instrument focusing mainly on a different 
market failure (Tinbergen, 1970).
Climate policy is meant to address one market failure in particu-
lar — the climate-change-related externalities associated with GHGs. 
As seen in Section 15.6, another important market failure applies in 
the market for innovation: because new knowledge can spill over to 
third parties, innovators often cannot capture all of the social benefits 
from the new knowledge they create. Introducing two policy instru-
ments, for example, emissions pricing to address the emissions exter-
nality, and a subsidy to R&D to address the innovation market failure, 
can lower the costs of achieving given emissions reductions. In addi-
tion to helping reduce emissions by encouraging fuel-switching and 
a reduction in demand, emissions pricing can help spur innovation. 
Likewise, the R&D subsidy can promote invention of low-carbon tech-
nologies, thereby helping to curb emissions. Hence the interactions 
of the two policies are beneficial. Although each of the two policies 
might to some degree affect both of the market failures, emissions 
pricing is particularly well focused on the first, while the R&D policy 
sharply addresses the second. Using two instruments helps achieve 
emissions reductions at the lowest cost. In this connection, Fischer 
and Newell (2004) and Oikonomou et  al. (2010) find that a policy 
combination including a price on GHG emissions and renewable 
energy subsidies achieves emissions reductions at significantly lower 
cost than either of these policies alone. Schneider and Goulder (1997) 
obtain a similar result for the combination of carbon tax and R&D 
subsidy. 
As noted already in Section 15.5.4.1, several studies (Greene, 1998; 
Goulder and Parry, 2008; Gillingham et  al., 2009b) argue that there 
is a market failure associated with consumer purchases of durable 
energy-using equipment (automobiles, refrigerators, etc.), according to 
which consumers systematically underestimate their own future gains 
from purchasing more energy efficient durables. To the extent that this 
market failure is significant, the combination of emissions pricing and 
a second instrument (for example, an energy-efficiency standard for 
appliances) to address this additional market failure could lead to ben-
eficial interactions and promote cost-effectiveness. 
Some studies suggest a market failure associated with reliance on 
crude oil, claiming that reliance on oil produces an ‘economic vul-
nerability externality’, given the possibility of supply disruptions on 
the world oil market (Jones et al., 2004). Under these circumstances, 
the combination of emissions pricing (to address the climate change 
externality) and a tax on oil consumption (to address the vulnerability 
externality) can be a cost-effective way of dealing with both climate 
change and economic vulnerability. Several authors (e. g., Nordhaus, 
2009), emphasize that the vulnerability to world oil price changes is 
largely a function of the share of overall oil consumption in GDP, rather 
than the share of consumed oil that comes from imports. This suggests 
that the vulnerability externality is best addressed through a tax on oil 
consumption rather than a tax on imported oil.
15�7�3�2 Problematic interactions
Multiple policies at the same jurisdictional level also can yield prob-
lematic interactions. This can happen when multiple policies only 
address the same market failure. Consider the situation where a given 
jurisdiction attempts to reduce greenhouse gases through both emis-
sions pricing and another policy such as a performance standard (a 
limit on the ratio of emissions per unit of production). Economic theory 
claims that, absent market failures and other barriers, emissions pric-
ing tends to promote a highly cost-effective outcome by promoting 
equality in the marginal costs of emissions-abatement across all the 
facilities that face the given price of emissions (the carbon tax or the 
price of emissions allowances). If, in addition, facilities face a perfor-
mance standard, then this added policy approach either is redundant 
or it compromises cost-effectiveness.
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It is redundant if meeting the performance standard would involve 
marginal abatement costs lower than the emissions price. In this event, 
cost-minimizing firms would be induced to meet or exceed this stan-
dard by the emissions price alone: there is no need for the standard. 
On the other hand, if the performance standard entails a cost per unit 
of abatement that is significantly higher than the emissions price, then 
this requirement sacrifices cost-effectiveness. Relying on emissions 
pricing alone would have promoted emissions reductions by the facili-
ties that can achieve those reductions at the least cost. Thus it would 
likely have led to a situation where the more expensive technology 
approach was not employed. Hence in this case the combination of 
emissions pricing and the performance standard does not promote 
cost-effectiveness.
Emissions price policies interact with other policies differently 
depending on whether the emissions price policy involves a quantity 
limit (as is the case under cap and trade) or a stipulated emissions 
price (as is the case under an emissions tax). In the presence of a 
cap-and-trade programme, introducing an additional instrument 
such as a performance standard might yield no further reductions 
in overall emissions (Burtraw and Shobe, 2009; Fankhauser et  al., 
2010). The reason is that overall emissions are determined by the 
overall cap or number of allowances in circulation. The problem is 
formally very similar to the difficulty described in Section 15.7.3 
above, where in the presence of a national cap-and-trade pro-
gramme an effort by a sub-national jurisdiction to achieve further 
emissions reductions is likely to have difficulty achieving that goal. 
In contrast, introducing a performance standard in the presence of 
an emissions tax can in fact lead to a reduction in overall emissions. 
The price of emissions — the emissions tax — does not change when 
the performance standard causes a reduction in emissions. For this 
reason the reduction caused by the performance standard does not 
lead to a compensating increase in emissions elsewhere. Overall 
emissions fall. 
For similar reasons, the same difficulty arises when a carbon tax is 
introduced in the presence of a cap-and-trade programme at the same 
jurisdictional level (Fischer and Preonas, 2010).
Nevertheless, as suggested above, the combination of emissions 
pricing and some other policy could be justified in terms of cost-
effectiveness to the extent that the latter policy directly addresses a 
second market failure that emissions pricing does not directly con-
front. 
It is important to recognize that the notion of a ‘market failure’ per-
tains only to the criterion of economic efficiency. Another important 
public policy consideration is distributional equity. Concerns about dis-
tributional equity can justify supplementing a given policy instrument 
with another in order to bring about a more equitable outcome. This 
may be desirable even if the multiplicity of instruments reduces cost-
effectiveness.
15.8 National, state and 
local linkages 
15�8�1 Overview of linkages across jurisdictions 
In the last few years, an increasing number of sub-national administra-
tions across the world have been active in the design and application 
of climate policies. Section 15.2 has reported some of these experi-
ences, whereas Section 15.7 has dealt with some of the interactions 
that may arise with the simultaneous use of climate policy instruments 
by several jurisdictions. This section goes back a little and is basically 
interested in the allocation of climate policy responsibilities across 
the different levels of government that usually exist in most countries 
(central, provincial, and local administrations). Although such alloca-
tion involves the use the policy types described in Section 15.4, the 
emphasis here will not be on instrument use in itself, as this was 
already covered in Sections 15.5 to 15.7. The objective of this section 
is to examine the theoretical backing for such practical applications 
and to extract lessons that may be useful for future sub-national appli-
cations and even for the design and implementation of national and 
supra-national mitigation policies. When dealing with the reasons for 
and guidelines for the ‘vertical’ allocation of responsibilities among 
jurisdictions that co-exist in a country, the theory of fiscal federal-
ism (economic federalism) offers valuable insights. In short, that the 
responsibility for public decision making over a particular issue (e. g., 
allocation of public goods, economic stabilization, or distribution) 
should be given to the jurisdictional level that could better manage 
it. In this sense, fiscal federalism contends that the central govern-
ment should have the basic responsibility for functions whose national 
extension would render ineffective and inefficient a sub-national 
approximation, including ‘national’ public goods (Oates, 1999). 
15�8�2 Collective action problem of sub-
national actions
Given the global and public good nature of climate change, its juris-
dictional allocation should actually be at the highest possible level. 
A sub-global allocation, as observed in Chapter 13, would lead other 
jurisdictions that are not active in climate change mitigation to ben-
efit without paying the costs, i. e., in a free-riding fashion (Kousky and 
Schneider, 2003). Empirically, case studies found that climate policies 
tended to be less intrusive at sub-national level. While co-benefits with 
local development were pursued, policies that might incur costs to 
local economy were avoided in prefectures in Japan (Aoki, 2010). The 
costs for a sub-national administration may be actually beyond those 
of pure mitigation, as climate policies implemented by a jurisdiction 
might bring about leakage, (see the glossary in Annex  I for a defini-
tion) (Kruger, 2007; Engel, 2009). Moreover, the ‘reshuffling’ that may 
be associated to sub-national policies may reduce their environmental 
effectiveness (Bushnell et al., 2008). As a consequence, climate change 
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mitigation would be provided in a sub-optimal level with sub-national 
allocation of responsibilities. 
15�8�3 Benefits of sub-national actions
Yet, even if the central government has a major responsibility in this 
area, this does not preclude the allocation of mitigation responsibilities 
within a federation, as observed in citizen’s attitudes on this matter 
(Lachapelle et  al., 2012). But even within the theory of fiscal feder-
alism there are other reasons that may justify sub-national action in 
this field. First, as noted by Edenhofer et al. (2013), the exploitation of 
heterogeneous sub-national preferences for mitigation would lead to 
efficiency gains. This is actually one of the reasons for the decentraliza-
tion theorem, a centrepiece of fiscal federalism, which in fact justifies 
sub-national allocation of certain public goods.
Moreover, decentralization can contribute to policy innovation by 
providing an opportunity to experiment with different approxima-
tions. Indeed, there might be potential gains from learning by doing 
in policy terms without imposing large costs on an entire country or 
the world with untried options (Oates, 2002). Sub-national govern-
ments could also choose to be leaders in the development of climate 
policies to obtain potential economic gains that are associated to 
‘first movers’ (Jänicke and Jacob, 2004) and may provide guidance 
and incentives to other jurisdictions to follow them (Bulkeley and 
Castán Broto, 2012). Besides, as they tend to be smaller, sub-national 
governments may be able to adapt to new situations in a swifter 
manner and therefore may have a greater flexibility to modify exist-
ing climate policies or to define new ones (Puppim de Oliveira, 2009; 
Galarraga et al., 2011). 
Other general approaches to federalism, such as cooperative and dem-
ocratic federalism, may also provide reasons for sub-national involve-
ment in this area (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997). On the one hand, 
cooperative federalism argues for allocating pure public goods to the 
local level, counting on the power of inter-jurisdictional bargaining to 
improve allocations. On the other hand, democratic federalism incorpo-
rates sub-national representation in central decision making on public 
goods. In any case, federal structures may be crucial for the transmis-
sion of mitigation policies because most sub-national governments are 
now responsible for matters that have huge effects on GHG emissions, 
namely: land use planning, building codes, waste management, traf-
fic infrastructure and management, and public transport (Collier and 
Löfstedt, 1997; Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005; Doremus and Hanemann, 
2008). But sub-national governments also have direct policies aimed 
at GHG mitigation, including: energy efficiency programmes, educa-
tional efforts, green procurement standards, partnership agreements 
with local businesses, or tree planting (Schreurs, 2008).
Yet another reason for a sub-national role in climate policies is beyond 
the standard collective action approach. By indicating that external-
ity-correcting regulations and global agreements are not the only 
pace to tackling climate change problems, Ostrom (2010) suggested 
a polycentric approach in which mitigation activities are undertaken 
by multiple (public and private) units at diverse scales. The prevalence 
of sub-national actions in the field, contentious to other approaches, 
may be actually a proof of polycentrism in the area (Byrne et al., 2007; 
Sovacool, 2011b). The polycentric approach could be seen as a reinter-
pretation of the findings of the federalism literature, as actions should 
involve many different agents in a reinforcing manner. 
Finally, further issues may explain sub-national allocation. Local 
authorities, for instance, may be more effective in reducing GHG emis-
sions from some sources such as waste and transport, as this may 
provide significant co-benefits to local citizens (Kousky and Schneider, 
2003). Moreover, sub-central administrations are usually closer to the 
places and citizens impacted by climate change. Even though climate 
change is a global phenomenon, the nature of its impacts and severity 
varies significantly across locations so some sub-national governments 
have reasons to be more protective than national or supranational 
administrations (Andreen, 2008). This is also the case of adaptation, 
where sub-national authorities can better manage challenges such 
as flood risk, water stress, or ‘climate proofing’ of urban infrastruc-
ture (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009). In all the preceding situations, sub-
national governments may tailor actions and policies to people’s 
needs, with an easier identification of priorities and difficulties as they 
are closer to citizens than more centralized administrations (Lindseth, 
2004; Galarraga et al., 2011).
15�8�4 Summary
As in other environmental areas (Dalmazzone, 2006), there is theoreti-
cal backing for the allocation of climate-related policies to sub-national 
levels of government, although there are several limiting factors to a 
widespread reliance on these administrations. A federal structure that 
provides coordination and enables an easier transmission of climate 
policies throughout the agents of the economy is likely to increase the 
effectiveness of actions against climate change. Moreover, the lessons 
learned in the design and application of climate policies at different 
jurisdictional levels could be used in a global setting.
15.9 The role of stakeholders 
including NGOs
This section considers the role of stakeholders and civil society in 
developing and delivering concrete mitigation action and focuses on 
how stakeholders impact policy design and implementation. The range 
of stakeholders is immense given the extent and complexity of climate 
change. Devising policy in an inclusive manner may be lengthy and 
politically challenging (Irvin and Stansbury, 2004), however adopting 
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an inclusive approach to climate policy can bring advantages, notably 
through increasing the legitimacy of policy design, its durability and 
implementation (Lazo et al., 2000; Beierle, 2002; Dombrowski, 2010). 
15�9�1 Advocacy and accountability
Some of the major functions and roles of NGOs can include raising 
public awareness, which often involves translating scientific and tech-
nical knowledge into actionable forms, lobbying, influencing business 
investment decisions, and monitoring and implementing agreements 
(Gulbrandsen and Andresen, 2004; Guay et al., 2004; Betsill and Corell, 
2008; Newell, 2008; Dombrowski, 2010). Their domains of action also 
include engagement in sub-national and national policies and institu-
tions as well as international processes like UNFCCC (Wapner, 1995; 
Lisowski, 2005). It is in these diverse forms that NGOs play a role in 
“connecting knowledge with responsibility” (Szarka, 2013) and pro-
moting norms of accountability (Gough and Shackley, 2001; Newell, 
2008).
Stakeholders can also affect when and how evidence of climate change 
translates into policies via the domestic political system (Social Learn-
ing Group, 2001). The differing results of the same scientific evidence, 
for instance, the political polarization in the United States versus more 
proactive and consensual attempts to find solutions in Europe (Skjærs-
eth et al., 2013) demonstrate how stakeholder interests can filter sci-
entific evidence.
Evidence also indicates that that some fossil fuel companies went fur-
ther and promoted climate scepticism by providing financial resources 
to like-minded think-tanks and politicians (Antilla, 2005; Boykoff and 
Boykoff, 2007), although other fossil fuel companies adopted a more 
supportive position on climate science (van den Hove et  al., 2002a). 
Differences in the attitudes of oil companies towards climate change 
are explained in part by domestic institutional contexts and manage-
ment structures as well as the structure of assets or technologies of 
different energy companies (Rowlands, 2000; Kolk and Levy, 2002).
15�9�2 Policy design and implementation
Three factors have been considered important for lobbying success in 
policy design namely: how institutions shape the space for participa-
tion (Kohler-Koch and Finke, 2007), organizational resources (Eising, 
2007), and the policy environment (Mahoney, 2008; Coen and Rich-
ardson, 2009).
In the case of the EU ETS, Skodvin et al. (2010) find that interest groups 
are able to limit “spectrum of politically feasible policy options.” 
Instrument choice is a function of the extent of resources these interest 
groups control, the role of veto players in the political process, policy 
networks and entrepreneurs (Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2009; Skodvin 
et al., 2010; Braun, 2013; Skjærseth et al., 2013). 
The role of business interests in supporting emissions trading as 
opposed to taxation, in the UK, has also been recognized (Bailey and 
Rupp, 2006; Nye and Owens, 2008). The political opposition to Austra-
lia’s Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme has been explained largely by 
the opposition of fossil fuel interests (Crowley, 2010, 2013; Macintosh 
et al., 2010; Bailey et al., 2012). Similarly, in New Zealand, the agri-
culture sector has played a major role in obtaining a transition period 
for the sector, use of an intensity-based accounting system, and free 
credits (Bullock, 2012). This has led to questions regarding the environ-
mental effectiveness of the ETS (Bührs, 2008).
Stakeholders also affect policy durability, flexibility, and implementa-
tion. For example, European Climate Change Programme featured con-
sultation processes that ensured policy credibility by having the buy-
in of stakeholders. Similarly, the persistence of climate legislation in 
California has been explained by the stability of coalition groups sup-
porting the legislation due to path dependence despite the economic 
downturn in contrast to the emerging coalition at the national level 
which broke down after economic shocks (Knox-Hayes, 2012).
15�9�3 Summary of the role of stakeholders 
Early findings indicate the importance of institutions in creating spaces 
for stakeholder participation, the organizational resources of the 
stakeholders themselves, and the general policy environment as being 
critical factors that determine the effectiveness of stakeholder engage-
ment. However, the degree to which policy design and implementation 
to mitigate climate change is dependent on stakeholder engagement is 
as yet under-researched and it must be stressed that the evidence base 
is thin and that these results primarily derive from case studies. 
15.10 Capacity building
As national and sub-national governments around the globe confront 
the multifaceted challenge of climate change mitigation and adapta-
tion, capacity is essential. According to the Agenda 21, building a coun-
try’s capacity “encompasses the country’s human, scientific, techno-
logical, organizational, institutional, and resource capabilities” (United 
Nations, 1992).
The priority for capacity building is strongly reflected in the Johan-
nesburg Plan of Implementation (United Nations, 2002), where capac-
ity building, especially for developing countries and countries with 
economies in transition, features prominently. It is also stressed in the 
UNFCCC’s capacity building framework for developing countries (Deci-
sion 2 / CP.7; UNFCCC, 2001). The goal of capacity building under this 
framework is “to strengthen particularly developing country parties, to 
promote the widespread dissemination, application and development 
of environmentally sound technologies and know-how, and to enable 
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them to implement the provisions of the Convention. In addition, the 
COP under the UNFCCC requested the Subsidiary Body for Implemen-
tation to organize an annual in-session Durban Forum for in-depth 
discussion on capacity-building following COP-17” (Decision 2 / CP.17; 
UNFCCC, 2011). The Durban Forum provides an opportunity for rep-
resentatives from governments, UN organizations, intergovernmental 
and non-governmental organizations, academia, and the private sec-
tor to share ideas, experiences, and good practices on implementing 
capacity-building activities. 
15�10�1 Capacity to analyze the implications of 
climate change
Climate change is a severe and major problem that has the potential 
to seriously derail poverty alleviation in a number of low income coun-
tries (Dell et  al., 2009). Climate change will affect livelihood assets 
by impacting health, access to natural resources and infrastructure 
(Skoufias, 2012). It is also likely to erode agricultural productivity in 
tropical climates (Skoufias, 2012). Given that the implications of cli-
mate change differ so dramatically between countries, to inform cli-
mate negotiations and allow countries to realize the full extent of their 
adaptation needs, substantial capacity would be required to analyze 
the implications of climate change and to formulate country posi-
tions. So far, the academic capacity is geographically very skewed. For 
example, the International Social Science Council (ISSC) commissioned 
a bibliometric study on social science research on climate change and 
global environmental change in the period from 2000 until 2010. It 
found that OECD countries completely dominated this research and 
that the poorest countries, notably in Africa, hardly were visible at all 
in the statistics (Hackmann and St Clair, 2012).
15�10�2 Capacity to design, implement and 
evaluate policies
The design, implementation, and evaluation of national and sub-
national climate policies necessitate in-country human capital. 
National governments and civil society require that climate policies be 
adapted to local economic, cultural, and social conditions to ensure 
their effectiveness and public support. To be politically acceptable, such 
work generally needs to be done by citizens of the country in which 
the policies are to be implemented. Political feasibility is mainly deter-
mined by policy design to improve environmental and economic effec-
tiveness and distributional equity (Bailey and Compston, 2012b). A 
high level of scientific knowledge and analytical skills are required for 
such work. Capacity building allows the leadership to be sensitive to 
environmental constraints and encourages policymaking to meet the 
needs of the people within these parameters (United Nations, 1992).
Many studies analyze the technological options for achieving deep 
reductions in GHG emissions, however they do not necessarily reflect 
the need for capacity building. For example, while Pacala and Socolow 
(2004), through their ‘stabilization wedges’, increased the understand-
ing of the technological options that could be deployed to reach sta-
bilization targets, they did so without pointing out the capacity neces-
sary to reach such a potential. These do however need local adaptation. 
Through the collaborative dialogue under the Durban Forum, key areas 
for capacity building on mitigation have emerged, including: low-car-
bon development strategies; NAMAs; Monitoring, Reporting and Veri-
fication; Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs); and mitigation assess-
ments.
15�10�3 Capacity to take advantage of external 
funding and flexible mechanisms
Climate change, and the global policies to mitigate and adapt to it, 
also imply additional capacity challenges in order to take advantage of 
international funding and flexible mechanisms such as the CDM in the 
Kyoto Protocol, and REDD+. So far, the distribution of projects under 
flexible mechanisms has been very skewed towards countries with 
greater capacity. As an example, only 2.5 % of normal CDM projects 
have been hosted by African countries (Fenhann and Staun, 2010).
In the preparations for the UNFCCC Durban Forum on Capacity Build-
ing (UNFCCC, 2011) it was noted that capacity-building in develop-
ing countries should be improved by (1) ensuring consultations with 
stakeholders throughout the entire process of activities; (2) enhanc-
ing integration of climate change issues and capacity-building needs 
into national development strategies, plans and budgets; (3) increas-
ing country-driven coordination of capacity-building activities; and 
(4) strengthening networking and information sharing among devel-
oping countries, especially through South-South and triangular coop-
eration. 
15�10�4 Capacity building modalities
Capacity building is about equipping people, communities, and organi-
zations with the tools, skills, and knowledge to address the challenges 
of climate change. It can be delivered through education, outreach, 
and awareness, but it can also be facilitated through peer learning, 
knowledge platforms, information exchanges, and technical assistance 
(Mytelka et al., 2012). The need for capacity building is large. Hundreds 
of thousands of scientists of various disciplines need to be trained 
globally in the coming decades as well as policymakers, civil servants, 
businessmen, and civil society. These needs are not limited to develop-
ing countries, as it is needed at all levels of society and in all regions 
of the world.
There are many different modalities. Since the 15th Conference of 
the Parties (COP-15), partnerships have formed at the international, 
national, and sub-national level aimed at climate readiness activities. 
Capacity building in the private sector is also important. Studies indi-
cate that good management, trained workers, and clean manufacturing 
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increase energy efficiency while reducing CO2 emissions. Substantive 
carbon reductions can be achieved at zero or negative cost through 
improved workplace practices, optimized processes, and behavioural 
changes in production (Bloom et al., 2010). Even this requires human 
resources and capacity to be undertaken. 
Capacity building requires a long time horizon, and this is particularly 
evident in education-poor countries. Building in-country academic pro-
grammes that can graduate well-trained masters and PhD students can 
take decades. When students graduate from such programmes it takes 
an additional 5 – 10 years of post-doctoral and junior faculty positions 
to build the experience and skills to contribute at a high international 
level (Sterner et al., 2012). Capacity building initiatives are therefore 
fragile and require continued support and nurturing by both national 
governments and international organizations. This may be one addi-
tional and important area for climate finance.
15.11 Links to adaptation
This section discusses links between national and sub-national policies 
and institutions for mitigation and adaptation. Links between adapta-
tion and mitigation policies at the international level are discussed in 
Chapter 13, while adaptation in general is discussed in WGII. Adapta-
tion will be needed because some climate change is inevitable (Chap-
ter 5). Indeed, some governments have started to plan and implement 
policies aimed at tackling changes that are likely to take place or have 
taken place already (Aaheim et al., 2009). In the longer term, the level 
of adaptation needed will depend on the success of mitigation efforts 
and the resulting GHG concentrations, thus there is an obvious linkage 
between mitigation and adaptation. However, the level of adaptation 
needed will also depend on the climate response to any given GHG 
level, around which there is high uncertainty. Mitigation will help to 
reduce the uncertainty on future changes and is therefore helpful for 
planning adaptation.
It has been argued that mitigation and adaptation policies are related 
to each other (Smith and Olesen, 2010). This, however, is a controver-
sial issue (Hamin and Gurran, 2009). Any given mitigation policy at the 
national or sub-national level is unlikely to have a significant effect on 
the global climate, so that the climatic consequences of that policy for 
the purpose of planning adaptation can usually be ignored. The direct 
side-effects of a mitigation policy for adaptation are more relevant. 
Examples of such direct effects are mainly in land use (discussed in 
Section 15.11.3 below) where synergies and tradeoffs between mitiga-
tion and adaptation policies may arise.
It is, of course, true that mitigation policies can have effects on adap-
tation across sectors. For example, carbon pricing can make air-con-
ditioning more expensive, thus hindering adaptation to a warmer cli-
mate. However, this is simply one of many costs of a mitigation policy 
that will be taken into account while making policies. Conversely, 
adaptation to higher temperatures has led to increased electricity con-
sumption for cooling (Gupta, 2012) that has to be taken into account 
while planning mitigation, but so do all changes in demand arising for 
other reasons such as income growth.
On the national scale, the approach to mitigation and adaptation dif-
fers between high or upper-middle income countries and low or lower-
middle income countries due to the balance of responsibilities and the 
focus on mitigation versus adaptation. 
The early national policy focus in high or upper-middle income coun-
tries was largely on mitigation. These policies were largely developed 
without in-depth consideration of adaptation linkages. Those high or 
upper-middle income countries that are developing national adapta-
tion strategies and policies (e. g., see Bizikova et  al., 2008; Stewart 
et al., 2009; Bedsworth and Hanak, 2010; Biesbroek et al., 2010) have 
shown limited consideration of the effects of adaptation policies on 
greenhouse gas emissions to date. Neufeldt et al. (2010) investigated 
the reasons for this disconnect in Europe and found it was due to a 
strong sectoral separation: sectors that were major emitters have been 
mitigation focused, and have received little attention on adaptation, 
whereas climate sensitive sectors such as agricultural, although a 
potential contributor to emission reductions, have focused on adapta-
tion. They also report that adaptation policy and actions have lagged 
behind mitigation more generally, and the difference in timing also 
contributes to the separation of the two domains. This is now start-
ing to change: Bruin et  al. (2009) in the Netherlands considered the 
potential GHG emissions of adaptation measures as part of a national 
multi-criteria ranking of options.
To date, most of the national climate policy initiatives in low-income 
countries, especially in the LDCs, have focused on adaptation, notably 
through the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPAs). How-
ever, more recently there has been a shift with a number of national 
policy initiatives that aim to develop climate resilient, low carbon 
economies (also known as low-emission development strategies or 
green growth). These include Ethiopia’s Climate Resilient Green Econ-
omy Vision (EPA Ethiopia, 2011) and Rwanda’s Green Growth and Cli-
mate Resilience National Strategy for Climate Change and Low Carbon 
Development (Government of Rwanda, 2011). Given the importance 
of climate change in these highly vulnerable countries, these initia-
tives look to build climate resilience, but also recognize the benefits in 
advancing low carbon development. Research on the linkages between 
emission reductions and adaptation is still at an early stage and most 
of the synergies between adaptation and mitigation are centred on the 
agricultural and forestry sectors.
Some local activities, such as those regarding land-use decisions, have 
important implications for both mitigation (e. g., by means of carbon 
sequestration) and adaptation (e. g., by means of increasing resil-
ience to climate change). Ravindranath (2007) explores the synergies 
between mitigation and adaptation in the forestry sector. As forests 
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are highly vulnerable to climate change, but provide opportunities 
for mitigation (e. g., through afforestation), efforts to enhance carbon 
sequestration need to embed adaptation elements so that exposure 
to climate impacts can be addressed. Mitigation efforts through for-
est management regimes such as conservation areas and sustainable 
forestry contribute to adaptation. Conversely, adaptation efforts such 
as urban forestry and measures to conserve soil and water also have 
mitigation effects (Ravindranath, 2007).
Similar issues have emerged for the agricultural sector, with the focus 
on climate-smart agriculture. This focus recognizes the high vulnerabil-
ity of agriculture as a climate-sensitive sector, but also addresses the 
fact that it is a major source of greenhouse gas emissions in develop-
ing economies. A number of options have been identified as potentially 
beneficial for mitigation and adaptation, including (McCarthy et  al., 
2011) soil and water conservation (including conservation agriculture, 
low or minimum tillage, vegetation strips, terraces, structures such as 
bunds contours, shade trees, tied ridges, small-scale water harvesting, 
compost production, cover crops, improved fallows, crop residues), 
agroforestry, and improved pasture and grazing management includ-
ing restoration. These options generally are based on sustainable agri-
cultural land management (SALM) practices. These practices reduce 
climate related risks in the form of rainfall variability and soil erosion, 
increase soil organic matter and soil fertility (thus increasing productiv-
ity), and reduce emissions by either reducing soil emissions or prevent-
ing other more emission intensive activities. More traditional measures 
to increase productivity, such as fertilizer use or increased irrigation, 
have the potential to increase greenhouse gas emissions because of 
the high energy intensity of fertilizer production and the energy use in 
water abstraction and pumping; however, they may still reduce land-
use emissions by increasing the productivity and yields per hectare, as 
well we reduce future land-use pressures that may lead to deforesta-
tion (Chapter 11). However, as highlighted by McCarthy et al. (2011), 
many of these climate-smart options involve important opportunity or 
policy costs, higher risks, or may involve benefits that arise over longer 
time periods (e. g., improved soil function), or involve wider environ-
mental benefits that are not immediately useful to farmers. They also 
frequently involve institutional, financial, and capacity barriers, and so 
may not happen autonomously. 
Both the forest and agricultural sectors also link through to issues 
of rural land-use change and land planning / management, which can 
have synergistic effects on mitigation and adaptation (Pimentel et al., 
2010), but which can also involve complex tradeoffs.
Overall, the emerging evidence suggests that while there may be a 
potential for synergistic mitigation and adaptation policy linkages 
in the agricultural and forest sectors, the translation of these poli-
cies through to implementation may well be challenging because of 
the different characteristics of mitigation and adaptation (e. g., the 
global public good nature of mitigation versus the local benefits from 
adaptation), because of the additional costs involved (e. g., involving 
higher capital costs or opportunity costs associated with synergistic 
options), because of institutional, technological or behavioural bar-
riers, and because different actors maybe involved in mitigation and 
adaptation decisions, including the need to address cross-sectoral 
aspects.
15.12 Investment and finance
15�12�1 National and sub-national institutions 
and policies
The justification for investment and finance and the description of 
the various financial agreements have been elaborated in Chapter 13. 
Chapter 16 assesses in more detail the range of institutional arrange-
ments for mitigation finance at the global, regional, national, and sub-
national levels. This section concentrates on institutional mechanisms 
which parties to the UNFCCC, developed and developing countries, 
have been using or introducing to facilitate, tap, channel, and catalyze 
climate change investment and finance. It also briefly touches on some 
of the major policy directions and trends affecting mitigation finance 
and investments. Earlier sections of this chapter presented the variety 
of policy instruments available and being used both in developed and 
developing countries. Public finance is needed for subsidies and public 
provision (Sections 15.5.2 and 15.5.6). In this section we track the con-
sequences with a view to the aggregate funding needed. 
Without dedicated financial policy, other policy instruments alone may 
be insufficient to mobilize the large-scale investments needed to move 
the world away from its current high-emission path. 
Recent case studies and some empirical evidence highlight the impor-
tance of targeted public finance to help catalyze and leverage private 
investment in some mitigation activities (CPI, 2012). For this purpose, 
governments have at their disposal a variety of mechanisms that 
include credit lines, bonds, guarantees, equity, venture capital, carbon 
finance, and grants (Maclean et al., 2008). These mechanisms exist and 
are effective mostly in developed and emerging economies (Kennedy 
and Corfee-Morlot, 2012).
In addition, a number of innovative mechanisms are being promoted 
in some developed countries with success. These include, ‘property 
assessed financing districts’ where residential and commercial prop-
erty owners are provided with loans for renewable energy and energy 
efficiency, ‘direct cash subsidies’ to promote the installation of energy 
efficiency measures and renewable energy systems, ‘power purchase 
agreements’, and ESCOs — Energy Service Companies to implement 
performance-based energy efficiency projects (Ellingson et al., 2010).
National development banks are increasingly playing a critical role in 
leveraging public and private resources in both developed and devel-
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oping countries. National development banks, which operate mainly 
domestically, have an advantage in accessing local financial markets 
and dealing with barriers that they understand better than others 
(Smallridge et al., 2013). 
International financing for mitigation and adaptation has impacted 
the domestic climate discourse and has created incentives for sus-
tainable development at national and local levels in developing 
countries (Metz and Kok, 2008). National and sub-national efforts 
to finance climate change often have an explicit link to international 
processes or support through the various mechanisms of the Con-
vention and Kyoto Protocol or those encouraged to facilitate fund-
ing for developing countries such as bilateral and multilateral chan-
nels. Some of these mechanisms have led to significant investment 
in developing countries. An estimated USD 215.4 billion had been 
invested in 4832 Clean Development Mechanism projects by June 
15, 2012 (UNFCCC, 2012). Similarly, the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) estimates that since the start of its operations (1991 – 2013), it 
has leveraged over USD 27 billion for climate change projects (GEF, 
2013).
A new trend is the establishment by several developing countries of 
funds and national funding entities dedicated to climate change. Table 
16.2 lists some of these institutions, their objectives, governance, and 
sources of funding. The missions and objectives are diverse and their 
level of institutionalization varies from country to country. All are 
designed to tap and blend funding available from international and 
domestic sources — public and private — to catalyze climate invest-
ment in their country (Flynn, 2011).
National funding entities have the potential to help countries cope 
with the proliferation of funds and entities offering financial resources 
for mitigation activities (Glemarec, 2011; Smith et al., 2011). Increased 
fragmentation of international assistance has increased transaction 
costs for recipients while the multiplicity and competitive nature of 
sources has challenged national and sub-national capacities (Knack 
and Rahman, 2007; Anderson, 2012). Limited absorptive and human 
capacity resources do however present serious challenges. Evidence of 
the ability of national funding entities to ensure coherence between 
national institutions dedicated to climate change and cabinet entities 
such as the Ministry of Finance or the Office of the President relies 
on case studies and, currently, does not yet offer general conclusions 
(Thornton, 2010).
15�12�2 Policy change direction for finance and 
investments in developing countries
There have been some significant trends in recent years regarding cli-
mate finance and the actors involved. Three are particularly relevant 
for their impact on the way climate finance is being managed and who 
does the management. 
First, financing climate objectives by mainstreaming climate change 
into development planning has been gaining ground. This is particu-
larly the case of countries wanting to integrate adaptation strategies 
into their overall national strategy as a way to build resilience. It is 
also evident in some of the climate change action plans and strate-
gies of some countries that are clearly linked to poverty reduction and 
national development objectives (Garibaldi et al., 2013). However, the 
benefits and costs of integrating climate change considerations into 
development planning may be difficult to attain in practice. The OECD 
(OECD, 2005) warns of ‘mainstreaming overload’ as climate change 
competes with other issues like governance and gender to be main-
streamed into development planning. Barriers to integrating climate 
and development objectives include: lack of human and institutional 
capacity and lack of coordination among line ministries (Knack and 
Rahman, 2007; Kok et al., 2008).
Second, is the growing recognition that financing climate actions 
can have large co-benefits. Investments in clean energy, for example, 
may result in improvement in health indicators as air pollution lev-
els decrease. Similarly, investing in forest conservation may result in 
a reduction of GHG emissions from deforestation. Thus, the increas-
ing interest in the concept of co-benefits or climate and development 
as ‘win-win’ outcomes. Reducing emissions has been seen as a by-
product of reducing energy costs in the case of China (Richerzhagen 
and Scholz, 2008). Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation is seen as another major opportunity to deliver both emis-
sions reductions and livelihood benefits. However, Campbell (2009) 
and Adams and Hulme (2001) argue that the ability to define these 
win-win objectives is a major factor for success.
Third, the number of actors involved in climate finance and investment 
is growing. Climate change finance is no longer a monopoly of the 
public sector. There is now a multiplicity of actors from the private and 
business world whose level of financing exceeds that of the public sec-
tor several fold, particularly in the middle-income and emerging econ-
omies (Gomez-Echeverri, 2013). This development has the potential 
to address implementation gaps, generate greater participation from 
stakeholders, and encourage public-private partnerships that promote 
sustainable development (Pattberg, 2010). 
Two areas of need emerge from the literature (Cameron, 2011; Zin-
gel, 2011). First, attracting climate finance investments will require 
strengthening institutional and governance capacities at the national 
and sub-national levels in recipient countries. Specifically, the ability to 
formulate strategies and action plans, including policies and measures, 
formulate, assess and approve projects, demonstrate accountability 
and transparency to their own populations, as well as to the develop-
ment partners to raise levels of investment confidence will be needed. 
Second, robust mechanisms are needed to ensure accountability. This 
would involve greater transparency in both donor and recipient coun-
tries. The role of civil society organizations and the media could be 
strengthened for good governance and accountability. 
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15.13 Gaps in  knowledge 
and data
•	 Cross-country comparisons of institutional design options, particu-
larly mechanisms for coordinating and mainstreaming climate and 
other related sector policies, are limited. Wider use of evaluation 
methods would allow for the understanding of relative effective-
ness of different options and designs to be used to improve out-
comes over time. 
•	 Evaluating the economic and environmental effectiveness of indi-
vidual policy instruments and packages is difficult as various juris-
dictions produce policy instruments influenced by context-specific 
factors such as co-benefits and political economy considerations. 
As a result, the cost of committing to a target and the actions 
needed to meet it, are difficult to estimate. For example, fuel taxes 
in the transport sector are implemented for multiple purposes 
including energy security, congestion and pollution reduction, rev-
enue for road construction, mitigation of climate change, and so 
forth. It is difficult to gauge the contribution of fuel taxes to miti-
gation efforts.
•	 While the distributional incidence of taxes has been studied 
quite extensively, much less is known about the distributional 
incidence of other policy instruments and packages. Similarly, 
knowledge gaps remain uneven across policy instruments on 
other criteria such as institutional, political, and administrative 
feasibility.
•	 The asymmetry of methodologies regarding ‘negative cost’ policies 
regarding regulation and information measures with case studies 
arguing for negative private and social cost polices while critiques 
basing results on economic theory and models has meant that con-
clusive results are not yet available.
•	 Understanding of the relative balance between demand pull and 
supply push policies needed to accelerate technological innova-
tion remains an important gap. Data on global private invest-
ment in research and development is a major gap along in addi-
tion to public R&D figures in middle income and low-income 
countries. 
•	 The valuation of co-benefits from emission reduction has been 
studied comprehensively in the United States (Muller et al., 2011), 
but much less is known about other countries. This is important 
because taking these co-benefits into account could significantly 
lower the cost of emission reduction, and perhaps offer negative 
costs, in several sectors.
15.14 Frequently Asked 
Questions 
FAQ 15�1 What kind of evidence and analysis will 
help us design effective policies?
Economic theory can help with policy design at a conceptual level, 
while modelling can provide an ex-ante assessment of the potential 
impact of alternative mitigation policies. However, as theory and mod-
elling tend to be based on sets of simple assumptions, it is desirable 
that they are complemented by ex-post policy evaluations whenever 
feasible. For example, theory and bottom up modelling suggest that 
some energy efficiency policies can deliver CO2 emission reductions 
at negative cost, but we need ex-post policy evaluation to establish 
whether they really do and whether the measures are as effective as 
predicted by ex-ante assessments (Section 15.4). 
As climate policies are implemented, they can generate an empirical 
evidence base that allows policy evaluation to take place. If evaluation 
is built into the design of a programme or policy from its inception, the 
degree of success and scope for improvement can be identified. Poli-
cies implemented at the sub-national levels provide sites for experi-
mentation on climate policies. Lessons from these efforts can used to 
accelerate policy learning. 
Much of the evidence base consists of case studies. While this method is 
useful to gain context-specific insights into the effectiveness of climate 
policies, statistical studies based on large sample sizes allow analysts 
to control for various factors and yield generalizable results. However, 
quantitative methods do not capture institutional, political, and admin-
istrative factors and need to be complemented by qualitative studies. 
FAQ 15�2 What is the best climate change mitiga-
tion policy?
A range of policy instruments is available to mitigate climate change 
including carbon taxes, emissions trading, regulation, information mea-
sures, government provision of goods and services, and voluntary agree-
ments (Section 15.3). Appropriate criteria for assessing these instruments 
include: economic efficiency, cost effectiveness, distributional impact, 
and institutional, political, and administrative feasibility (Section 15.5).
Policy design depends on policy practices, institutional capacity 
and other national circumstances. As a result, there is no single best 
policy instrument and no single portfolio of instruments that is best 
across many nations. The notion of ‘best’ depends on which assess-
ment criteria we employ when comparing policy instruments and the 
relative weights attached to individual criteria. The literature provides 
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more evidence about some types of policies, and how well they score 
against the various criteria, than others. For example, the distributional 
impacts of a tax are relatively well known compared to the distribu-
tional impacts of regulation. Further research and policy evaluation is 
required to improve the evidence base in this respect (Section 15.12).
Different types of policy have been adopted in varying degrees in 
actual plans, strategies, and legislation. While economic theory pro-
vides a strong basis for assessing economy-wide economic instru-
ments, much mitigation action is being pursued at the sectoral level 
(Chapters 7 – 12). Sectoral policy packages often reflect co-benefits and 
wider political considerations. For example, fuel taxes are among a 
range of sectoral measures that can have a substantial effect on emis-
sions even though they are often implemented for other objectives. 
Interactions between different policies need to be considered. The 
absence of policy coordination can affect environmental and economic 
outcomes. When policies address distinct market failures such as the 
externalities associated with greenhouse gas emissions or the under-
supply of innovation, the use of multiple policy instruments has con-
siderable potential to reduce costs. In contrast, when multiple instru-
ments such a carbon tax and a performance standard are employed to 
address the same objective, policies can become redundant and under-
mine overall cost effectiveness (Section 15.8.4.2). 
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